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Abstract
This thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter previews the analysis of
the following three chapters. In the second chapter, my co-author and I provide new
empirical evidence that the distribution of liquidity has a strong in-sample and out-
of-sample predictive power on intraday market volatility. To this end, we introduce
a novel way of summarizing the relative depth provision in the whole limit order
book. Our measure, global depth, considers the entire quoted depth and assigns
weights decreasing with distance from the best quotes. We document that global
depth outperforms alternative predictors of volatility, such as the bid-ask spread,
standard depth variables, and measures of trading activity, in explaining the variations
in market volatility.
The third chapter, forthcoming in the Journal of Banking and Finance, inves-
tigates the effects of competition and signaling in a pure order driven market and
examines the trading patterns of agents when walking through the book is not al-
lowed. My co-author and I show that the variables capturing the cost of a large
market order are not informative for an impatient trader under this market mecha-
nism. We also document that the competition effect is not present only at the top of
the book but persistent beyond the best quotes. Moreover, we show that institutional
investors’ order submission strategies are characterized by only a few pieces of the
limit order book information.
The fourth chapter analyses the relationship between the firms’ disclosure deci-
sions and the market expected value of default probabilities. I use option prices to
estimate the option implied probability of default, whereas the level of disclosure is
measured by a self-constructed voluntary disclosure index for the largest 85 U.S. bank
holding companies. I provide evidence that the enhanced disclosure is followed by
reduced market implied default probabilities in the subsequent year. This evidence
suggests that by mitigating the information asymmetries between the bank manage-
ment and their depositors and regulators, disclosure affects investors’ assessments of
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1.1 Informational Content of a Limit Order Book
The following two chapters of this thesis focus on the effects of the information
content of a limit order book in a pure order driven market using high frequency data.
In the first part, “Global Depth and Future Volatility”, we propose a new way of sum-
marizing the liquidity distribution in a limit order book and further examine the
predictive power of this distribution over future volatility. On the other hand, “Com-
petition, Signaling and Non-walking Through the Book: Effects on Order Choice“,
investigates how the state of a limit order book affects investors’ order submission
strategies.
As of today, most of the equity and derivatives exchanges around the world are
either pure order driven or at least allowing limit orders in addition to the on-floor
market making. The role of limit orders in trading processes expanded progressively
over the last decade. This shift in trading is followed by a tremendously increasing
academic literature.
The state of the order book, as being the collection of all outstanding limit or-
ders, shows the actual demand and supply for the underlying stock, it contains non-
negligible information about the short-term price formation process, since the latter
is a result of the state of the limit order book and the order flow. Moreover, under-
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standing the dynamics of limit orders is crucial to understand their contribution to
the liquidity. Besides academic purposes, studying the order book is interesting for
practical purposes as well. Regulatory bodies want to set the rules of exchanges to
produce fair trading that maximizes the flow. For market participants on the other
hand, the choice of market or limit orders, or order aggressiveness in general, depends
on the structure and dynamics of the limit order book since that affects the execution
costs.
Even though that beneficial, construction of a limit order book is not an easy
task and the limit order book data availability is restricted. Using the order flow
and trade data provided by the Istanbul Stock Exchange, we reconstruct the limit
order book dynamically and obtain useful variables to use in further financial analysis.
Some stock exchanges or information companies supply five or ten best prices for the
bid and ask side and corresponding volumes. However, by creating the whole data
book, we will not be limited to the available periodicals and we can reach a very
high frequency trading information. Both chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis use the
reconstructed limit order book, order flow, and trade data from the Istanbul Stock
Exchange for the period of June and July 2008. Our data consists of the biggest 30
stocks listed on the exchange, which corresponds to 75% of the total trading volume
of the Istanbul Stock Exchange for the period under consideration.
Chapter 3 contributes to the vast literature that investigates the effects of a state
of a limit order book and the characteristics of an asset, such as volatility, on order
choice. First, we examine the trading patterns of agents given a specific market
rule: non-walking through the book. In the Istanbul Stock Exchange, similar to the
Australian Stock Exchange, the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa), and the Stock
Exchange of Hong Kong, for example, walking through the book is not allowed. In
this case, the unexecuted portion of a “large” market order is converted to a limit order
rather than walk up or down the book to fully executed. This market mechanism
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affects the order choice of a trader since, in this case, the cost of a large market order
is lower.
Second, the chapter tests whether competition or signaling effects, two theories
that have been proposed in the existing literature by Parlour (1998) and Goettler,
Parlour and Rajan (2005), Goettler, Parlour and Rajan (2009) respectively, dominate
each other for depth beyond the best quotes. The signaling effect is based on an
early dynamic equilibrium model of Parlour (1998). She analyses the effects of the
depth of a limit order book and concludes that an increase in the same–side thickness
of the limit order book crowds out the limit orders on that side due to increased
competition. On the other hand, we borrow the term “signaling effect” from two
recent theory papers of Goettler et al. (2005) and Goettler et al. (2009); the volume
of orders accumulated away from the best quotes signals the mispricing in the market.
By employing a two-stage sequential ordered probit model, we show that none of
the price information, either spread or price distance variables, matter for a market
order trader in her order choice. We believe this is specific to markets in which
walking through the book is not allowed. Also, we show that the competition effect
is persistent beyond the best quotes and dominates the signaling effect at every level,
being strongest for the volume of orders waiting at the second best quotes. Finally, we
focus on the trading patterns of institutional vs. individual investors. We conclude
that institutional investors consider only the level of competition while deciding to
submit a market or a limit order, and none of the other state variables affect the
order choice of institutions. This may suggest that institutional traders place their
orders based on their own private valuations rather than the information provided by
the limit order book.
In summary, “Competition, Signaling and Non-walking Through the Book: Effects
on Order Choice“ concludes that a state of a limit order book provides essential in-
formation for a trader who wants to design an appropriate order submission strategy.
18
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Moreover, existing theoretical microstructure literature illustrates that limit orders
are information driven. In other words, informed traders may exploit their informa-
tional advantage by submitting limit orders (e.g. Foucault (1999), Foucault, Kadan
and Kandel (2005), and Rosu (2012)). Chapter 2 of the thesis, “Global Depth and
Future Volatility” builds upon these ideas. We specifically ask whether the orders
waiting in a limit order book at a given time has any explanatory power over future
volatility.
Volatility and liquidity are of particular interest in a wide spectrum of theories
and applications in finance, for example option pricing or portfolio valuation. In
microstructure content, volatility is important because the execution probability of
limit order increases with volatility. Putting differently, the probability of the current
price hits the pre-determined limit price increases when volatility is higher.
In order to measure how liquidity is distributed in a given limit order book, we
develop a new measure, global depth. It has two ingredients: it aggregates the relative
quoted depth provided by different price levels and it assigns weights decreasing with
distance from the best bid or ask price. The economic link between the global depth
and volatility follows from two recent theory papers of Goettler et al. (2005) and
Goettler et al. (2009): when volume of orders are accumulated away from the best
quotes increases, this signals to the market that the current quotes are mispriced. In
this case, we argue that price jumps are more likely, which will in the end translate
into higher price volatility.
We perform both in-sample and out-of-sample tests. In order to test the in-sample
explanatory power of global depth on future market volatility, we employ a standard
OLS regression model. The dependent variable is the mid-quote volatility of the
ISE-30 index calculated by employing two-scales realized volatility (TSRV) estimator
proposed by Ait-Sahalia, Mykland and Zhang (2011). The main explanatory vari-
ables are the aggregated global depth for buy and sell sides of the market, which
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are calculated as the cross-sectional averages of individual stocks’ global depths. We
document that global depth significantly and negatively predicts the intraday market
volatility up to 150 minutes ahead. Moreover, global depth outperforms alternative
predictors of volatility, such as the bid–ask spread, standard depth variables, and
measures of trading activity, in explaining the variations in market volatility. Simi-
larly, the out-of-sample tests reveal formal evidence for substantial forecasting power
of global depth. It predicts one-period-ahead market volatility with an out-of-sample
R2 of over 14%, where the forecasting power lasts up to 75 minutes ahead.
1.2 Disclosure and Implied Probability of Default
Chapter 4 asks whether the level of disclosure chosen by the management affects
the market assessment of the riskiness of a bank. Several commentators have pointed
to the inadequacy of transparency of the financial institutions before the 2008 cri-
sis and argued that the investors’ limited information of the risks held by financial
intermediaries amplified the crises. It is because in bad times, there is a flight to
quality. Possible sudden and large amounts of selling pressure on “bad” may lead to
withdrawals of liquidity, or even the breakdown of trading. In turn, the question of
whether the severity of crises would be smaller if market participants have access to
better information and sufficiently punish the banks which took excessive risks is not
solely an academic interest.
Chapter 4 of this thesis, “Disclosure Practices and Option Implied Probability of
Default” provides a disclosure template as a simple way of summarizing and assessing
the extent of disclosure by financial institutions. The template is based on a scoring
system constructed on the summary measures proposed by the December 2009 and
2011 Financial Stability Reports of the Bank of England. By using a sample of the
largest publicly listed 85 U.S. bank holding companies for the period 1998–2011, I
document a significant and negative relationship between the level of disclosure and
20
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various bank enterprise risks, with a focus on the market implied default risk, where
the latter is estimated from the option prices based on the methodology proposed by
Capuano (2008).
Economic theory suggests that rational investors interpret any piece of withheld
information that can be credibly disclosed as conveying bad news (see for instance
Grossman and Miller (1980), Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981), and Verrecchia
(2001)). The idea is based on the Akerlof (1970)’s asymmetric information argu-
ment, and that firms’ disclosure can be effective in reducing information asymmetries
between the managers, investors, and supervisory authorities.
This chapter makes two important contributions. First, to the best of my knowl-
edge, it is the first study in the literature that formally investigates the relationship
between the level of disclosure and market assessment of the default probability of
an institution. Second, I propose a template to measure the level of voluntary disclo-
sure, which is constructed by using publicly available 10–K and annual reports data.
In contrast to the self-constructed disclosure indices proposed in the literature (e.g.,
Botosan (1997), Baumann and Nier (2003), and Francis, Nanda and Olsson (2008)),
our disclosure index mainly focuses on the disclosure of the riskiness, rather than
the profitability of an institution. Moreover, it considers the recent risk factors that
threaten the financial system, like liquidity or spillover risk rather than the credit
risk, which turn to be compulsory due to current Basel regulations. Finally, despite
its data limitations, our validating experiments suggest its adequacy on measuring
the level of management’s decision of disclosure.
I first employ a panel regression model with year and bank fixed effects and test the
statistical relationship between the level of disclosure and the market implied default
probability of a given bank holding company. The results confirm a negative and
economically significant relationship; one standard deviation increase in the current
level of disclosure is associated with a 19% and 27% decrease in the next year’s
21
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and three months’ probability of default, respectively. The results are robust to the
inclusion of various bank characteristics, such as size, beta, capital buffers, or non-
performing loans.
Next, I examine whether enhanced disclosure is associated with other enterprise
risks. I consider four other risks: aggregate risk, measured by the stock return volatil-
ity, downside risk, proxied by the implied volatility estimated from the option prices,
the systematic and the idiosyncratic risk of a bank holding company estimated from
the CAPM model. I conclude that banks with higher level of disclosure this year
benefit from lower enterprise risk in the following period. Finally, in a cross-sectional
setting, I examine the determinants of disclosure. I find that bigger banks, banks that




Global Depth and Future Volatility
Co-authored with Marcela Valenzuela (London School of Economics)
2.1 Introduction
This paper examines the link between two central concepts in financial markets:
liquidity and volatility. Liquidity is essential for well-functioning financial markets.
It is generally ample but occasionally evaporates very rapidly, signaling the start of
a crisis. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the effects of liquidity provision on
market dynamics. This has gained an increased attention from regulators, market
participants, and academics alike. Nevertheless, we are still in the early stages of
accurately defining and measuring liquidity, due to its unobservable and multidimen-
sional nature. On the other hand, information on future volatility is one of the main
ingredients in assessing risk-return trade-off for portfolio valuation, derivatives pric-
ing models, and it affects the execution probability of a limit order. In this paper,
we propose a novel way of summarizing the distribution of liquidity in a limit order
book and examine whether liquidity dry-ups in equity markets anticipate spikes in
volatility.
Our focus is to evaluate the role of the relative depth provision in future market
volatility. Predicting market volatility, rather than an individual stock volatility, is
important because it approximates the aggregate uncertainty. It is an indicator for
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policy makers of the vulnerability of financial markets, as changes in market volatility
have systemic repercussions on the whole economy (see Schwert (1989) and Poon and
Granger (2003) for further discussions). An individual stock volatility, on the other
hand, may increase due to stock-specific news or announcements, and not necessarily
due to systemic events, such as a sudden withdrawal of liquidity. We examine the
volatility–liquidity relationship at an intraday level. Trading in financial markets
nowadays mostly takes the form of electronic markets, where trading occurs fast.
Hence, during stressed market conditions, liquidity may disappear very quickly. For
example, the withdrawal of the high-frequency liquidity providers has contributed
to the volatility present within the flash crash of 2010 within minutes. This makes
it desirable to study the market dynamics at an intraday level. Nevertheless, little
research has been undertaken to study the predictive power of market liquidity on
market volatility at an intraday frequency.1
The high-frequency relationship between liquidity and subsequent volatility has
important implications on traders’ order choice strategies. There is extensive evi-
dence, both theoretically and empirically that investors submit limit orders in high
volatility states (see Foucault (1999) and Ranaldo (2004) for instance). When volatil-
ity is high, the risk of being picked off by an informed agent increases, inducing in-
vestors to submit less aggressive orders. Another explanation is given by the option-
like feature of limit orders. Placing a buy (sell) limit order is equivalent to writing
a free put (call) option to the market (Handa and Schwartz (1996)). The higher the
volatility, the higher the option value of the limit order, as in this case the proba-
bility that the spot price hits the limit price increases. Hence, this paper presents
a statistical model to predict volatility using available limit order book information,
which can be employed by market participants to submit less aggressive orders when
1Relevant exceptions are Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001) and Pastor and Stambaugh
(2003). However, both studies focus on a contemporaneous relationship at a daily frequency.
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volatility is expected to be high.
We provide new empirical evidence that the distribution of orders waiting to be
traded strongly predicts market volatility. We measure the liquidity distribution by
developing a short-run market measure, global depth. A stock’s global depth is a
weighted average of the volume of orders waiting at the entire limit order book, with
weights decreasing with distance from the best bid/ask price. The aggregate level
is the average of global depth of individual stocks. One natural motivation behind
the weighting scheme comes from the execution probabilities. Limit orders submitted
farther away from the best quotes have lower execution probabilities compared to the
ones submitted closer to the best quotes. Hence, a trader gives higher weights to the
information around the best quotes compared to the rest of the book.
There are several practical routes that one could take to construct a liquidity
measure. With our approach, we aim to fill a gap that is left by the existing literature.
Many studies focus on the volume of orders at the highest bid and the lowest ask
prices (depth at the best quotes). Some others include the volume of orders waiting
beyond the best quotes up to a specific price level. The main conclusion we extract
from these studies is that, although both matter, depth at the best quotes is more
informative.2 Hence, a relevant proxy to capture the available liquidity needs two
ingredients: it should consider the whole book and weigh the information in the book
based on price distances.3 In order to construct our measure, global depth, we first
sample the limit order book in discrete trading intervals. Second, we consider the
(tick-adjusted) price distance of each order relative to the best limit price. Then,
by calculating the percentage of total volume supplied or demanded up to a given
price distance, we obtain the empirical cumulative distribution function of the limit
2See Parlour (1998), Ahn, Bae and Chan (2001), Handa, Schwartz and Tiwari (2003), Ranaldo
(2004), Bloomfield, O’Hara and Saar (2005), Foucault et al. (2005), Ellul, Holden, Jain and Jennings
(2007), Cao, Hansch and Wang (2008), Cao, Hansch and Wang (2009), Pascual and Veredas (2009),
Goettler et al. (2009) and Valenzuela and Zer (2013), among others.
3Price distance refers to the position of a given bid (ask) with respect to the best bid (ask) price.
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order book. Finally, a stock’s global depth is the weighted average of the distribution
function, where weights are decreasing with price distances.
Compared to standard liquidity measures like spread, depth, and ratios based on
both spread and depth, global depth provides a more complete picture of the liquidity
provision by considering the whole book. Instead of focusing on the size of the orders
waiting, our measure is based on the distribution of volume at a given time. That
is, it measures the relative concentration of depth provision at each quote, which
reveals information of the disagreement on the true price. As models of Goettler
et al. (2005) and Goettler et al. (2009) predict, if orders waiting in a given book are
accumulated at a quote farther away from the best prices, then this signals to the
market that current quotes are mispriced. In this case, jumps are plausible, creating
higher future volatility. On the other hand, higher liquidity provision around the best
quotes relative to the rest of the book is associated with a consensus on the current
price; therefore, we expect lower future volatility.
While conceptually this study could be conducted in any limit order market,
there are certain market characteristics that are of particular benefit to address the
liquidity–volatility relationship. It is definitely helpful if the data contains the entire
order book. This is not the case for most data from the European and the US markets
because of the multiple trading platforms and hybrid market structures. That makes
the information flow fragmented. Furthermore, it is important for our analysis that
the market provides high pre-trade transparency, i.e., the market participants can
observe the whole book rather than being limited to the best five or ten quotes.
One exchange that meets these criteria and is relatively large is the Istanbul Stock
Exchange (ISE).4 The order and trade books from ISE form the dataset that we use
in this study. By matching these two books and removing the executed orders, we
4As of December 2011, ISE is the 20th (8th) biggest stock exchange in the world (Europe–Africa–
Middle East region) in terms of value of share trading in electronic order book trades with a trading
value of $405,136 million. See, the World Federation of Exchanges for details.
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reconstruct the limit order book. That is, for a given time we have the best bid and
ask prices, all of the orders waiting to be executed, their submitted prices and their
corresponding volumes.
Our empirical results contribute to our understanding of the relationship between
liquidity and future volatility of the efficient price. It is challenging to estimate
intraday volatility of the true price because of the microstructure noise arising from
several sources inherent in the trading process or high-frequency data, such as the
informational effects, bid–ask bounces, or data recording errors. Ait-Sahalia et al.
(2011) address this specific problem and provide the volatility proxy that we use in
our study.
We provide new empirical evidence on both in-sample and out-of-sample informa-
tiveness of the liquidity distribution on market volatility of the efficient price at an
intraday level. We show that global depth is both economically and statistically the
strongest among standard liquidity and trading activity measures, on explaining the
variations in market volatility. Out-of-sample forecasting tests provide formal evi-
dence for substantial forecasting power of global depth. It predicts one-period-ahead
market volatility with an out-of-sample R2 of over 14%, where the forecasting power
lasts up to 75 minutes ahead. Finally, we show that the time-series relation between
global depth and market volatility is not driven by variations in a particular stock
or industry, but rather that the relation is shared by the majority of the stocks. We
find a negative and significant relationship between the individual stock level global
depth and future volatility for 83% of the stocks in our sample.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section frames our work
within the context of the existing literature. Section 2.3 describes data and the
trading structure in our market. Section 2.4 explains the estimation of our measure
in detail. Section 2.5 introduces the econometric methodology and variables included
in the analysis. Estimation results, the out-of-sample forecasting evaluations, and
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robustness checks are presented in Section 2.6. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
This paper relates to recent literature that attempts to measure the liquidity
provision considering the whole book. Domowitz, Hansch and Wang (2005) propose
an illiquidity measure based on the supply and demand step functions for a given
security. By using data from the Australian Stock Exchange, they conclude that not
only the liquidity risk, but also the liquidity commonality, is priced in stock returns.
In another related study, Naes and Skjeltorp (2006) examine the informativeness of
the order book from the Oslo Stock Exchange. They introduce a new variable–the
slope of the book–that describes the average elasticity across all price levels with the
corresponding volumes, and show that it is negatively related to both trading volume
and price volatility. Our contribution to this literature is twofold: first, we propose a
new way of summarizing the state of the whole book, which considers the distribution
of depth at different price levels. In addition, our proposed measure, global depth,
weighs information provided by different quotes by assigning the highest weights to
the best quotes and lower weights for the quotes that are farther away from the
best prices. Second, by including several liquidity measures in our analysis, we run a
horserace among them and evaluate their performances in explaining future volatility.
Our work also builds on the literature illustrating that limit orders are information
driven. Foucault et al. (2005), Kaniel and Liu (2006), Rindi (2008), Goettler et al.
(2009), and Rosu (2012) provide theoretical background explaining that informed
traders may reveal their private information via limit order submissions. Foucault
et al. (2005) show that if spread increases over a cutoff level, all traders submit limit
orders. In the setting of Goettler et al. (2009), although informed traders are liquidity
providers, they switch to market orders in order to benefit from the mispricing in high
volatility states. In Rosu (2012)’s model, informed traders can submit limit or market
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orders based on how far the fundamental value is from the publicly available price.
Kaniel and Liu (2006) show that informed traders are more likely to submit limit
orders than market orders if the information is long lived. In the model of Rindi
(2008), liquidity suppliers can be either uninformed or informed. She shows that the
disclosure of traders’ identity decreases the adverse selection, motivating informed
traders to provide more liquidity. Bloomfield et al. (2005), Anand, Chakravarty and
Martell (2005), and Menkhoff, Osler and Schmeling (2010) complement this literature
by providing empirical evidence that informed traders submit limit orders. In this
paper, we document evidence from an emerging country stock exchange that the
limit order book contains information shaping agents’ trading decisions. We show
that several summary measures extracted from the limit order book have explanatory
power on future volatility.
Finally, our paper is closely related to the literature that examines the predictive
power of liquidity on volatility. In an early empirical work, Ahn et al. (2001) analyze
the interactions between transitory volatility and order flow composition by using data
from the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. They show that an increase in transitory
volatility is followed by an increase in the market depth, where the latter is measured
by the total number of limit orders posted at the best quotes. Moreover, they show
that although the depth at the best quotes explains future individual volatility, the
depth beyond the best quotes does not have any explanatory power. Hence, they
conclude that the transitory volatility arises mainly from the scarcity of limit orders
at the best quotes. By employing cointegration analysis for the bid and ask quotes,
Pascual and Veredas (2010) separate transitory volatility from informational volatil-
ity (volatility arising by the actions of informed agents) and show that trade size and
quoted depth both at the best and away from the quotes have predictive power on
individual volatility. Duong and Kalev (2008) investigate the forecasting power of the
Naes and Skjeltorp (2006)’s definition of order book slope. They document a negative
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relation between future volatility and order book slope. Finally, by using data from
the automated futures market, Coppejans, Domowitz and Madhavan (2001) study
the dynamic relation between liquidity, return and volatility in a vector autoregres-
sive framework. Consistent with the aforementioned studies, they find a negative
relationship between liquidity and future volatility. We contribute to this literature
in two ways: first, we extract a new measure from the limit order book, and second,
we study the relationship between market liquidity and future market volatility.
2.3 The Market and Data
Our dataset comprises order and trade books of the individual constituents of the
Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE)–30 index for the period of June and July 2008.5 The
index corresponds to almost 75% of the total trading volume of the ISE for the sample
period.
The ISE is a fully computerized as well as a fully centralized stock exchange, i.e.,
the trading of the listed stocks has to be executed in the ISE via electronic order
submissions. Hence, our data fully captures the order flow. The information of a new
order arrival or execution is updated instantaneously on traders’ screens. All brokers
are directly connected to the ISE system and have access to the full book. Prior to
the submission of an order, they can see the quantity available at different prices, not
limited to the best five or ten quotes.
The trading occurs between 09:30am to 5:00pm, with a lunch break. There are
two opening call auctions: one for the morning session and one for the afternoon
session. In contrast to the opening sessions, during the continuous double auction
all of the orders submitted are either matched instantaneously, or booked until the
corresponding match order arrives to the system based on the usual price and time
5We sincerely thank Recep Bildik, Ozkan Cevik, Ulkem Basdas, and Huseyin Eskici from Istanbul




All of the orders include the price and the quantity. Trade occurs if a matching
order is submitted on the opposite side of the book. If an order is not fully executed,
then the excess is converted into a limit order at the corresponding price instead of
walking through the book.6 Moreover, there are no hidden orders; the price and the
quantity of all orders are fully displayed.
Order book data consists of information regarding the orders submitted for a given
stock and date, whereas trade data records the executed orders. The order and trade
ID numbers generated by the exchange system allow us to match orders in these two
books and track any order through submission to (possible) execution or modification.
Samples of the order and transaction data sets are presented in Tables A.1 and A.2 in
Appendix A. By using the order and trade books, we first reconstruct the limit order
book dynamically for each stock and obtain relevant information, such as the bid
and ask prices and corresponding volumes at a given time. Hence, the reconstruction
methodology enables us to obtain snapshots of a limit order book at any given time.
In particular, we have the same information that a trader observes: the volume of
orders waiting to be executed for the entire price range. We use this information to
calculate the relative frequency of orders waiting in every price level. Sample of a
constructed limit order book data is presented in Appendix A, Table A.3. To conserve
space, only the information up to the 10 best prices is presented.
Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics for 30 stocks in our sample. We report
the time-series averages of all the figures, except the market capitalization, for which
the value at the beginning of the sample is presented.
The results reveal that one of the biggest stocks in our sample, GARAN, is 40 times
more actively traded than the smallest stock, MIGRS. On average, the maximum
6This is similar to the Australian Stock Exchange, the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa), and
the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, for example.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for Each Stock
The table reports the summary statistics of ISE–30 stocks for June-July 2008. The first column
presents the ticker of the securities in our sample. The market capitalization is the value at beginning
of the sample period in million Turkish Liras (M TRY). Number of Orders (Trades) is the average
of the total number of orders (trades) in a day. Ave. Trade Size is the daily average size of trades
in number of shares. Spread is the tick-adjusted difference between the best ask and the best bid.
Finally the last two columns report the average of the daily percentage of buy orders and limit
orders, respectively.
Mcap Number of Number of Ave. spread %Buy %LO
Orders Trades Trade (tick adj.)
Size
AKBNK 16650 2,609 1,643 5,376 1.04 46.79 68.56
AKGRT 1463 1,044 714 2,007 1.15 52.13 62.16
ARCLK 1664 1,003 576 1,234 1.25 45.50 71.04
ASYAB 1980 1,392 954 2,168 1.14 49.20 62.10
DOHOL 2160 2,438 1,546 7,676 1.06 44.11 68.74
DYHOL 1082 2,991 1,949 4,706 1.06 48.77 65.93
EREGL 9995 2,286 1,455 1,495 1.08 48.71 67.76
GARAN 14448 9,259 6,186 13,015 1.02 47.46 69.78
GSDHO 277 2,074 1,400 7,336 1.05 47.48 64.22
HALKB 7750 1,656 972 2,506 1.10 46.46 71.57
HURGZ 745 2,281 1,455 5,695 1.10 47.05 67.16
IHLAS 202 1,975 942 7,596 1.01 47.64 70.75
ISCTR 13165 7,332 4,732 6,777 1.03 49.48 69.81
ISGYO 459 700 367 3,448 1.11 44.94 71.81
KCHOL 7629 1,399 855 4,542 1.11 45.17 68.76
KRDMD 670 2,016 1,150 8,376 1.05 45.80 70.28
MIGRS 3614 346 152 3,040 1.03 38.90 70.28
PETKM 1024 1,156 688 1,537 1.14 46.81 70.54
PTOFS 2778 507 295 1,541 1.38 45.80 69.47
SAHOL 8676 1,103 713 3,076 1.15 48.54 66.25
SISE 1439 1,572 975 3,189 1.08 51.39 67.02
SKBNK 876 1,872 1,216 2,579 1.15 44.15 64.36
TCELL 17050 1,847 1,095 4,569 1.10 46.47 71.25
THYAO 919 1,252 787 2,040 1.10 50.52 68.10
TKFNK 2166 1,172 747 1,227 1.13 48.63 64.70
TSKB 490 707 448 3,840 1.06 48.98 63.23
TTKOM 14350 4,447 2,343 3,527 1.05 39.22 73.20
TUPRS 7387 1,413 761 1,036 1.07 48.45 73.68
VAKBN 4400 4,813 3,169 9,533 1.04 47.42 68.53
YKBNK 9999 2,939 1,911 7,562 1.04 48.33 67.08
Average 5184 2253 1406 4408 1.10 47.01 68.27
Median 2163 1752 973 3487 1.08 47.44 68.65
Min 202 346 152 1036 1.01 38.90 62.10
Max 17050 9259 6186 13015 1.38 52.13 73.68
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trade size is over 13,000 units, with a median of 3,500 units. In terms of the number
of orders submitted, GARAN is 5 times larger than the median, whereas MIGRS is
5 times smaller. The bid-ask spread is presented in column V. The results show that
the inside spread of the ISE–30 constituents is narrow, with a tick-adjusted maximum
of 1.38. Finally, about 68% of the submitted orders are limit orders and on average,
the number of buy and sell orders are almost balanced.
2.4 Global Depth and the Limit Order Book Distri-
bution
To evaluate the role of liquidity on future volatility, we first need a measure that
summarizes the state of a given limit order book. We want our measure to capture the
relative depth provision in the whole book to account for the liquidity supply beyond
the inside quotes. Intuitively, one needs to consider the whole book, not only the
information contained in the best quotes, because both price impact and execution
probability of an order could depend on the depth beyond the best quotes.7
Latza and Payne (2013) investigate the forecasting power of market and limit order
flows on high-frequency stock returns on a sample of traded stocks from the London
Stock Exchange SETS system. They define the limit order flow as the difference
between the weighted sums of the buy and sell limit order shares. The declining
weights associated with each limit order capture the price positioning, hence the
aggressiveness of a new limit order entry. Moreover, the extant literature documents
that the information provided farther away from the best quotes is less informative
compared to that from quotes closer to the best prices. One possible reason is that
the execution probability of an order is a decreasing function of the price distance.
Hence, while considering the execution probability–price trade-off, it is natural
for a trader to give higher importance to the information around the best quotes.
7For example, the execution probability of a limit order submitted, say at the second best quotes,
depends on the accumulated volume of orders waiting at the best and the second best quotes.
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These arguments bring the second ingredient of our measure: assigning weights to
the information provided in different quotes based on price distances.
To construct our summary measure, global depth, we first consider the distribution
of orders within different tick sizes along with their quoted volumes and calculate the
limit order book probability density function (LOB–PDF). Second, we obtain the
limit order book cumulative distribution function (LOB–CDF) by integrating the
LOB–PDF over the different ranges of price distances. A stock’s global depth is the
weighted average of the cumulative distribution function of the limit order book.8
Finally, the aggregate level of depth is approximated as the cross-sectional average of
global depth measures of individual stocks.
2.4.1 Construction of global depth
We obtain the limit order book distribution and global depth by employing the
following steps:9
1. For each security and each day, we sample the limit order books every 15 min-
utes, excluding the lunch break and the opening sessions.10 The first snapshot
of the book contains the unexecuted orders submitted until 10:00am, whereas
the last one contains all of the unexecuted orders submitted until 17:00pm.
Hereafter, the time subscript τ indexes these trading intervals.
2. We calculate the (tick-adjusted) price distance of each limit order relative to
the best extant limit price at the end of each snapshot. In other words, for each
8One could easily find good arguments in favor of constructing global depth from the probability
distribution function (LOB–PDF) instead of the the LOB–CDF. We repeat the analysis by using the
LOB–PDF and obtain qualitatively similar but less strong results. Hence, the rest of our analysis
depends on the measure calculated from the LOB–CDF.
9Appendix A, Section A.2, illustrates the steps with an example.




order i in the limit order book at τ , we define the price distance ∆ as:
∆buyi,τ = (p
B
τ − pbuyi )/tick,
∆selli,τ = (p
sell
i − pAτ )/tick,
where pBτ (pAτ ) is the best bid (ask) price in interval τ and p
buy
i (pselli ) is the limit
price of the ith order.
3. For each side of the book, day, and snapshot, we get the LOB–PDF by cal-
culating the percentage of total volume supplied/demanded at a given ∆ for
∆ = 0, 1, 2, ..,∆c.11 Therefore, LOB–PDF summarizes both the relative magni-
tude of the depth provision and its price location.
4. By integrating the LOB–PDF of the buy (sell) side over the ranges of ∆, i.e.,
by calculating the cumulative frequencies, we obtain the LOB–CDF of the buy
side (sell).
5. We define a stock’s global depth as the weighted average of the LOB–CDF.




F buys,τ (∆)g(λ,∆), (2.1)






for a constant decay parameter λ. A stock’s global depth of the sell side is
constructed analogously. Throughout the paper, we assume the following expo-
11To capture the whole book without missing any orders submitted farther away from the best
quotes, we set ∆c = 30.
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6. g(λ,∆) is a non-linear function of the decay parameter λ, which can be exoge-
nously given or estimated within a regression model. We obtain the “optimal”
decay parameter by employing a non-linear panel regression of the form:
σs,τ+1 = b0 + b1σs,τ + b2
∆c∑
∆=0
F buys,τ (∆)g(λ,∆) + b3
∆c∑
∆=0







csDs + εs,τ ,
where, for a given stock s in a trading interval τ , σs,τ is the mid-quote volatility,
F buys,τ (F sells,τ ) is the cumulative limit order book distribution function for the buy
(sell) side of the market, g(λ,∆) is the weight function previously defined in
equation (2.2), Tk,τ is the intraday dummy that equals to 1 if k = τ , and finally,
Ds are stock-specific dummy variables allowing for stock fixed effects.
7. For each stock s and interval τ , we evaluate global depth at the optimal decay
parameter λ̂ and calculate GDs,τ (λ̂), as introduced in (2.1). Finally, the ag-
gregated global depth measure is the cross-sectional average of individual stock
global depth measures.
Global depth is the convolution of two functions: the LOB–CDF and the weight
function. It is size-related and goes beyond the inside quotes. It aggregates all of
the orders waiting on a given side of the market, and focuses on how the available
liquidity is distributed across price levels. Thus, it provides a more complete picture
of liquidity. It gives the flexibility of assigning different weights to different quotes
based on price distances.13
12As a robustness, we use different weight functions. The discussion is presented in Section 2.6.5.
13Note that by setting λ = 0 one can assume equal weights for each of the quotes.
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By definition, global depth is related to the standard “local” depth measures, i.e.,
the quoted depth up to a given threshold. An investigation of their relationship is pre-
sented in Appendix A, Section A.3. From this analysis, we conclude that although
they are positively and significantly correlated, there is a non-trivial proportion of
the variation of global depth that cannot be explained by the standard depth mea-
sures. Hence, global depth captures different information than that of standard depth
measures.
2.4.2 Descriptive analysis
Figure 2.1, Panel A plots the limit order book probability density function (LOB–
PDF) averaged across intervals, days, and stocks (average LOB–PDF), whereas Panel
B plots the corresponding cumulative distribution (LOB–CDF). Panel A reveals that
for both sides of the market, the frequency of the orders waiting at the second best
quotes is the highest and the limit order book distribution is positively skewed. Simi-
lar to the findings of Bouchaud, Mezard and Potters (2002) for the analysis conducted
on three stocks traded in Paris Bourse, the empirical densities of price distance ∆
have a gamma-like shape.
Table 2.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the limit order book distribution.
The first column reports the summary statistics of the average LOB–PDF. The last
four columns report the statistics for four limit order book distributions at 10:00am
(beginning of the day), 12:00pm (end of the morning session), 14:15pm (beginning of
the afternoon session) and 17:00pm (end of the trading day).
The results reveal that the liquidity provision is concentrated closer to the best
quotes for the buy side compared to the sell side, which can be observed by comparing
either the mean or the skewness of the distribution. The mean of the distribution,
for all of the time intervals, is higher for the sell side than the buy side, whereas
































(b) Panel B: LOB–CDF
Figure 2.1: Panel A plots the limit order book probability density function (LOB–
PDF), averaged across stocks and trading intervals. Panel B plots the corresponding
cumulative distribution functions.
can also be concluded from the cumulative frequencies of volumes for different price
distances ∆. Around 40% and 30% of the depth is concentrated at the best or second
best quotes (∆ = 0 or ∆ = 1) for buy and sell sides, respectively. The frequency of
orders waiting 5 or more ticks away from the quotes is 35% for the sell side, whereas
it is only 23% for the buy side. Finally, the average variance of the sell side is 36%




Table 2.2: Summary Statistics: The Limit Order Book Distribution
For both sides of the market, this table presents the descriptive statistics for the empirical limit order
book distributions. The mean, variance, skewness, and the fractions of number of shares accumulated
up to a given price distance ∆ are reported. The first column shows the summary statistics of the
limit order book distribution which is obtained by averaging across intervals, days, and stocks. The
last four columns report the statistics for four limit order book distributions (averaged across stocks)
at 10:00am (beginning of the day), 12:00pm (end of the morning session), 14:15pm (beginning of
the afternoon session) and 17:00pm (end of the trading day).
uncond. 10:00am 12:00pm 14:15pm 17:00pm
Buy side mean 3.43 3.64 3.32 3.41 3.42
variance 18.42 20.06 17.67 17.83 17.52
skewness 2.41 2.34 2.60 2.33 2.35
up to 1 ∆ 0.40 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.41
up to 3 ∆ 0.68 0.66 0.69 0.68 0.68
up to 5 ∆ 0.82 0.81 0.84 0.82 0.82
up to 10 ∆ 0.93 0.92 0.94 0.93 0.93
up to 20 ∆ 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
up to 30 ∆ 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Sell side mean 4.63 4.68 4.64 4.56 4.73
variance 25.16 27.51 25.77 23.73 24.20
skewness 1.84 1.83 1.89 1.77 1.74
up to 1 ∆ 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.28
up to 3 ∆ 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.53
up to 5 ∆ 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.70
up to 10 ∆ 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.88
up to 20 ∆ 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
up to 30 ∆ 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
2.5 Predicting Market Volatility
Examining the relationship between future market volatility and aggregate liquid-
ity at an intraday level is the aim of this section. To this end, after sampling each
trading day into twenty-one 15-minute intervals, we first calculate our proposed mea-
sure, global depth, for each stock and each interval. We then use the cross-sectional
average of individual stock global depths for buy and sell sides of the market as main
explanatory variables. The market volatility is defined as the volatility of the Istanbul
39
Chapter 2
Stock Exchange–30 index. We employ the following predictive regression model:










+ controls + ετ ,
where for a given interval τ , σMτ is the mid-quote-volatility of the value-weighted
index, and GDbuyτ and GD
sell
τ are global depth for buy and sell sides of the market,
respectively. Tk,τ is the intraday dummy that equals to 1 if k = τ .
We include the lagged volatility, σMτ , and interval dummies in the set of explana-
tory variables to control the well-known systematic intraday patterns and clustering
in volatility. Furthermore, we employ both the standard predictors of volatility and
other liquidity measures as control variables. Similar to the construction of GD, the
control variables are calculated as the equal-weighted cross-sectional average of the
individual stock measures.14
The coefficients of interest, a2 and a3, are expected to be negative; the higher
liquidity provision around the best quotes, the lower the future volatility. The first
possible link follows from the price impact of an order. If the liquidity provision
is concentrated near the best quotes, i.e., when global depth is high, then the price
impact of an order is lower, leading to smaller future short-term volatility. The second
link arises from the dispersed beliefs, based on the theoretical predictions of Goettler
et al. (2005) and Goettler et al. (2009). They show that an increase in the frequency of
orders waiting away from the best prices signals that the current quotes are mispriced.
Hence, an increase in the dispersed beliefs about the true price of an asset may make
large price jumps plausible, which in turn creates higher future volatility.
14As a robustness check, we repeat the analysis by calculating the value-weighted average of the
explanatory variables to proxy the aggregated measures. The results are presented in Section 2.6.5.
Our main results are also confirmed in these regressions.
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2.5.1 Measuring volatility: the two scales realized volatility
estimator (TSRV)
To explore the role of relative depth provision in explaining the volatility of the
true price process rather than the noise component, we calculate the return volatility
by employing the two scales realized volatility (TSRV) estimator proposed by Ait-
Sahalia et al. (2011).
Let X denote the fundamental log-stock price process. In financial data, instead,
we can only observe log-price Y , either in a form of transaction or quoted price, which
is a linear combination of X and some noise :
Yt = Xt + t,
where  is assumed to be independent of the X process for identification purposes
and X follows a geometric Brownian motion. The noise may be a result of many
microstructure effects: frictions inherent in the trading process, temporary liquidity
withdrawals, and measurement or data recording errors. In this paper, the market
microstructure noise is assumed to be i.i.d., however no additional distributional
assumption is imposed. In other words, we adopt the nonparametric case and let the
diffusion term be an unrestricted stochastic process (see Ait-Sahalia et al. (2011) for
further details).
Without the noise, the realized variance estimator, [Y, Y ](all)T =
∑n
i=1 (Yti+1 − Yti)2
is a consistent and asymptotically unbiased estimator of the quadratic variation of
the process X, 〈X,X〉T =
∫ T
0
σ2t dt, where T is any fixed time interval. However,
in the presence of the microstructure noise, Ait-Sahalia, Mykland and Zhang (2005)
and Zhang, Mykland and Ait-Sahalia (2005) show that the realized volatility (RV)
is no longer a consistent and unbiased estimator of the volatility of the true value
of an asset. It leads to an estimate of the volatility of the noise, instead of the true
price of the underlying asset. As a solution, Ait-Sahalia et al. (2011) propose the two
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scales realized volatility estimator (TSRV), which enables the use of the full available
sample data, and gives an unbiased and consistent estimate of the quadratic variation
of the true price process.
The TSRV is defined as:
〈X,X〉TSRVT =
√






where [Y, Y ](all)T is the realized variance calculated using the whole sample with size
T and





[Y, Y ]sparse,kT .
To obtain [Y, Y ]sparse,k, we first divide the whole sample into K number of moving
window subsamples (K = 5 minutes) with a fixed length of N , where N = T −
K. For example, the first subsample starts with the first and ends with the N th
observation, whereas, the second subsample starts with the second and ends with
(N+1)th observation. Then, we sparse each subsample with one-minute frequency. So,
[Y, Y ]sparse,k is the realized variance estimator of the kth one-minute-sparsed subsample
of returns.
Figure 2.2, Panel A plots the RV and TSRV estimates of a stock in a day calculated
for different sparse periods. Consistent with Ait-Sahalia et al. (2011), the TSRV
is almost invariant to the choice of the sparse period, whereas the RV estimator
changes dramatically, mainly due to noise embedded in the data. Panel B plots our
dependent variable, the TSRV estimate of the mid-quotes for the value-weighted index
calculated for each interval and day based on one-minute sparse periods (scaled by
100). There is substantial variability in the return volatility, with a standard deviation
of 11%. Finally, the augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests suggest the



































(b) Panel B: TSRV time-series
Figure 2.2: Panel A plots the realized volatility (RV) and the two scales realized volatility
(TSRV) estimates calculated at different sparse periods. Panel B plots our dependent vari-
able; the TSRV estimate of the mid-quotes for the value-weighted index calculated for each
interval and day based on one-minute sparse periods (scaled by 100).
2.5.2 Estimation of the decay parameter
A stock’s global depth is obtained by multiplying the cumulative limit order book
distribution with a normalised weight function and then taking the area below the
resulting curve. The weight function is a non-linear function of the decay parameter
λ, which is estimated by using the first 3 days of data as a training period and running
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the non-linear regression model introduced in equation (2.3). The estimated decay
parameter λ̂ is equal to 0.366, with a standard error of 0.173, suggesting a “moderate”
decay on the information provided in each quotes.15 Then, for the rest of the sample
period, for each stock s and interval τ , we evaluate global depth at the optimal decay
parameter λ̂, as introduced in equation (2.1), and calculate the cross-sectional average
of GDs,τ (λ̂).
Figure 2.3 presents the time-series plot of the aggregated optimal-decayed global
depth measure for both sides of the market. We see that the depth provision around
the best quotes on the buy side is higher compared to the sell side for most of the
trading intervals, in line with the findings discussed in Section 2.4.2. These two
variables are negatively correlated with a correlation coefficient of −25%. The average
of global depth is 49% (40%), whereas it ranges from 30% (24%) to 62% (52%) for
the buy (sell) side of the market. The augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron
tests reject the unit-root in global depth variable for both sides of the market.
2.5.3 Control variables
Trade-related variables
Since both trading activity and volatility depend on the news arrival process,
several studies have used trade-related variables to forecast price volatility. Consistent
with Bollerslev and Domowitz (1993), Jones, Kaul and Lipson (1994), and Foucault,
Moinas and Theissen (2007), the number of trades occurring in the interval τ , NT,
and the average trade size, AQ, are included to capture the trading activity.
15Our empirical findings are robust to the different training periods chosen. We use 5 and 10 days
of data as training period to estimate the decay parameter λ. The estimated parameter is equal to
0.304 and 0.335 when 5 and 10 days of data are used as training period, respectively. Hence, the
















Figure 2.3: This figure plots the intraday estimates of global depth evaluated at the optimal
decay parameter for buy and sell sides of the market. The estimation is based on the sampling
of a trading day in 15-minute intervals.
Relative spread
In a related study, Foucault et al. (2007) show that the bid-ask spread is infor-
mative about future individual stock volatility. Hence, we also include the relative
spread, relSPRτ , which is calculated as the ratio of the bid-ask spread to the mid-
quote prices for each interval.
Slope of the limit order book
Another measure extracted from the limit order book is “the slope of the order
book” proposed by Naes and Skjeltorp (2006). The slope measures the sensitivity
of the quantity supplied in the order book with respect to the prices. Furthermore,
Duong and Kalev (2008) document evidence for the predictive power of the order
book slope over price volatility. Following these studies, we consider the SLOPE as







where DEs,τ and SEs,τ denote the slope for bid and ask sides, respectively, for stock































where NB (NA) denotes the total number of bid (ask) prices. pk is the quote at the
tick level k. p0 corresponds to the mid-quote at the end of interval τ . Finally, νBt
(νAk ) is the natural logarithm of the accumulated total volume up to the price level
pBk (pAk ).
In harmony with the findings of Duong and Kalev (2008), we expect the slope
to be negatively related to the future volatility. The steeper the slope, the more
concentrated the volumes in the order book are in a given time interval.
Standard depth measures
The “local” depth, defined as the total volume available to be traded at the best bid
or ask prices, is one of the traditional measures of liquidity. We calculate DEPTH0buy
and DEPTH0sell for the buy and sell sides of the market respectively.
Recent theoretical and empirical studies document that the volume at and farther
away from the best quotes have a different impact on the order choice of a trader
(see Goettler et al. (2005), Goettler et al. (2009), Cao et al. (2008), and Valenzuela
and Zer (2013), among others). Moreover, Pascual and Veredas (2010) document
that both at and away from the best quotes are informative about future individual
stock volatilities. Hence, to capture the volume available beyond the best quotes, we
include the cumulative depth from the second up to the five best quotes for the buy




We employ the Amihud (2002)’s illiquidity measure, AMR, which is the ratio of
absolute stock return to the turnover. For stock s and interval τ , it is calculated as
AMRs,τ =
|rτ |∑NTτ
i=1 pi · qi
, (2.7)
where NT is the number of trades in interval τ , rτ is the return on mid-quotes between
intervals τ and τ − 1, qi is the number of shares traded and pi is the corresponding
trade price for trade i.
Quote-slope
We include the log quote slope, logQS, introduced by Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001).
The logQS aggregates the tightness and depth dimensions of liquidity. For each time






ln (qAτ · qBτ )
, (2.8)
where qA and qB are the volume of orders waiting at the best ask price pA and the
best bid prices pB, respectively. A decrease in the logQS means that the slope of the
best quotes is flatter and the market is more liquid.
Domowitz-Hansch-Wang illiquidity measure
Finally, we consider the illiquidity measure proposed by Domowitz et al. (2005),
DHW. This variable measures the cost of buying and selling Q shares of the stock,
simultaneously. The higher the cost, the more illiquid the stock. For each time



































where qAk and qBk are the volume of orders waiting at the kth best ask price pAk and
the kth best bid price pBk , respectively. m and m′ denote the position in which the
last sell and buy orders are executed. Finally, for each stock s, Qs is the median of
the accumulated volume of orders waiting in the book.
2.6 Empirical Findings
As a natural first step in our empirical analysis, we compare the explanatory
power of the optimal-decay-weighted global depth (GD evaluated at λ = λ̂), equal-
weighted global depth (GD evaluated at λ = 0) and the standard “local” depth
measures that take into account the depth provision up to a given threshold. We
further investigate the in-sample predictive power of global depth on volatility by
adding standard predictors of volatility and other liquidity measures in our analysis.
Section 2.6.1 reports the results. Section 2.6.2 asks whether the global depth-volatility
relationship holds for further horizons.
Our findings are based on regressions of the market volatility on lagged global
depth measures and different sets of control variables. Market volatility is calculated
as the two scales realized volatility of the mid-quote return of the value-weighted
index. All of the specifications use 21 trading intervals on 36 days and include intraday
dummies. To conserve space, we do not report the estimated coefficients of the dummy
variables. t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West standard errors to capture
possible autocorrelation in the residuals.
Finally, in Section 2.6.3, we examine whether the documented time-series relation
between global depth and future market volatility is driven by a variation in a par-
ticular stock or industry. To this end, we shift our focus to the relation between the
individual stock volatility and liquidity. We first run the regression model in a pooled
data with stock fixed effects. t-statistics are based on cluster robust standard errors
on stock level. The interval and stock dummies are jointly significant, but for the
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sake of brevity they are not reported. To take into account possible cross-sectional
variations that cannot be captured by the stock fixed effects, we also run the predic-
tive regressions for each of the stocks in our sample and report the summary of the
individual regression results.
The discussion of the results is based on the estimated coefficients, their statistical
significance, and the adjusted R2s. To improve the ease of interpretation of the
estimated coefficients, all of the explanatory variables are standardized to have a unit
variance, and the dependent variable is presented in percentage terms.
2.6.1 One-period-ahead predictability regressions
Our first focus is to examine the predictive power of the optimal-decay-weighted
and equal-weighted global depth measures. GDτ (λ̂) is global depth evaluated at
the optimal decay factor λ̂ and assigns exponential weights to the quotes based on
price distances, as introduced in Section 2.4.1, whereas GDτ (λ = 0) is global depth
evaluated at a decay factor 0, i.e., it assigns equal weights to each quotes. The
dependent variable is the 15-minute-ahead market volatility, σMτ+1. Table 2.3 reports
the results.
The results show a strong predictive power of global depth for both sides of the
market over the one-period-ahead market volatility. Irrespective of the chosen decay
factor λ, an increase in the average liquidity around the best quotes is followed by a
lower level of volatility in the next period. The explanatory power of global depth
evaluated at the optimal decay factor is higher compared to the one that assigns equal
weights to each quote. This confirms that depth closer to the best quotes is more
informative.
For all of the specifications, the economic importance of the buy side is higher than
the sell side. This asymmetry is consistent with the extant literature, documenting
that buy orders are more informative than sell orders (see, for instance, Burdett and
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Table 2.3: Predictive Regressions–Global vs. Local Depth
This table reports the estimated coefficients of the regression model defined in equation (2.4). The
dependent variable is the 15-minute-ahead market volatility, σMτ+1, calculated as the TSRV mid-
quote volatility of the value-weighted index (multiplied by 100). GD
buy
τ (λ̂) and GD
buy
τ (λ = 0) are
the cross-sectional averages of global depth of individual stocks, GDbuys,τ , evaluated at the optimal










τ are the accumulated volume of orders from the second to the
5th best quotes for the buy and sell sides of the market, respectively. All of the explanatory variables
are standardized. t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West standard errors to capture possible
autocorrelation in the residuals and reported in parenthesis. For the sake of brevity, the estimated
coefficients of the intraday dummies are omitted.
dep. var.: σMτ+15min I II III IV V VI
GD
buy






























σMτ 0.038 0.027 0.023 0.032 0.023 0.023
(6.82) (5.35) (4.96) (6.70) (4.97) (4.67)
constant 0.179 1.707 0.749 0.292 0.734 0.741
(7.94) (5.35) (8.07) (7.46) (7.56) (7.40)
adj. R2(%) 16.94 22.87 24.62 19.65 24.44 24.79
O’Hara (1987), Griffiths, Smith, Turnbull and White (2000), and Duong and Kalev
(2008), among others).
Second, the correlation between global depth and local depth measures reported
in Appendix A may indicate that these variables share common information on future
volatility. Hence, it is important to examine whether global depth is still significant
in explaining subsequent volatility under the presence of standard depth variables.
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To this end, we include both the volume of orders at the best quotes and total volume
of orders from the second to the fifth best prices in our analysis. Table 2.3 columns
IV-VI present the estimated coefficients and the corresponding t-statistics.
DEPTH0buy and DEPTH0sell, the total volume of orders waiting at the best bid
and ask prices, respectively, significantly explain the future market volatility. As
expected, a decrease in the volume of orders at the best quotes creates higher future
volatility. However, when global depth variables are included in the analysis, they
are no longer significant. Finally, we see that including global depth to the regression
significantly increases the adjusted R2 from 16.9% to 24.6%, whereas including all of
the local depth variables together with GD does not add any explanatory power. The
adjusted R2 increases slightly to 24.8%.
Overall, we conclude that the exponentially-weighted global depth has a superior
in-sample predictive power compared to the standard depth measures and compared
to global depth that assigns equal weights.
To confirm the robustness of the explanatory power of global depth on one-period-
ahead market volatility, which is documented in “simple” regressions, we include sev-
eral other control variables. Table 2.4 presents the estimated coefficients and the
corresponding t-statistics.
The results reveal that global depth for the buy side strongly predicts market
volatility. This result is remarkably robust to the inclusion of alternative liquidity
measures and standard predictors of volatility. Besides global depth variables, the rel-
ative spread and the slope of the book are both positively and significantly correlated
with the future volatility.
This result further extends the findings of Foucault et al. (2007), who document
that the relative spread has explanatory power over future individual stock volatili-
ties. We show that the aggregated measure has an explanatory power on the market
volatility as well. Yet, the estimated (standardized) coefficients show that our ag-
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Table 2.4: Predictive Regressions–Control Variables
This table reports the estimated coefficients of the regression model defined in equation (2.4). The
dependent variable is the 15-minute-ahead market volatility, σMτ+1, calculated as the TSRV mid-quote
volatility of the value-weighted index (multiplied by 100). GD
buy
τ (λ̂) is the cross-sectional average
of global depth of individual stocks, GDbuys,τ , evaluated at the optimal decay factor λ̂, as outlined
in Section 2.5.2. All of the control variables are constructed analogously. SLOPE is the slope of
the limit order book defined in equation (2.6), relSPR is the relative spread, NT is the number of
trades and AQ is the average trade size. AMR is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure. The logQS
is the log quote slope, introduced by Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) and defined in equation (2.8).
Finally, DHW is the Domowitz et al. (2005) illiquidity measure described in equation (2.9). All of
the explanatory variables are standardized. t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West standard
errors to capture possible autocorrelation in the residuals and reported in parenthesis. For the sake
of brevity, the estimated coefficients of the intraday dummies are omitted.
dep. var.: σMτ+15min I II III IV V
GD
buy
τ (λ̂) -0.034 -0.030 -0.030 -0.028
(-6.82) (-6.83) (-5.44) (-5.23)
GD
sell
τ (λ̂) -0.021 -0.017 -0.011 -0.011
(-3.51) (-3.14) (-1.50) (-1.56)
SLOPEτ 0.013 0.017 0.015
(1.87) (2.79) (2.26)












σMτ 0.038 0.023 0.013 0.015 0.011
(6.82) (4.96) (2.51) (3.30) (2.19)
constant 0.179 0.749 -0.796 -0.947 -0.889
(7.94) (8.07) (-2.54) (-3.14) (-2.87)
adj. R2(%) 16.94 24.62 28.81 28.88 28.95
gregated global depth measure is both economically and statistically the strongest in
explaining the variations in the market volatility.
The estimated coefficient of the slope has an unexpected sign. Naes and Skjeltorp
(2006) and Duong and Kalev (2008) document that the slope is negatively related to
the volatility. If the volume of orders is more concentrated in a given price, then the
book has a higher slope, signaling the consensus about the true price. Therefore, a
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higher slope should be followed by lower future volatility. To investigate this further,
we run the slope in a simple regression and see that it is negatively and significantly
correlated with the future volatility at a 5% level as expected (not reported). Thus,
we conclude that controling other liquidity measures changes the sign of the slope.
This indicates that the relationship between the slope and volatility is not robust
to the inclusion of other liquidity measures. Finally, we note that the adjusted R2
increases significantly from 17% to 25% with the inclusion of GD variables, whereas
we see a slight increase with the inclusion of further controls.
2.6.2 Predicting further horizons
In this section, we examine the informativeness of the limit order book distribution
at time τ on multiple-period-ahead volatilities. Specifically, we run the same baseline
regression model specified in equation (2.4), while we calculate the dependent variable
as the mid-quote volatility of the index at time τ + h, with h = 1, 2, ..., 10, where
for example, τ + 2 refers to the 30-minute-ahead volatility. The regression results are
presented in Table 2.5.
In Panel A we report the “simple” regressions, whereas Panel B reports the results
when all of the control variables are included in the regression equation. We see that
the significance of the estimated coefficients as well as the predictive power of global
depth is (almost) monotonically decreasing with the prediction horizon. Global depth
is significant for all of the horizons, suggesting that the limit order book distribution
is informative over the 150-minute-ahead volatility. When we add the other control
variables, we see that the relative spread and the slope of the book significantly
predicts longer term volatility as well.
Finally, although the illiquidity measure proposed by Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001),
the quote-slope, does not significantly explain the 15-minute-ahead volatility, the





Table 2.5: Predictive Regressions–Further Horizons
This table reports the estimated coefficients of the regression model defined in equation (2.4). The dependent variable is the market volatility, σMτ+h calculated
as the TSRV mid-quote volatility of the value-weighted index (multiplied by 100) in period τ + h for h = 1, 2, ..., 6. GD
buy
τ is the cross-sectional average of
global depth of individual stocks, GDbuys,τ , evaluated at the optimal decay factor λ̂, as outlined in Section 2.5.2. All of the control variables are constructed
analogously. SLOPE is the slope of the limit order book defined in equation (2.6), relSPR is the relative spread, NT is the number of trades and AQ is the
average trade size. AMR is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure. The logQS is the log quote slope, introduced by Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) and defined
in equation (2.8). Finally, DHW is the Domowitz et al. (2005) illiquidity measure described in equation (2.9). In Panel A for every time horizon, we report
the “simple” regressions, whereas Panel B reports the results when all of the control variables are included in the regression equation. All of the explanatory
variables are standardized. t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West standard errors to capture possible autocorrelation in the residuals and reported in
parenthesis. For the sake of brevity, the estimated coefficients of the intraday dummies are omitted.
dep. var.: σMτ+h Panel A: “simple” regressions Panel B: multiple regressions
0–15 15–30 30–45 . 105–120 120–135 135–150 0–15 15–30 30–45 . 105–120 120–135 135–150
GD
buy
τ (λ̂) -0.034 -0.029 -0.027 . -0.028 -0.027 -0.025 -0.028 -0.023 -0.023 . -0.024 -0.025 -0.025
(-6.82) (-5.55) (-4.60) . (-3.29) (-3.30) (-2.63) (-5.23) (-5.17) (-4.29) . (-3.01) (-2.93) (-2.91)
GD
sell
τ (λ̂) -0.021 -0.023 -0.022 . -0.020 -0.017 -0.016 -0.011 -0.011 -0.009 . -0.002 0.002 -0.006
(-3.51) (-3.46) (-3.07) . (-2.24) (-1.93) (-1.85) (-1.56) (-1.94) (-1.34) . (-0.23) (0.17) (-0.60)
SLOPEτ 0.015 0.023 0.020 . 0.017 0.011 0.010
(2.26) (2.69) (2.33) . (1.82) (1.31) (1.01)
relSPRτ 0.021 0.019 0.021 . 0.023 0.033 0.049
(2.12) (2.86) (2.89) . (2.47) (2.98) (3.43)
NTτ 0.008 0.013 0.006 . 0.010 0.005 0.009
(1.24) (1.86) (1.01) . (1.09) (0.45) (0.94)
AQτ 0.001 0.003 0.003 . 0.006 -0.002 -0.013
(0.28) (0.68) (0.75) . (1.15) (-0.35) (-2.13)
AMRτ 0.002 0.009 -0.001 . 0.002 0.001 0.000
(0.58) (7.56) (-1.12) . (0.36) (0.27) (-0.04)
logQSτ 0.014 0.027 0.022 . 0.018 0.001 -0.023
(0.96) (2.80) (2.40) . (1.62) (0.09) (-1.43)
DHWτ 0.003 0.002 0.005 . 0.015 0.018 0.013
(0.60) (0.52) (1.00) . (1.49) (1.86) (1.51)
σMτ 0.023 0.016 0.012 . 0.000 0.004 0.010 0.011 -0.001 -0.002 . -0.017 -0.006 0.004
(4.96) (3.40) (2.03) . (-0.07) (0.75) (1.62) (2.19) (-0.16) (-0.36) . (-2.29) (-1.06) (0.54)
constant 0.749 0.754 0.733 . 0.751 0.692 0.655 -0.889 -1.314 -1.200 . -1.124 -1.038 -0.996
(8.07) (8.50) (6.81) . (5.39) (5.24) (4.15) (-2.87) (-3.05) (-2.98) . (-2.70) (-2.43) (-1.81)
. .
adj. R2(%) 24.62 20.53 17.69 . 13.58 12.26 13.10 28.95 28.40 23.66 . 20.66 18.42 19.7754
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depth has a leading role in explaining longer horizon future volatility.
2.6.3 Predicting individual stock volatilities
This section examines the relationship between the limit order book distribution
and the future volatility, if any, on an individual stock level. To this end, we run the
following predictive regression:









csDs + controls + εs,τ ,
where, for stock s and interval τ , σs,τ is the mid-quote two scales realized volatility,
GDbuys,τ and GDsells,τ are global depth estimates for the buy and sell sides of the market,
respectively. Tk,τ is the intraday dummy that equals to 1 if k = τ , and Ds are stock-
specific dummy variables allowing for stock fixed effects. We employ the same control
variables introduced in Section 2.5.3.
We first run the regression model in a pooled data with stock fixed effects. Ta-
ble 2.6 columns I to IV report the estimated coefficients for the pooled regression
with the corresponding t−statistics. Second, we estimate individual regressions for
all of the stocks in our sample to take into account the possible cross-sectional vari-
ations that cannot be captured by the stock fixed effects. The summary of these
results are presented in columns V to VIII. We report the cross-sectional median of
the estimated significant coefficients at a 5% level. In brackets, first, we report the
percentage of the stocks with a significant coefficient at a 5% level, and second, we
report the percentage of the positive estimates (given significant).
Our main result is confirmed in these individual volatility regressions. Global
depth is negatively related to the future volatility for 83% of the stocks for the buy
side of the market. We conclude that the time-series relation between the aggregate





Table 2.6: Predictive Regressions–Individual Stocks
This table reports the estimated coefficients of the regression model defined in equation (2.10). GDbuys,τ and GDsells,τ are the individual stock’s global depth
estimates for the buy and sell sides of the market, respectively, evaluated at the optimal decay factor, as outlined in Section 2.5.2. In a given trading interval
τ , SLOPE is the slope of the limit order book defined in equation (2.6), relSPR is the relative spread, NT is the number of trades and AQ is the average
trade size. AMR is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure. The logQS is the log quote slope, introduced by Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) and defined in
equation (2.8). Finally, DHW is the Domowitz et al. (2005) illiquidity measure described in equation (2.9). All of the explanatory variables are standardized.
The dependent variable is στ+1, which is the TSRV volatility calculated using the mid-quotes of the orders originated in interval τ + 1 (multiplied by 100).
Columns I to IV show the results for the pooled regression. t-statistics based on cluster robust standard errors on stock level are reported. Columns V to VIII
summarize the results when the model is estimated for each stock separately. The cross-sectional median of the estimated significant coefficients at a 5% level
is reported. In brackets, first, the percentage of the stocks with a significant coefficient at a 5% level and second, the percentage of the positive estimates,
are reported. t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West standard errors to capture possible autocorrelation in the residuals. For the sake of brevity, the
estimated coefficients of the intraday dummies and stock fixed effects are omitted.
Pooled regression Summary of individual regressions
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
GDbuyτ (λ̂) -0.056 -0.059 -0.057 -0.054 -0.063 -0.059 -0.061 -0.055
(-12.40) (-12.88) (-12.71) (-12.35) [83/0] [87/0] [77/0] [77/0]
GDsellτ (λ̂) -0.020 -0.028 -0.017 -0.018 -0.040 -0.049 -0.057 -0.055
(-5.66) (-6.63) (-3.58) (-4.02) [27/0] [40/0] [13/0] [13/0]
SLOPEτ -0.006 0.035 0.028 -0.046 0.058 0.047
(-0.82) (5.56) (4.80) [33/20] [37/81] [27/75]
relSPRτ 0.051 0.014 0.009 0.083 0.056 -0.044
(5.50) (1.43) (0.91) [43/100] [43/54] [33/40]
NTτ 0.0331 0.036 0.046 0.046
(9.88) (10.93) [53/100] [63/100]
AQτ 0.000 0.004 0.029 0.030
(-0.02) (0.98) [23/71] [23/71]
AMRτ -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.015
(-0.80) (0.29) [20/50] [17/60]
logQSτ 0.077 0.080 0.115 0.108
(9.80) (10.22) [40/100] [43/100]
DHWτ 0.013 0.014 0.069 0.071
(2.67) (2.85) [30/100] [27/100]
στ 0.076 0.047 0.058 0.037 0.076 0.060 0.064 0.057
(15.17) (9.23) (13.33) (7.37) [97/100] [53/100] [70/100] [30/100]
constant 0.757 0.188 -0.192 -0.145 0.785 1.058 -0.102 0.692
(20.19) (1.25) (-1.39) (-1.09) [100/100] [60/94] [33/50] [30/67]
adj. R2(%) 13.40 15.10 15.80 16.20 10.07 13.74 13.53 14.4556
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industry, but rather the relation is shared by the majority of the stocks.
The results reveal the asymmetry between the buy and sell sides of the market at
the individual stock level as well. The sell side of the market is informative only for
27% of the stocks in the individual regressions. Although both sides of the market
are significant in the pooled regression, the economic importance of the buy side is
almost three times greater than the sell side.
Besides global depth, there are other pieces that contain information about future
individual stock volatility. In line with the main prediction of Foucault et al. (2007),
we find that a wider relative spread signals that the informed traders expect higher
volatility in the future. Moreover, the number of trades and the (log) slope of the
best quotes, logQS, are positively related to the future volatility.
In summary, we conclude that global depth on the buy side of the market has the
leading explanatory power on one-period-ahead individual stock volatility compared
to the standard predictors of volatility. This result is robust to the inclusion of the
liquidity controls. Besides the standard predictors, we provide new evidence that the
slope of the best quotes (an illiquidity measure proposed by Hasbrouck and Seppi
(2001)) predicts volatility.
2.6.4 Out-of-sample tests
The results presented in Section 2.6 document that our proposed measure, global
depth, significantly explains up to the 150-minute-ahead market volatility. Besides
global depth, the slope of the order book and the relative spread contain information
about the future market volatility. In this section, we assess the predictive ability of
these three measures through out-of-sample forecasting experiments.
We evaluate the out-of-sample forecasting ability of each variable compared to its
historical average. Specifically, for a subsample of observations up to a given time t,
we compare the h-period-ahead squared forecast errors with the squared difference
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between the realized value at t + h and the sample mean value up to time t. To do
so, we split our data into two subsamples: Tin is the estimation period and Ttest is
the testing period with Tin + Ttest = T . We then re-estimate the parameters of the
model in which we use the variable of interest as the predictor. Recursive estimators
of h-period-ahead forecasts are based on the sample starting from Tin up to T − h.






t+h − σMt ,
where σMt+h and σ̂Mt+h are the two scales realized and fitted market volatilities at time
t+ h and σMt is the mean value of the market volatility up to time t.
We evaluate the comparison by using two different metrics: the difference in mean-
squared errors (∆MSE) and the out-of-sample R2. If the proposed measure has
superior out-of-sample forecasting ability relative to the average of past data, then
both of these measures will be positive. Finally, we employ the Diebold and Mariano
(1995) predictive ability test (DM) to test the significance of ∆MSE. The difference





















Panels A and B of Table 2.7 present the statistics when the estimation windows
are 250 and 350 observations, respectively.
Our findings in Panel A reveal that the difference in mean-squared errors and
out-of-sample R2s are positive irrespective of the chosen forecasting variable. In other
words, forecasts based either on global depth variables, slope or the relative spread





Table 2.7: Out-of-Sample Forecasting Evaluation
The out-of-sample forecasting experiment results are reported in the table. The h-period-ahead forecast error is obtained as the difference between the realized
volatility at t + h and the fitted value of the predictive regression estimated up to time t, whereas the competing error is calculated from the sample mean
volatility up to time t. The dependent variable is the 15-minutes market volatility, σM , calculated as the TSRV mid-quote volatility of the value-weighted index
(multiplied by 100). GD
buy
τ (λ̂) is the cross-sectional average of global depth of individual stocks, GDbuys,τ , evaluated at the optimal decay factor λ̂. Similarly,
SLOPEτ and relSPRτ are the cross-sectional averages of the slope of the limit order book defined in equation (2.6) and the relative spread, respectively. The
out-of-sample R2(%) and the difference in mean-squared errors (∆MSEx1000) are defined in equations (2.12) and (2.11), respectively. Finally, DM denotes
the Diebold-Mariano predictive ability test. Panels A and B report the results when the estimation window is set to 250 and 350 observations, respectively.
Forecasting variable 0–15min 15–30min 30–45min 45–60min 60–75min 75–90min
Panel A: Estimation Window: 250 obs.
GD
buy
τ (λ̂) out-of-sample R2(%) 11.24 8.64 7.55 7.05 5.70 4.10
∆MSE 1.82 1.40 1.22 1.14 0.93 0.67
DM t−stat 2.76 2.54 2.49 2.33 2.05 1.52
GD
sell
τ (λ̂) out-of-sample R2(%) 2.51 3.83 3.17 3.33 3.76 3.91
∆MSE 0.41 0.62 0.51 0.54 0.61 0.64
DM t−stat 0.79 1.00 0.95 0.96 1.15 1.19
SLOPEτ Out-of-sample R2(%) 3.06 1.37 1.68 2.90 3.52 4.10
∆MSE 0.50 0.22 0.27 0.47 0.57 0.67
DM t−stat 1.63 0.79 1.38 1.75 1.55 1.26
relSPRτ out-of-sample R2(%) 15.39 13.93 13.54 13.43 13.12 13.64
∆MSE 2.49 2.25 2.19 2.18 2.13 2.23
DM t−stat 3.22 3.14 3.04 2.99 2.89 3.21
Panel B: Estimation Window: 350 obs.
GD
buy
τ (λ̂) out-of-sample R2(%) 14.48 11.96 11.33 10.00 8.12 6.15
∆MSE 2.00 1.64 1.55 1.36 1.10 0.81
DM t−stat 2.65 2.52 2.73 2.32 2.15 1.54
GD
sell
τ (λ̂) out-of-sample R2(%) 0.31 1.15 1.56 0.92 0.43 -0.67
∆MSE 0.04 0.16 0.21 0.13 0.06 -0.09
DM t−stat 0.08 0.22 0.34 0.21 0.10 -0.15
SLOPEτ Out-of-sample R2(%) 1.31 0.70 0.59 -0.07 -0.97 -0.93
∆MSE 0.18 0.10 0.08 -0.01 -0.13 -0.12
DM t−stat 0.53 0.48 0.40 -0.03 -0.37 -0.22
relSPRτ out-of-sample R2(%) 9.98 6.71 7.09 6.47 5.19 5.68
∆MSE 1.38 0.92 0.97 0.88 0.70 0.75
DM t−stat 1.77 1.44 1.45 1.35 1.04 1.21
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past volatility. The Diebold-Mariano test shows that only global depth for the buy
side of the market and the relative spread are the statistically significant predictors of
market volatility, relative spread being stronger. Moreover, we see that the predictive
power of both spread and global depth are decreasing almost monotonically with the
prediction horizon.
Panel B, on the other hand, uncovers stronger results for GDbuy. Our variable
delivers impressive out-of-sample R2’s from 14.5% when forecasting one-period-ahead
market volatility up to 6.2% when predicting 90-minutes-ahead market volatility. On
the other hand, we observe that all of the statistics are worsened when we focus on the
relative spread performance. The highest out-of-sample R2 is 9.98% and reached when
the forecast horizon is one-period-ahead. The statistical significance of the difference
in mean-squared errors is also found to be the highest for the same prediction horizon,
but only with a t-statistics of 1.77.
As a further analysis, we examine whether employing relative spread alone, or em-
ploying the buy side global depth along with the spread produces better forecasts. To
do so, the first forecast errors are calculated from the model where GDbuy and relSPR
are the explanatory variables, whereas the second forecast errors are calculated from
the model in which relative spread is the only explanatory variable. Similarly, we
repeat the analysis for two different estimation window sizes; 250 and 350 observa-
tions. The results show that, when we set the estimation window size equal to 250,
where both of the variables were found to have a good out-of-sample performance,
including global depth into the analysis increases the out-of-sample R2 by almost 7%.
The difference in mean-squared errors is significant at 5% with a t-statistics of 2.66.
When the estimation window is 350 observations, as expected, all of the statistics
improve. The out-of-sample R2 is increased to over 11% and ∆MSE is significant
with a t-statistics of 3.20. Note that by construction, global depth does not include
the bid-ask spread since the price distances are calculated as the position to the best
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quotes, rather than the mid-quotes. Thus global depth is related to the depth di-
mension of liquidity and can be thought as a complement of the tightness dimension.
Hence, we conclude that capturing both the tightness and the depth dimension of
liquidity significantly increases the out-of-sample forecasting power.
2.6.5 Robustness
We perform four sets of robustness tests. Our first set of robustness checks is on
the specification of the weights to estimate global depth. We employ the following








We re-estimate the optimal decaying factor λ via non-linear least squares as λ̂ = 1.318
following the model outlined in equation (2.3). We then evaluate global depth at λ̂.
Second, instead of sampling the trading day using the 15-minute snapshots, we
test the predictive power of the limit order book distribution on 30-minute intervals.
Similarly, we first re-estimate the decay parameter for 30-minute intervals as 0.364
and then evaluate global depth at λ̂.
Third, we perform a robustness test on the specification of the regression model.
We re-estimate the benchmark specification in equation (2.4) with the log-transformed
variables to allow the left-hand side of the equation to include potentially both positive
and negative numbers.
In our analysis, to proxy the aggregate level of liquidity, we first calculate global
depth for each stock and get the cross-sectional average. Our final robustness check
includes the re-calculation of the aggregated measures by using value-weighted cross-
sectional averages.
Our results are presented in Table 2.8. Columns I and II repeat the results for






This table reports the results for the robustness analysis. Columns I and II repeat the results reported in Table 2.4: the benchmark specification. Columns
III and IV present the results for the first robustness check, i.e., when the linear decaying weight function introduced in equation (2.13) is used instead of
the exponential decaying weights. The following two columns show the results when the sampling period is 30 minutes instead of 15 minutes. In columns
VII and VIII, we report the estimated coefficients for the log-transformed variables. Finally, the last two columns report the results when the explanatory
variables are aggregated via value-weighted cross-sectional averages instead of equal-weighted. All of the explanatory variables are standardized. In all of the
specifications t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West standard errors to capture possible autocorrelation in the residuals and for the sake of brevity, the
estimated coefficients of the intraday dummies are omitted. All of the variables are defined in Table 2.4.
benchmark linear-decaying weights 30–min. sampling log-transform. value-weighted
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
GD
buy
τ (λ̂) -0.034 -0.028 -0.031 -0.027 -0.043 -0.041 -0.034 -0.029 -0.031 -0.028
(-6.82) (-5.23) (-6.55) (-5.07) (-5.41) (-6.03) (-6.86) (-5.29) (-6.20) (-4.40)
GD
sell
τ (λ̂) -0.021 -0.011 -0.019 -0.009 -0.028 -0.009 -0.022 -0.011 -0.022 -0.016
(-3.51) (-1.56) (-3.14) (-1.27) (-2.74) (-1.03) (-3.59) (-1.55) (-3.95) (-2.29)
SLOPEτ 0.015 0.015 0.039 0.017 0.021
(2.26) (2.21) (2.73) (2.60) (2.59)
relSPRτ 0.021 0.021 0.033 0.022 -0.001
(2.12) (2.09) (3.10) (2.24) (-0.09)
NTτ 0.008 0.008 -0.002 0.005 0.009
(1.24) (1.27) (-0.16) (0.74) (1.69)
AQτ 0.001 0.002 0.012 -0.001 -0.004
(0.28) (0.33) (1.45) (-0.29) (-0.99)
AMRτ 0.002 0.002 0.012 0.002 0.001
(0.58) (0.59) (2.24) (0.50) (0.39)
logQSτ 0.014 0.015 0.045 0.014 0.034
(0.96) (1.00) (2.93) (0.93) (2.30)
DHWτ 0.003 0.003 0.011 0.003 0.000
(0.60) (0.55) (1.66) (0.56) (0.03)
σMτ 0.023 0.011 0.024 0.012 0.047 0.02 0.023 0.01 0.025 0.01
(4.96) (2.19) (5.02) (2.23) (4.87) (2.01) (4.86) (2.60) (5.39) (2.66)
constant 0.749 -0.889 1.026 -0.704 1.016 -2.333 0.858 -3.220 0.626 -0.450
(8.07) (-2.87) (7.10) (-2.15) (7.02) (-4.05) (7.94) (-3.23) (8.79) (-1.63)
adj. R2(%) 24.62 28.95 24.31 28.68 33.23 43.02 24.84 28.83 24.26 27.2962
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robustness check, i.e., when the linear decaying optimal weights are employed instead
of exponential decaying weights. The following two columns show the results when
we use 30-minute sampling frequency instead of 15-minute sampling. In columns VII
and VIII, we report the results for the log-transformed variables.
Finally, the last two columns report the results when the explanatory variables are
aggregated via value-weighted cross-sectional averages. All of the regressions include
the intraday dummy variables. The estimated coefficients are omitted for the sake of
brevity. All of the explanatory variables are standardized.
The results for all of the robustness tests provide strong evidence for the informa-
tiveness of the buy side global depth on future volatility of the efficient price. The
sell side of the market is significant only when the aggregated sell side global depth
is approximated as the value-weighted average of the individual stocks. We observe
an increase in the informativeness of global depth, specially in a multivariate setting,
when the sampling period is 30 minutes instead of 15 minutes. All of the estimated
coefficients and the adjusted R2s are higher under the former frequency.
Overall, the results reveal that our findings for the informativeness of global depth
over future efficient return volatility is robust to the weight functions, different model
specifications, and the chosen sampling period.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we evaluate the role of relative depth provision in future market
volatility. To measure the former, we propose a novel way of summarizing the dis-
tribution of liquidity in a limit order book, while taking into account the relative
magnitude and the location of the quoted depth. Our summary measure, global
depth, considers how liquidity is distributed in the whole book and assigns weights
to the information provided by different quotes.
By using high-frequency data from the Istanbul Stock Exchange, we document
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strong evidence that global depth is negatively correlated with one-period-ahead mar-
ket and individual stock volatilities. It dominates the explanatory power of standard
predictors of volatility. These results are remarkably robust to the inclusion of several
liquidity measures. Besides global depth, we find evidence that the relative spread is
informative, supporting the theoretical prediction of Foucault et al. (2007).
Out-of-sample forecasting experiments provide formal evidence of the predictive
power of both global depth and the relative spread on future volatility. We conclude
that including both measures in the analysis and thus capturing both the tightness
and the depth dimension of liquidity, significantly increases the out-of-sample R2.
We contribute to the existing empirical literature, which examines the informa-
tiveness of a limit order book on future volatility. However, this is the first study that
examines the predictive power of aggregate liquidity on intraday market volatility.
Moreover, we propose a new measure with a superior explanatory power compared
to standard liquidity measures.
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Competition, Signaling and Non-Walking
Through the Book: Effects on Order
Choice
Co-authored with Marcela Valenzuela (London School of Economics)
3.1 Introduction
The limit order book and the characteristics of an asset, such as volatility, provide
essential information for a trader who wants to design an appropriate order submis-
sion strategy. This in turn affects the price formation of an asset and the liquidity
dynamics in the market. Following this, there has been a growing research interest
on investors’ choice of order submission over the last decade. By undertaking an
empirical study of a pure order driven market, this paper aims to contribute to this
literature. Our contribution is twofold: first, we examine the trading patterns of
agents when walking through the book is not allowed, i.e., when orders that would
otherwise walk through the book are converted into limit orders. Second, we test
whether “competition” or “signaling” effects, two theories that have been proposed in
the existing literature, dominate each other for depth beyond the best quotes. Both
of these analyses are the first attempts in the literature.
In the Istanbul Stock Exchange, walking through the book is not allowed. That
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is, a “large” market order is first matched with the available volume at the best
corresponding quote. Then, the remaining part is converted to a limit order at the
quoted price instead of walking up or down the limit order book to be fully executed.
This market rule obviously affects the cost of a market order. When walking down/up
the book is allowed, the cost of execution of a large market order is higher since it
matches with less favorable prices (Hamao and Hasbrouck (1995)). This in turn
should affect the market order trader’s submission strategy. By focusing on the order
choice of an impatient (market order) trader, we analyze the informativeness of the
price information contained in the book.
In an early work, Parlour (1998) suggests that an increase in the same-side thick-
ness of the limit order book reveals high competition, which in turn increases the
submission of more aggressive orders in order to jump the queue (“competition ef-
fect”). On the other hand, in their recent theoretical works, Goettler et al. (2005)
and Goettler et al. (2009) argue that if the total volume of orders waiting beyond the
best bid (ask) is “too high”, then this signals to the market that the current quotes
are mispriced and should decrease (increase) (“signaling effect”). By calculating the
volume of orders waiting in the queue for the 10 best quotes, we analyze which effect
dominates at every price level.
Our analysis requires considering the reaction of patient (limit order) and impa-
tient (market order) traders separately to the changing market conditions. Hence,
similar to Pascual and Veredas (2009), we employ a two-stage sequential ordered pro-
bit (SOP) model. Although our methodology coincides with their study, our research
questions are different. In order to test whether competition effect is more persistent
than the best quotes, we focus on the actions of patient traders. On the other hand,
to analyze whether or how non-walking through the book affects the trading strategy
of a market order trader, we focus on the trading strategies of impatient traders.
Using the unprocessed order flow and trade data provided by the Istanbul Stock
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Exchange (ISE), we first reconstruct the limit order book dynamically. We use the
order flow, trade book and limit order book to analyze the effects of the informa-
tion content of the books on the order choice of a trader on a sample of 30 stocks
for the period of June and July 2008. Our data set has one major advantage com-
pared to many studies: since the ISE is a fully computerized and centralized stock
exchange (unlike NYSE, there is no specialist and unlike the London Stock Exchange
for instance, there is a single trading platform in the ISE), the data generated fully
captures the order flow and the execution process. Moreover, in our data set we can
distinguish whether an order is initiated by an institutional or individual investor.
By using this classification we examine whether the trading behavior is different for
institutional traders compared to the individual ones.
There are several papers that provide a theoretical background that the state
of the limit order book contains information that shapes agents’ trading decisions.1
Ahn et al. (2001), Ranaldo (2004), Beber and Caglio (2005), Ellul et al. (2007), Fong
and Liu (2010), Menkhoff et al. (2010), among others, investigate the state of the
book and its effects on order choice of an investor in an empirical framework. The
aforementioned studies consider the informativeness of the limit order book only at
the best quotes, as opposed to Cao et al. (2008), Cao et al. (2009), Pascual and
Veredas (2009) and Lo and Sapp (2010).
Using data from the Australian Stock Exchange, Cao et al. (2008) show that the
information contained at the best quotes affects order submissions, cancelations, and
modifications. On the other hand, the rest of the book matters for order cancellations
and modifications. Using the same data set, Cao et al. (2009) investigate whether
the prices beyond the best bid and offer and their corresponding depths matter in
price discovery. They conclude that the contribution of beyond the book to the price
1See Parlour (1998), Foucault (1999), Foucault et al. (2005), Goettler et al. (2005), Kaniel and
Liu (2006), Goettler et al. (2009), Rosu (2009), among others.
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discovery is 22%, whereas the remaining part comes from the current bid and ask
prices as well as the transaction price. Using a two-stage sequential ordered probit
model, Pascual and Veredas (2009) conclude that not only the best quotes, but the
information beyond the best quotes matters in explaining the degree of patience of
incoming orders. Moreover, they note that although the impatient traders strongly
rely on the best quotes, for limit order traders, strategic decisions are primarily based
on the state of the book beyond the best quotes. Lo and Sapp (2010) empirically
show the trade-off between order aggressiveness and quantity. Using a simultaneous
equations framework in a foreign exchange market, they conclude that order size tends
to be smaller when an order is more aggressive. That is, by submitting smaller size
market orders, traders avoid the higher execution costs. Our paper is the first study
that investigates whether the volume of orders waiting at different price distances
encourage agents to submit more aggressive orders and jump the queue, or rather
signal them to submit less aggressive orders. Moreover, an atypical feature of our
dataset enables us to examine the order choice of a trader when walking through the
book is not allowed.2
Our main findings can be summarized as follows:
• The competition effect dominates the signaling effect for both sides of the mar-
ket, in every stage.
• For a limit order agent, the competition effect is persistent beyond the best
quotes. We show that for both sides of the market, the volume up to the second
best quotes has the strongest competition effect.
• While fitting the size of her market order, for an impatient trader none of
the price information, neither spread or price distance variables, matter in our
2There are other studies that use intraday data from the ISE. For instance, Bildik (2001) and
Ekinci (2008) provide intraday descriptive analyses for the ISE. Bildik (2001) examines the intraday




market. This might be a result of the non-walking through the book, since under
this mechanism, the spread and the price distance variables do not capture the
cost of a large market order.
• We show that volatility, previous price trend and volume accumulated beyond
the best quotes on the opposite side of the book affect the aggressiveness of
market orders. This result might also be explained by the non-allowance of
walking through the book, since these variables affect the execution probability
of the unexecuted part of a large market order.
• Institutional investors consider only the competition effect variables while they
decide to submit a market or a limit order. If they are informed traders as
proposed by the existing literature, this may imply that institutions place orders
based more on their own private valuations than the information provided by
the limit order book.
The paper is organized as follows: Next section describes data and introduce the
order aggressiveness categories. Section 3.3 presents the econometric methodology;
the two-stage sequential ordered probit model. In Section 3.4, we list the explanatory
variables and discuss the empirical questions. Section 3.5 presents the empirical
findings and robustness checks. Finally section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Market and Data
3.2.1 Trading structure in the Istanbul Stock Exchange
The Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) is operating as a fully computerized pure
order-driven market since November 1994. As of December 2012, the ISE index
had a $358 billion value of shares traded year-to-date and $315 billion of market
capitalization. The total value of shares trading and the market capitalization were
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3% and 2% of NYSE respectively.3 In terms of value of shares traded, it is the 20th
largest stock exchange in the world and 5th within the emerging countries.4
Similar to all other major exchanges, a trading day starts with a call market
matching mechanism to determine the opening price. For the rest of the day, a double
auction continuous order matching mechanism is used for trading. Trading occurs in
two sessions with a lunch break and every order is valid for a corresponding session or
for a day. For the period under consideration, the double-continuous auction trading
occurs between 9:45–12:00 in the morning session and 14:00–17:00 in the afternoon
session. A given order is either matched, resulting in a trade, or queued up in a limit
order book waiting to be executed based on the usual price and time priorities. The
fully computerized system ensures the strict enforcement of those priority rules. The
status of a given security is updated almost instantaneously on the traders’ screens,
whenever there is an order arrival, or execution.
Similar to the Australian Stock Exchange and the Spanish Stock Exchange for
instance, the ISE is an open limit order book market. In this market, both individual
and institutional investors are directly connected to the ISE system and they can
observe the book in real time. On the other hand, the ISE offers more pre-trade
transparency compared to many other exchanges. Upon arrival, traders can observe
all of the orders submitted/traded, with the corresponding prices and volumes. The
information is not truncated to any price step. Moreover, for the executed orders
only, they can see the name of the corresponding party who initiated the trade.5 The
open book and pre-trade transparency properties are relevant for our study since we
examine the “competition” and “signaling” effects beyond the best quotes up to the
10 best prices.
3Source: World Federation of Stock Exchanges.
4Emerging countries are classified based on the list of the International Monetary Fund July 16,
2012 report.
5The non-anonymity has changed by October 2010, but for the sample under consideration,
traders can identify the name of the trading parties.
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The other market mechanism worth to emphasize is that walking through the
book is not allowed in the ISE, similar to the Australian Stock Exchange, the Sao
Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa), and the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, for example.
Hence, the unexecuted portion of a marketable limit order6 is converted to a limit
order. If an investor wishes to buy (sell) shares by walking up (down) the book, she
needs to use appropriate limit orders. This characteristic allows us to examine the
effects of this particular market mechanism on the order choice of a market order
trader.
3.2.2 Data and descriptive analysis
Our dataset contains the order and trade books for the period of June and July
2008 for the biggest 30 stocks listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE–30 index).
The 30 stocks in our sample correspond to 75% of the total trading volume of the
ISE for the period under consideration. These data sets allow us to reconstruct the
complete limit order book dynamically. The order book data consists of all submitted
orders for a given stock and date, their corresponding prices and quantities, order
submission times, an order identification number (order ID), buy/sell indicator, as
well as whether the trader is an institutional or an individual one. On the other hand,
the transaction data consists of all the executed orders, their corresponding prices and
quantities, and execution times. These two books are linked to each other with order
and trade ID numbers generated by the ISE system. Hence, our data enables us to
track an order from submission to execution or modification (if any).
To reconstruct the limit order book, we incorporate every order according to the
price and time priority rules and fill in the limit order book one by one. If the price of
a new-coming buy (sell) order is higher (lower) than or equal to the ask (bid) price,
we classify it as a market order. A market order is matched with the corresponding
6In this study, we call marketable limit orders as market orders following Payne (2003) and
Hasbrouck and Saar (2009).
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order(s) from the other side of the book and removed from the limit order book.
Moreover, if an order revision (including the split) is submitted, the original order is
removed from the limit order book. For a given limit order book snapshot, we have a
list of orders submitted but not yet executed, whether they are buy or sell orders and
originated by individual or institutional traders, price and volume information up to
the 10th best quotes. The volume available at the best, second best, and up to the 10th
best prices are calculated as the total volume of orders waiting at that price level.
Hence, by reconstructing the limit order book, we have access to the information
on both the length (price information) and the height (the corresponding volume
information) of a limit order book, which is crucial for our analysis to understand
how the information beyond the best quotes affects the order submission strategies
of agents.
Table 3.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the order flow and trade book, av-
eraged across the sample period. Besides the market capitalization, for which the
value at the beginning of the sample period in million Turkish Liras (M TRY) is
presented, all of the figures are obtained by averaging across trading days (excluding
the opening sessions). The results show that, on average 2253 orders are submitted
in a day, equivalent to 83 million TRY.7 The highest number of orders is submitted
and traded by Garanti Bankasi (GARAN) investors, whereas the smallest one is for
Migros (MIGRS). In terms of volume of orders submitted, GARAN is 8 times bigger
than the average, whereas MIGRS, is 9 times smaller than the average. Although our
sample is composed by the 30 biggest stocks traded in the ISE, these results show a
high degree of heterogeneity in the sample of study. On average around 1400 trades
occur in a day with a total daily average trade size of 9 million shares. This corre-
sponds to an average value traded of around 28 million TRY per day. The number
of buy orders is slightly less than the number of sell orders, and the number of limit
7On 25th of July 2008, the exchange rate was 1.20USD/TRY.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Each Stock
The table reports the summary statistics of ISE–30 stocks for June–July 2008. The first and the
second columns present the ticker and names of the securities in our sample, respectively. The
market capitalization is the value at beginning of the sample period in million Turkish Liras (M
TRY). Number of Orders (Trades) is the average of the total number of orders (trades) in a day.
Volume of Orders (Trades) is the average of the daily number of shares submitted (traded). Value of
Orders (Trades) is the average of the daily value of orders (trades) (volume x price). Spread is the
tick-adjusted difference between the best ask and the best bid. Finally the last two columns report
the average of the daily percentage of buy orders and limit orders, respectively.
Company Company Market Number of Volume of Value of
Ticker Name Capitalization Orders Orders Orders
(M TRY) (M shares) (M TRY)
AKBNK Akbank 16650 2609 26 130.63
AKGRT Aksigorta 1463 1044 4 18.35
ARCLK Arcelik 1664 1003 2 10.51
ASYAB Asya Katilim Bankasi 1980 1392 7 16.94
DOHOL Dogan Holding 2160 2438 37 54.95
DYHOL Dogan Yayin Holding 1082 2991 28 46.06
EREGL Eregli Demir Celik 9995 2286 7 61.99
GARAN Garanti Bankasi 14448 9259 221 749.10
GSDHO Gsd Holding 277 2074 33 35.77
HALKB Halk Bankasi 7750 1656 8 49.35
HURGZ Hurriyet Gazetesi 745 2281 29 45.50
IHLAS Ihlas Holding 202 1975 32 18.15
ISCTR Is Bankasi 13165 7332 89 393.63
ISGYO Is GMYO 459 700 5 4.94
KCHOL Koc Holding 7629 1399 12 41.51
KRDMD Kardemir 670 2016 34 38.73
MIGRS Migros 3614 346 3 60.88
PETKM Petkim 1024 1156 4 20.39
PTOFS Petrol Ofisi 2778 507 2 8.47
SAHOL Sabanci Holding 8676 1103 7 28.25
SISE Sise Cam 1439 1572 10 14.73
SKBNK Sekerbank 876 1872 10 21.47
TCELL Turkcell 17050 1847 15 117.95
THYAO Turk Hava Yollari 919 1252 5 26.83
TKFNK Tekfen Holding 2166 1172 3 25.96
TSKB TSKB 490 707 6 5.73
TTKOM Turk Telekom 14350 4447 29 119.25
TUPRS Tupras 7387 1413 3 75.11
VAKBN Vakiflar Bankasi 4400 4813 86 151.08
YKBNK Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi 9999 2939 42 106.19
Average 5184 2253 26.52 83.28
Median 2163 1752 10.04 40.12
Min 202 346 1.59 4.94
Max 17050 9259 221.13 749.10
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Each Stock (cont.)
Company Number of Volume Value Spread %Buy %LO
Ticker Trades Traded Traded (tick adj.)
(M shares) (M TRY)
AKBNK 1643 8.81 44.09 1.04 46.79 68.56
AKGRT 714 1.54 6.59 1.15 52.13 62.16
ARCLK 576 0.75 3.27 1.25 45.50 71.04
ASYAB 954 2.19 5.64 1.14 49.20 62.10
DOHOL 1546 12.37 18.45 1.06 44.11 68.74
DYHOL 1949 9.45 15.40 1.06 48.77 65.93
EREGL 1455 2.19 20.22 1.08 48.71 67.76
GARAN 6186 82.39 278.14 1.02 47.46 69.78
GSDHO 1400 10.91 11.78 1.05 47.48 64.22
HALKB 972 2.56 15.99 1.10 46.46 71.57
HURGZ 1455 9.53 15.09 1.10 47.05 67.16
IHLAS 942 7.63 4.30 1.01 47.64 70.75
ISCTR 4732 32.46 143.32 1.03 49.48 69.81
ISGYO 367 1.35 1.31 1.11 44.94 71.81
KCHOL 855 3.93 13.72 1.11 45.17 68.76
KRDMD 1150 9.91 11.39 1.05 45.80 70.28
MIGRS 152 0.48 9.84 1.03 38.90 70.28
PETKM 688 1.12 6.02 1.14 46.81 70.54
PTOFS 295 0.48 2.53 1.38 45.80 69.47
SAHOL 713 2.19 9.44 1.15 48.54 66.25
SISE 975 3.24 4.63 1.08 51.39 67.02
SKBNK 1216 3.23 7.06 1.15 44.15 64.36
TCELL 1095 5.05 40.15 1.10 46.47 71.25
THYAO 787 1.65 8.99 1.10 50.52 68.10
TKFNK 747 1.00 8.56 1.13 48.63 64.70
TSKB 448 1.72 1.62 1.06 48.98 63.23
TTKOM 2343 8.48 35.07 1.05 39.22 73.20
TUPRS 761 0.83 22.86 1.07 48.45 73.68
VAKBN 3169 31.17 54.61 1.04 47.42 68.53
YKBNK 1911 14.61 36.47 1.04 48.33 67.08
Average 1406 9.11 28.55 1.10 47.01 68.27
Median 973 3.24 11.59 1.08 47.44 68.65
Min 152 0.48 1.31 1.01 38.90 62.10
Max 6186 82.39 278.14 1.38 52.13 73.68
orders constitute about 68% of all the submitted orders. The average tick adjusted
spread is quite narrow, being less than 2 for all of the stocks in our sample. This
is similar to the findings of Griffiths et al. (2000) on the most liquid securities of
the Toronto Stock Exchange, but lower than the spreads presented in Pascual and




In order to analyze how the state of the book affects the order choice of an investor,
we define order aggressiveness categories based on the classification of Biais, Hillion
and Spatt (1995). The first two categories are related to the market order (MO)
aggressiveness, whereas the rest is defined for the limit order (LO) aggressiveness
based on the limit price position.
• Category 1 (“large MO buy”): Vorder ≥ Vask and Porder ≥ Pask.
• Category 2 (“small MO buy”): Vorder < Vask and Porder ≥ Pask.
• Category 3 (“buy LO within the quotes”): Pask > Porder > Pbid.
• Category 4 (“buy LO at the quote”): Pask > Porder = Pbid.
• Category 5 (“buy LO away from the quote”): Porder < Pbid < Pask.
where, Vorder and Porder are the volume and the price of a buy order, respectively. Vask
is the total volume of orders waiting at the best ask price, Pask. Finally, Pbid denotes
the best bid price. Sell side is constructed analogously.
Table 3.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the order aggressiveness categories
for both buy and sell sides of the market separately. The results suggest that for the
buy side, the most frequent events are small buy market orders (category 2) followed
by orders submitted at the quotes, whereas for the sell side the ones away from the
best quotes (category 5) have the most frequent arrivals, contradicting the findings
of Biais et al. (1995), Beber and Caglio (2005), and Griffiths et al. (2000) for the
Paris Bourse, the NYSE and the Toronto Stock Exchange, respectively. Table 3.2
also shows a very low frequency of orders within the quotes (for both sides of the
book), which can be explained by the small inside spread.The results regarding the
execution rate, i.e., the proportion of orders executed, suggest that only around 20%
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of the Order Aggressiveness Categories
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the order aggressiveness categories for both sides
of the market. Orders are divided into five categories based on the limit price position following
Biais et al. (1995). Category 1 (“large MO buy”): Vorder ≥ Vask and Porder ≥ Pask. Category 2
(“small MO buy”): Vorder < Vask and Porder ≥ Pask. Category 3 (“buy LO within the quotes”):
Pask > Porder > Pbid. Category 4 (“buy LO at the quote”): Pask > Porder = Pbid. Category 5 (“buy
LO away from the quote”): Porder < Pbid < Pask. Vorder and Porder are the volume and the limit
price of the buy order, respectively. Vask is the accumulated volume of orders waiting at the best
ask price, Pask. Finally, Pbid denotes the best bid price. Sell side is constructed analogously. The
first two columns report the proportion of orders and order sizes for each category. Execution rate
is calculated as the proportion of orders executed in each category, whereas the last column presents
the average execution time (in minutes) of orders in each category.
Number of Volume of Execution Execution
Orders (%) orders (%) Rate (%) Time (min)
Buy Side
Category 1 3.77 14.82 98.05 3
Category 2 33.24 24.31 99.77 0
Category 3 0.98 1.90 86.88 18
Category 4 32.14 34.79 67.33 24
Category 5 29.87 24.17 21.31 88
Sell Side
Category 1 3.51 12.71 98.16 2
Category 2 24.44 22.42 99.77 0
Category 3 0.85 1.66 88.95 15
Category 4 28.79 32.32 60.72 21
Category 5 42.41 30.88 16.04 78
of orders away from the quotes are executed compared to 60% of execution rate for
the orders at the quotes. That is, going from category 4 to 5; traders are facing a
substantial non-execution risk. These figures are very similar to the study of Griffiths
et al. (2000) conducted on the Toronto Stock Exchange. A similar conclusion can be
derived from the average waiting times for execution.
3.3 Sequential Ordered Probit Regressions
We investigate how the information content of the limit order book affects the
order choice of the investor, by considering the order choice as a two-stage process.
As a first step in her order choice, observing the market dynamics and limit order book
information, the agent is patient, i.e., submits a limit order, or she is impatient, i.e.,
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submits a market order.8 In the second stage, given the agent is patient, she decides
the position of her limit price (decides to submit category 3, 4 or 5 order), whereas the
impatient trader decides whether to submit a large or small market order (category 1
or 2 order). To allow this sequential decision, following Pascual and Veredas (2009),
we employ a sequential ordered probit (SOP) model for the empirical investigation.
The attractiveness of the SOP model, compared to the ordered probit model, is that
the former enables us to compare the reaction of the patient and impatient trader to
the changing market conditions separately.
3.3.1 First stage–arrival of a market or limit order trader
Let Y ∗ denote the degree of patience of an incoming agent in the first stage of
the SOP model. Although Y ∗ is unobservable, we assume that it is a function of
K observable (limit order book) variables, Xs. We consider volatility, price trend,
volume and price distances as explanatory variables. A detailed explanation of the




βkXk,t−1 + εt, (3.1)
Yt =
{
0 if −∞ < Y ∗t ≤ δ
1 if δ < Y ∗t <∞
, (3.2)
where δ is the threshold and t refers to the transaction time, not the clock time. The
first-stage-dependent variable is equal to 1 if the trader is impatient and submits a
market order or 0 if the trader is patient and submits a limit order.
8One can argue that the degree of patience is based on a trader’s information level, preferences
or waiting costs, hence, exogenously determined. However, recent theoretical works suggest that
market conditions and the state of the book affect the degree of patience. For example Goettler
et al. (2009) claim that although a patient informed agent submits a limit order, when she observes
high volatility, she switches to a market order to take advantage of the mispriced quotes. Similarly,
in Foucault et al. (2005), if spread increases over a cutoff level, all traders, even the ones with high
waiting costs, will submit limit orders. Moreover, Ranaldo (2004), Beber and Caglio (2005), among
others, show empirically that a trader considers the state of the book while formulating her order
strategies. Hence, we allow the arrival rate of patient and impatient agents to be influenced by the
state of the book and market conditions.
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Assuming that the error terms are normally distributed, the probability of the
incoming trader being patient is:
P (Yt = 0) = P (−∞ < Y ∗t ≤ δ)
= P (−∞ <
K∑
k=1





where Φ is the normal cumulative distribution function.
3.3.2 Second stage–patient trader
In the second stage, both patient and impatient traders choose their level of ag-
gressiveness given the information content of the book. A patient trader has three











1 if −∞ < LO∗t ≤ δlo1
2 if δlo1 < LO∗t ≤ δlo2
3 if δlo2 < LO∗t <∞
, (3.5)
where δlo1 and δlo2 are the thresholds.
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a trader submits a limit order away from
the best quotes (category 5), is equal to 2, if the order is submitted at the best quotes
(category 4) or is equal to 3 if the order is submitted within the quotes (category 3).
Hence, our dependent variable increases as aggressiveness increases.
Assuming that the error terms are normally distributed, the probability of the
incoming patient trader being type i = 1, 2, 3 is:







where δlo0 = −∞ and δlo3 =∞.
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3.3.3 Second stage–impatient trader
Finally, the impatient trader decides the quantity she wants to trade; whether she
submits an aggressive market order (category 1), or submits a small market order












0 if −∞ < MO∗t ≤ δmo1
1 if δmo1 < MO∗t <∞
, (3.8)
where, δmo1 is the threshold.
As the coefficients of the sequential ordered probit measure the change in the
latent variable with respect to a change in one of the explanatory variables, they
are difficult to interpret. A direct interpretable measure is given by the marginal
probabilities (marginal effects), which show how the probability of order choices is
affected given a marginal change in any of the explanatory variables:








































Empirically we ask the following questions: whether “competition” or “signaling”
effects dominate each other at every level of the depth, how/whether walking through
the book affects the order decision of an impatient trader, and finally, whether the
limit order book information affects the trading behavior institutional investors.
3.4.1 Covariates for the impact of depth at and beyond the
best quotes
We test whether the competition and signaling effects, proposed by Parlour (1998)
and Goettler et al. (2005), Goettler et al. (2009), respectively, dominate each other for
depths beyond the best quotes. To do so, we calculate the volume of orders waiting in
the queue for the 10 best prices. We define a proxy for the signaling and competition
effects separately for every stage of the sequential ordered probit (SOP) model. In
the first stage, when a trader decides whether to submit a market or a limit order, she
considers only the increase of the volume at the best quotes (Vsame1 and/or Vopp1)
as an increased competition. We therefore use the volume of orders waiting beyond
the best quotes as a proxy for signaling effect. Given that the trader is impatient, in
the second stage, she decides the size of her market order. In this case, since the order
has the price priority, there will be no price competition and the volume of orders
beyond the best quotes captures the signaling effect.
On the other hand, in the second stage, when a limit order trader decides her
limit price, we consider two states: first, (tick-adjusted) inside spread greater than 1
and second, spread equal to 1. If an agent observes the inside spread greater than 1,
then by submitting an order within the quotes (category 3 order) she can jump the
queue. In this case, Vsame1 and (possibly) depth beyond the best quotes captures the
competition effect. However, if the spread is 1, then “mechanically” it is not possible
to submit a category 3 order, i.e., a trader cannot gain priority over the orders already
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waiting at Vsame1. In this case, while positioning her limit price, she may consider
just the depth beyond the best quotes as an increased competition, at least up to some
cutoff level, discarding the depth at the quotes as part of the competition effect. In
order to determine the cutoff point, we run the SOP regressions with accumulated
volume of orders from the second to the third, from the second to the fourth and from
the second to the fifth best prices (Vsame2_3, Vsame2_4 and Vsame2_5). The signaling
effect will then be captured by Vsame4_10, Vsame5_10 and Vsame6_10, respectively.
Table 3.3 reports the results. For both sides of the market, the volume up to the
second best quotes has the strongest competition effect. That is, the competition
effect persists beyond the best quotes. The marginal effects as well as the significance
of the estimated coefficients are decreasing with the additional quotes added.9 More-
over, at every price level, competition effect dominates the signaling effect. Finally,
the results suggest an asymmetry between the sell and the buy side. The signaling
effect is more persistent and stronger for the sell side.
As suggested, we pick the volume at the second best quote as the cutoff level.
Hence, we define the competition effect, Vcomp and the signaling effect, Vsign as
follows:








t + ...+ Vsame
10
t .
• Step 2– order choice of patient traders:
Vcompt =
{
Vsame2t if spreadt = 1
Vsame1t + Vsame
2






t + ...+ Vsame
10
t .
9For the sake of brevity we did not report the marginal effects, but only report the median
coefficient for the statistically significant stocks. Note that the marginal effect of an order submitted
at the quotes (category 4) is positively related to the coefficient reported.
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Table 3.3: Analysis of Depth Beyond the Best Quotes
The table presents the results of the depth analysis using different cutoff values. Vcomp=Vsamej +
...+Vsamecutoff, where j = 1, if spread/tick> 1, j = 2 otherwise. Whereas, Vsign=Vsamecutoff+1 +
...+Vsame10. Vcompopp and Vsignopp are constructed analogously for the opposite side of the book.
All of the volume variables are scaled by 1e-6. Vola is the EWMA volatility (multiplied by 1000),
Trend is the previous price change of 60 observations (multiplied by 1000), SPR is the (tick adjusted)
inside spread, calculated as the difference between the best ask and bid quotes. The median, the
percentage of positive coefficients given that they are significant, and finally the percentage of stocks
with a statistically significant slope at a 5% level are reported.
BUY Vola Trend SPR Vcomp Vcompopp Vsign Vsignopp
cutoff=2 Median 0.04 0.82 0.78 0.67 0.08 -0.10 0.07
Sig. (%) 50 73 97 80 27 60 37
Pos. (%) 93 100 100 100 75 6 100
cutoff=3 Median 0.04 0.83 0.81 0.47 0.07 -0.14 0.05
Sig. (%) 47 77 97 67 47 53 27
Pos. (%) 93 100 100 95 79 0 88
cutoff=4 Median 0.04 0.82 0.84 0.39 0.09 -0.11 0.02
Sig. (%) 47 77 97 57 43 43 40
Pos. (%) 93 100 100 82 92 15 58
cutoff=5 Median 0.04 0.82 0.82 0.32 0.15 -0.09 0.06
Sig. (%) 47 80 97 53 53 47 37
Pos. (%) 93 100 100 75 100 29 64
SELL
cutoff=2 Median 0.05 -0.62 0.66 1.30 0.11 -0.19 0.05
Sig. (%) 43 60 100 83 27 83 47
Pos. (%) 85 6 100 100 63 8 79
cutoff=3 Median 0.05 -0.63 0.68 0.68 0.08 -0.24 0.06
Sig. (%) 47 57 97 77 50 77 43
Pos. (%) 79 6 100 96 60 0 69
cutoff=4 Median 0.05 -0.64 0.65 0.21 0.10 -0.34 0.04
Sig. (%) 43 57 97 67 43 67 47
Pos. (%) 77 6 100 85 92 0 64
cutoff=5 Median 0.05 -0.65 0.65 0.12 0.07 -0.44 0.01
Sig. (%) 43 57 97 57 57 60 40
Pos. (%) 77 6 100 59 94 0 58





t + ...+ Vsame
10
t . (3.14)
where Vsamei is the total volume of orders waiting at the ith best quote. Competition




3.4.2 Covariates for the impact of non-walking through the
book
In markets where walking through the book is allowed, an aggressive (category
1) market order has to walk up or down the order book to be fully executed. For
markets in which walking through the book is not allowed, any excess that cannot be
executed at the pre-specified limit price joins the queue at the quoted price instead
of walking through and executed with less favorable prices. By focusing on the order
choice of a market order trader, we test the relevance of price information while fitting
her order size when walking through the book is not allowed. In addition to the depth
variables, we define the inside spread and the price distance variables.
i) The (tick adjusted) inside spread, calculated as the difference between the best
ask and bid quotes.
ii) • The (tick adjusted) price distance between the best and the second best
quotes for the opposite and the same sides of the book.
• The (tick adjusted) price distance between the second best ask (bid) and
the highest available ask (lowest available bid) quote for the opposite and
the same sides of the book.
The spread and the price distance variables for the opposite side capture the
(weighted) average execution price of an aggressive order for markets in which walking
through is possible. Because, in that case, when a large buy (sell) market order is
submitted, it will eat up all the available volume at the best ask (bid) and then
move up (down) to the second best ask (bid), and if necessary move up to third after
consuming the second, etc. Since the cost of a market order increases with Dopp1_2
or/and Dopp2_max, this should lead to a submission of less aggressive market orders.
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3.4.3 Additional explanatory variables
Besides our key explanatory variables discussed above, the current literature posits
that the volatility and the previous price trend affect the order choice of an agent.
We include these two variables in our analysis as explanatory variables.
Following Beber and Caglio (2005), we define the volatility as the exponential
moving average of the last 60 mid-quote squared returns. The optimal decay factor
λ is obtained via maximum likelihood estimation.10
σˆt =
√
λσˆ2t−1 + (1− λ)r2t−1. (3.15)
Expected signs: While higher volatility implies a higher probability of execution,
it also increases the adverse selection costs. Existing literature identifies a negative
relationship between volatility and order aggressiveness. Foucault (1999), Wald and
Horrigan (2005) and Goettler et al. (2009), among others, claim that in high volatility
states, since the picking off risk increases, the aggressiveness of an incoming agent
decreases.
An order submission strategy may also depend on recent movements in the price
(Hall and Hautsch (2006)). We identify the previous price trend observed by the
agents (Trend) as the change of the mid-quote prices for the last 60 observations at
the time of the order arrival.
Expected signs: Given that a trader observes an increasing price trend upon arrival,
this may indicate a possible future price increase as well. Since this movement will
move the prices away from the current levels, a buy trader may interpret it as an
increased non-execution risk of her limit order; hence, she prefers to submit a more
aggressive order. This works opposite for the seller.
In all of the regressions, to control the seasonality on the arrival rate of orders,
10Riskmetric EWMA is a version of GARCH(1,1) where persistence parameters sum up to one and
the constant term is equal to zero. In other words, the optimal decay parameter λ can be obtained
by estimating the Integrated GARCH model.
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we use time of the day dummy, indicating which half-an-hour of the day the order
is submitted. Moreover, five previous lags of the dependent variables, determined by
the Akaike information criterion (AIC) is included as control variables.11
3.5 Results
As mentioned in Section 3.2, the 30 stocks in our sample present a high degree
of heterogeneity. Thus, we estimate the sequential ordered probit (SOP) regressions
for each stock separately, for buy and sell sides of the market. All of the regressions
include 5 lags of the dependent variable and the time-of-the day dummies. For the
sake of brevity, those are not reported. We report the median, minimum, maximum
and the 25th and the 75th percentile of the estimated coefficients, the percentage of
statistically significant coefficients at 5% level, and the percentage of positive coeffi-
cients given that they are significant. Table 3.4, Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 present the
results of the first stage, the second stage for a limit order trader, and the second
stage for a market order trader of the SOP model, respectively. Table B.1 provides the
description of the explanatory variables defined in Section 3.4 and Table B.2 provides
a summary of the major findings.
3.5.1 Impact of depth at and beyond the best quotes
Table 3.4 reveals that an increase in the depth at the best quotes (Vcomp) is
perceived as an increased competition and encourages traders to submit more market
orders for both sides of the market. On the other hand, when competition on the
opposite side of the book (Vcompopp) increases, agents predict that the market order
arrivals increases on the opposite side of the book, implying an increased probability
of execution for their limit orders, hence they submit more limit orders. These results
11While the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) chooses 5 as the optimal lag in the first stage
and the second stage–limit order trader, it chooses 2 as the optimal lag in the second stage–market
order trader. We perform a robustness analysis with optimal lags chosen by the BIC and conclude
that the results are similar.
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are consistent with the findings of Ranaldo (2004), Beber and Caglio (2005), and
Pascual and Veredas (2009). Our results suggest that an increase in the volume of
orders waiting beyond the best quotes (Vsign) is perceived as a disagreement on the
current price and discourages the market order submissions. This signaling effect is
more pronounced on the sell side of the book compared to the buy side. This contra-
dicts with the results of Pascual and Veredas (2009) who find a positive relationship
between the accumulated number of orders waiting from the second to the fifth best
quotes and the arrival rate of market order traders. They conclude that this finding
supports the “crowding-out” hypothesis of Parlour (1998).
Table 3.5 presents the regression results for a patient trader. It suggests that only
the same side of the book matters for both, buyer and seller. Vcomp and Vsign has
expected signs. An increase in the competition leads to a submission of aggressive
limit orders to jump the queue, whereas an increase on the same side depth away
from the quotes (Vsign) is perceived as a possible mispricing of the best quotes as
Goettler et al. (2005) and Goettler et al. (2009) predict and lead to a submission of
less aggressive limit orders.
Marginal effects regarding the depth variables reveal that the volume at the best
quotes is particularly emphasized while determining the degree of patience of the
incoming trader compared to depth beyond the best quotes. Furthermore, the com-
petition effect is stronger compared to the signaling effect for both sides of the market
in all stages of the SOP.
3.5.2 Impact of non-walking through the book
Table 3.6 shows that, while fitting the size of her market order for an impatient
trader, none of the price information, neither spread nor price distance variables,
matter. This is intuitive, since when walking through the book is not allowed, the





Table 3.4: First Stage Sequential Ordered Probit
The table presents the results of the first stage of the two-stage sequential ordered probit model. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the incoming
trader is impatient (submits a market order, MO), and 0 otherwise. Vola is the EWMA volatility (multiplied by 1000), Trend is the price change of the
last 60 observations (multiplied by 1000), SPR is the (tick adjusted) inside spread, calculated as the difference between the best ask and bid quotes, Vcomp
(Vcompopp) is the volume accounting for the competition effect on the same (opposite) side of the book, Vsign (Vsignopp) is the volume accounting for the
signaling effect on the same (opposite) side of the book as defined in equation (3.12). All of the volume variables are scaled by 1e-6. Dsame1_2 is the price
distance between the best and the second best quotes, whereas Dsame2_max is the price distance between the second best ask (bid) and the highest available
ask (lowest available bid) quote for the same side of the book. Dopp1_2 and Dopp2_max are constructed analogously for the opposite side of the book. All
of the regressions include 5 lags of the dependent variable and the time-of-the day dummies. For the sake of brevity, those are not reported. The median,
minimum, maximum and the 25th and the 75th percentile of the estimated coefficients, the percentage of positive coefficients given that they are significant,
and finally the percentage of stocks with a statistically significant slope at a 5% level are reported. The cross sectional median of marginal effects (scaled by
1e3) is also reported.
Buy Vola Trend SPR Vcomp Vcompopp Vsign Vsignopp Dsame1_2 Dsame2_max Dopp1_2 Dopp2_max
Median -0.02 -1.08 -0.31 1.64 -1.95 -0.02 0.00 -0.14 -0.01 -0.14 -0.02
Min. -0.09 -5.67 -4.46 0.08 -8.03 -0.35 -0.56 -0.83 -0.04 -0.96 -0.75
P25 -0.04 -1.55 -0.40 0.80 -3.76 -0.06 -0.08 -0.40 -0.02 -0.36 -0.04
P75 0.01 -0.62 -0.23 3.53 -1.03 0.04 0.05 -0.09 0.00 -0.04 0.00
Max. 0.05 0.87 -0.04 7.40 -0.16 0.67 0.39 0.18 0.02 0.50 0.05
Sig. (%) 63 83 80 100 100 60 53 40 43 30 73
Pos. (%) 16 0 0 100 0 33 56 8 15 22 32
Marginal Effects–median
MO -9.28 -406.55 -121.38 650.20 -746.44 -6.21 -0.56 -54.55 -1.99 -54.80 -6.28
Sell
Median -0.03 1.02 -0.37 1.76 -1.77 -0.14 0.01 -0.15 0.00 -0.25 -0.01
Min. -0.10 -0.14 -1.26 0.14 -7.89 -0.93 -0.51 -1.02 -0.64 -0.75 -0.12
P25 -0.04 0.59 -0.41 0.73 -3.32 -0.28 -0.12 -0.41 -0.02 -0.35 -0.02
P75 -0.02 1.36 -0.24 4.15 -0.77 -0.05 0.07 -0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00
Max. 0.05 4.85 -0.05 9.97 -0.14 0.05 0.39 0.73 0.03 0.26 0.02
Sig. (%) 67 80 83 100 100 77 70 40 30 43 50
Pos. (%) 5 100 0 100 0 4 57 25 44 0 20
Marginal Effects–median




Table 3.5: Second Stage Sequential Probit–Patient Traders
The table presents the results of the second stage of the two-stage sequential ordered probit model for patient traders. Given the trader is patient, the
dependent variable is equal to 1, 2 or 3 if the trader submits a category 5, category 4 or category 3 order (limit price within, at or away from the best
quotes), respectively. Vcomp (Vcompopp) is the volume accounting for the competition effect on the same (opposite) side of the book, Vsign (Vsignopp) is
the volume accounting for the signaling effect on the same (opposite) side of the book as defined in equation (3.13). They are scaled by 1e-6. The rest of
the explanatory variables are defined in Table 3.4. All of the regressions include 5 lags of the dependent variable and the time-of-the day dummies. For the
sake of brevity, those are not reported. The median, minimum, maximum and the 25th and the 75th percentile of the estimated coefficients, the percentage
of positive coefficients given that they are significant, and finally the percentage of stocks with a statistically significant slope at a 5% level are reported. The
cross sectional median of marginal effects (scaled by 1e3) is also reported.
Buy Vola Trend SPR Vcomp Vcompopp Vsign Vsignopp Dsame1_2 Dsame2_max Dopp1_2 Dopp2_max
Median 0.02 0.67 0.78 0.52 0.08 -0.07 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00
Min. -0.10 -0.14 0.08 -0.07 -0.52 -0.72 -0.20 -1.26 -0.04 -2.40 -0.06
P25 -0.01 0.42 0.56 0.20 -0.04 -0.24 -0.01 -0.31 0.00 -0.20 -0.01
P75 0.04 1.16 0.86 1.43 0.30 -0.01 0.11 0.47 0.02 0.22 0.02
Max. 0.14 2.10 1.79 4.17 2.23 0.54 0.56 1.91 0.04 5.39 1.59
Sig. (%) 50 73 97 80 27 60 37 60 50 27 43
Pos. (%) 93 100 100 100 75 6 100 44 53 50 54
Marginal Effects–median
LO–Above -8.13 -259.55 -303.69 -204.17 -32.90 27.73 -5.44 -11.87 -1.46 -10.25 -0.22
LO–At 7.57 250.95 287.37 194.83 32.33 -26.76 5.33 11.31 1.41 9.85 0.21
LO–Within 0.25 9.09 12.02 5.96 0.56 -0.65 0.14 0.28 0.07 0.50 0.01
Sell
Median 0.02 -0.42 0.66 0.58 0.02 -0.08 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00
Min. -0.05 -2.49 0.20 -0.03 -1.28 -1.33 -0.59 -1.00 -0.05 -0.73 -0.06
P25 0.00 -0.94 0.53 0.19 -0.03 -0.36 -0.01 -0.41 -0.01 -0.07 -0.01
P75 0.05 -0.10 0.84 1.88 0.11 -0.03 0.11 0.54 0.02 0.41 0.00
Max. 0.22 0.50 1.18 5.56 0.96 0.65 0.53 1.39 1.67 5.00 0.04
Sig. (%) 43 60 100 83 27 83 47 40 37 40 30
Pos. (%) 85 6 100 100 63 8 79 42 55 75 56
Marginal Effects–median
LO–Above -6.45 164.39 -264.32 -229.53 -8.61 32.53 -8.54 -0.31 -0.39 -101.07 -0.38
LO–At 6.26 -158.65 256.27 221.10 8.01 -32.08 8.45 0.31 0.38 99.31 0.35
LO–Within 0.14 -4.70 8.52 5.93 0.11 -0.89 0.08 0.00 0.01 1.80 0.0288
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price of a large market order compared to a small one. To analyze this further, we
first test the joint significance of these variables and second, we use a different proxy
to capture the price and volume information contained beyond the best quotes.
For the majority of the stocks, we cannot reject the null hypothesis γSPR =
γDopp1_2 = γDopp2_max = 0 with a median χ2 = 4.63 (p-val=0.1759) and χ2 = 2.88
(p-val=0.4112) for buy and sell sides, respectively, where γ is defined in equation
(3.7). This suggests that the price information contained in the limit order book
is even jointly uninformative for a market order trader. As a different proxy, we
fit a second degree polynomial for the total volume available at each price and the
corresponding quotes. Then the coefficients of the quadratic term for both sell and
buy sides of the book are used in the SOP regressions. As expected, the fit of the
quadratic trend for the same and the opposite sides of the book are insignificant at
5% level.
Our results suggest that a market order trader only considers volatility, previous
price trend, and volume accumulated beyond the best quotes on the opposite side
of the book. In high volatility states an impatient trader submits more aggressive
market orders. This can be explained by two: first, an impatient trader may benefit
from a high volatility state since it increases the probability of fully execution of large
size orders. This is due to the fact that the excess is converted to a limit order and
the execution probability of a limit order increases with volatility.12 This result is
consistent with findings of Hall and Hautsch (2006). In their analysis conducted on
Australian Stock Exchange, another market with non-walking through the book, they
focus only on the aggressive market and limit orders. Their results suggest that high
volatility states increase the arrival rate of aggressive market orders. Second, given
that the trader submits a market order in a high volatility state, it is more likely that






Table 3.6: Second Stage Sequential Probit Regressions–Impatient Traders
The table presents the results of the second stage of the two-stage sequential ordered probit model. Given the trader is impatient, the dependent variable is
equal to 0 if she submits a small market order (MO) (category 2 order) or equal to 1 if she submits a large MO (category 1 order). Vcomp (Vcompopp) is
the volume accounting for the competition effect on the same (opposite) side of the book, Vsign (Vsignopp) is the volume accounting for the signaling effect
on the same (opposite) side of the book as defined in equation (3.14). They are scaled by 1e-6. The rest of the explanatory variables are defined in Table 3.4.
All of the regressions include 5 lags of the dependent variable and the time-of-the day dummies. For the sake of brevity, those are not reported. The median,
minimum, maximum and the 25th and the 75th percentile of the estimated coefficients, the percentage of positive coefficients given that they are significant,
and finally the percentage of stocks with a statistically significant slope at a 5% level are reported. The cross sectional median of marginal effects (scaled by
1e3) is also reported.
Buy Vola Trend SPR Vcomp Vsign Vsignopp Dsame1_2 Dsame2_max Dopp1_2 Dopp2_max
Median 0.18 -1.01 -0.12 -0.14 -0.05 -0.09 -0.04 0.01 -0.16 0.00
Min. 0.10 -5.57 -0.89 -2.54 -0.98 -1.62 -0.97 -0.05 -0.86 -0.65
P25 0.15 -1.52 -0.22 -0.31 -0.14 -0.69 -0.16 0.00 -0.35 -0.05
P75 0.22 -0.41 0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.08 0.04 0.11 0.02
Max. 0.41 0.56 0.46 2.79 0.26 0.46 0.53 0.09 0.56 0.11
Sig. (%) 100 67 3 27 33 70 10 27 23 47
Pos. (%) 100 0 0 13 50 5 0 88 29 43
Marginal Effects–median
Large MO 23.29 -134.84 -14.43 -8.13 -5.55 -12.14 -5.81 1.44 -12.59 0.60
Sell
Median 0.19 1.20 -0.01 -0.51 -0.08 -0.09 0.01 0.01 -0.10 -0.01
Min. 0.10 -0.18 -0.61 -4.22 -1.37 -1.07 -0.81 -0.17 -1.56 -0.09
P25 0.17 0.44 -0.13 -0.98 -0.27 -0.27 -0.15 -0.01 -0.41 -0.03
P75 0.24 2.10 0.12 -0.12 -0.05 0.00 0.26 0.02 0.12 0.01
Max. 0.63 5.00 0.81 0.32 0.02 0.74 0.57 0.05 0.80 0.07
Sig. (%) 100 67 7 63 53 50 13 10 37 13
Pos. (%) 100 100 50 0 0 7 0 33 18 25
Marginal Effects–median
Large MO 31.36 181.68 -2.50 -71.17 -12.70 -19.65 1.68 1.02 -8.24 -0.9390
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she is informed as Goettler et al. (2009) predict. She would like to take advantage of
the mispricing at the quotes, which makes her to submit an aggressive market order.
The accumulated volume of orders on the opposite side of the book (Vsignopp) and
the change of the mid-quote prices for the last 60 observations (Trend) are negatively
related with the buy market order aggressiveness. In other words, an impatient
buyer splits her orders into several small quantities rather than submitting a large
market order when Vsignopp or Trend increases. Because, an increase in Vsignopp
or Trend signals a possible future price increase, increasing the non-execution risk for
the limit-order-converted-part of the aggressive market order. The opposite is true
for the seller.
In comparison to the study of Pascual and Veredas (2009), which is conducted
on the Spanish Stock Exchange, we have different results. The authors show that
the spread and the price distances on the opposite side of the market matters for an
impatient trader’s decision. In addition, in his study on the Swiss Stock Exchange,
Ranaldo (2004) demonstrates that the sensitivity of a large market order with respect
to volatility is more negative compared to a small one. Thus, in high volatility states
an impatient trader prefers to submit a small market order, which contradicts our
finding. One plausible explanation of the discrepancy in the results could be the
walking through the book mechanism, which is allowed in both of the markets.13
3.5.3 Effects of the additional variables
In line with the existing literature, we find that the probability of an incoming
agent being patient increases with volatility, since the picking off risk increases in high
volatility states. On the other hand, Table 3.5 shows that, given that the agent is
patient and submits a limit order, she prefers to submit more aggressive limit orders
13Non-walking through the book is not the only difference between the ISE and the other markets




when volatility is higher since submitting orders away from the quotes decreases the
execution probability significantly.14 This result is weak for both sides of the market.
Our results suggest that, when the previous price trend increases, a buyer submits
more limit orders whereas a seller submits more market orders. This contradicts
the expected sign proposed. One possible interpretation is the expectation of mean
reversion in the prices. If a seller, for instance, believes that prices will revert back,
she would submit an aggressive market order to take advantage of this “mispricing”,
instead of waiting and to be compensated by a limit order.
Consistent with the majority of the literature, the first stage SOP regressions show
that when spread is wider the arrival rate of patient traders increases. On the other
hand, Table 3.5 shows that, the importance of the inside spread is more pronounced
for the limit order trader while positioning their limit price. We find that a wider
spread persuades patient traders to compete more heavily to jump the queue when
spreads are wide, which confirms the predictions of Foucault et al. (2005) and Goettler
et al. (2005).
3.5.4 Trading behavior of institutions
The current literature points out that individual and institutional investors may
differ in their level of information implying that institutions are informed traders
(Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Cornell and Sirri (1992), Koski and Scruggs (1998), and
Chakravarty (2001)). In our data we can distinguish whether an order is initiated
by an institutional or individual investor, with a limitation however. Due to internal
regulations, some of foreign institutional investors are classified as individual instead
of institution. Thus, whenever it is marked as an institutional investor in our data set,
it is an institutional investor for sure. However, individual traders are pooled with
14For instance, Table 3.2 suggests that submitting an order away from the quotes instead of at
the quotes decreases the execution probability from 60% to 20%.
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foreign institutions.15 This in turn reduces our sample size significantly, but does not
affect the conclusions we derived. In our sample, on average 3.7% of all orders are
initiated by institutional investors.
In order to formally test whether we can separate the sample as individual and
institutional trading, we run the following two-stage sequential ordered probit (SOP)
regression for both buy and sell sides of the market and test the null hypothesis
µ = γ1 = γ2 = ... = γK = 0.










t−1Xk,t−1 + εt, (3.16)
where Xs are the observable (limit order book) variables defined in Section 3.4, and
Y ∗s,t is the dependent variable introduced in equation (3.2). We define a dummy
variable, DINS which takes the value 1 if the order is initiated by an institutional
trader.16 The hypothesis is rejected at 5% of significance level with a median χ2 =
46.65 (p-val=0.0009) for 76% of the stocks for the sell side of the market. Similar
conclusion holds for the buy side of the market. The joint hypothesis is rejected
for the 83% of the stocks with a median χ2 = 41.49 (p-val=0.0000). These reveal
that the information contained in the limit order book affects the trading behavior
of institutions and individuals differently.
Following this, we separate the sample into two groups: orders initiated by institu-
tional investors and by individual investors and re-run the first stage SOP regressions
introduced in equation (3.2) for each of the groups separately. The results for the
sell side of the market are presented in Table 3.7. Buy side results are qualitatively
similar. The same explanatory variables, introduced in Section 3.4, are employed as
in the analysis using the whole sample. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the
15According to the information provided on the web page of the ISE, for the June and July 2008,
on average, 10% of the trading value is originated by foreign investors. The maximum and minimum
ratios are around 30% and 2%, respectively.
16It is not possible to run this regression for one of the stocks in our sample (IHLAS) due to





Table 3.7: First Stage Sequential Ordered Probit–Institutional vs Individual Investors
The table presents the results of the first stage of the two-stage sequential ordered probit model for institutional (INS) and individual (IND) investors for the
sell side of the market. For both set of regressions, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the incoming trader is impatient (submits a market order, MO), and
0 otherwise. All of the explanatory variables are defined in Table 3.4. All of the regressions include 5 lags of the dependent variable and the time-of-the day
dummies. For the sake of brevity, those are not reported. The median, minimum, maximum and the 25th and the 75th percentile of the estimated coefficients,
the percentage of positive coefficients given that they are significant, and finally the percentage of stocks with a statistically significant slope at a 5% level are
reported. The cross sectional median of marginal effects (scaled by 1e3) is also reported.
INS Vola Trend SPR Vcomp Vcompopp Vsign Vsignopp Dsame1_2 Dsame2_max Dopp1_2 Dopp2_max
Median -0.05 1.06 -0.41 2.51 -2.78 0.04 0.02 -0.06 -0.01 0.19 0.01
Min. -0.17 -2.02 -5.39 0.40 -13.45 -0.93 -1.24 -1.66 -2.09 -1.63 -0.20
P25 -0.09 0.04 -0.82 1.44 -4.54 -0.11 -0.18 -0.56 -0.05 -0.88 -0.03
P75 0.06 1.72 0.10 5.14 -1.63 0.17 0.10 0.17 0.03 0.57 0.05
Max. 0.12 5.59 4.08 14.84 -0.48 1.97 0.69 0.76 0.15 2.01 0.24
Sig. (%) 10 24 3 93 83 14 28 7 21 10 38
Pos. (%) 33 100 0 100 0 75 38 0 17 0 55
Marginal Effects–median
MO -17.80 403.50 -137.50 962.00 -929.50 10.36 7.70 -23.70 -2.67 72.90 4.19
IND
Median -0.03 1.05 -0.35 1.78 -1.74 -0.15 0.01 -0.12 0.00 -0.17 -0.01
Min. -0.11 -0.13 -1.22 0.14 -8.03 -0.99 -0.52 -1.03 -0.60 -0.73 -0.12
P25 -0.05 0.59 -0.42 0.70 -3.51 -0.37 -0.12 -0.34 -0.02 -0.33 -0.02
P75 -0.02 1.37 -0.26 4.09 -0.75 -0.05 0.07 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00
Max. 0.05 4.80 -0.07 10.02 -0.14 0.04 0.40 0.73 0.03 0.26 0.02
Sig. (%) 70 87 77 100 100 83 70 37 40 43 50
Pos. (%) 5 100 0 100 0 4 57 27 42 0 20
Marginal Effects–median
MO -9.96 367.50 -125.00 632.50 -610.00 -52.00 1.93 -41.50 -0.26 -57.80 -3.1194
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incoming trader is impatient (submits a market order) and 0 if she submits a limit
order.
When we examine the results for the sample of individual investors, we see that
volatility, the previous price trend, the inside spread, the competition variables, and
the signaling variables are highly significant at a 5% level. On the other hand, the
regression results for institutions reveal that only the volume at the same and at the
opposite side of the book, (Vcomp and Vcompopp), are significant for institutional
investors. The joint hypothesis βINSVcomp = βINSVcompopp = 0 is rejected with a median
χ2 = 51.07 (p-val=0.0000) for all of the stocks except one. In other words, competition
matters in their decision to submit a limit or a market order. Other features of the
results presented in Table 3.7 are worth to underline. Volatility is not informative
for an informed agent. This may suggest that institutional traders do not face the
picking off risk that drives them to submit more limit orders rather than a market
order in high volatility states. Similarly, the signaling variables (Vsign and Vsignopp)
are not informative as expected. Informed agents do not rely on the signaling on
the current prices provided by the market. Finally, the coefficients on volatility, price
trend, spread, signaling variables, and price distance variables are jointly insignificant
for 62% of the stocks with a median χ2 = 13.42 (p-val=0.0967).
To sum up, we conclude that, similar to the individual investors, institutional
investors consider the information provided by the limit order book while designing
their trading strategies. However, their decision to submit a market or a limit order
is based on only a few pieces of the limit order book information. They take into
account other traders’ actions only for competition. This suggests that institutional
investors’ order submission strategies are based on their own private valuations rather




We provide several robustness checks to conclude that our findings are not driven
by an arbitrary choice. The first robustness check is related to the model specification.
Instead of estimating the model with ordered probit, we use ordered logit. The second
robustness checks are on the definitions of the transient volatility and the price trend.
Throughout the paper, we proxy the price fluctuations by using the exponential-
weighted moving average (EWMA) volatility and the price trend as the percentage
change in the mid-quote prices for the last 60 observations. First, we re-estimate the
optimal decay parameter λ by using 100 mid-quote returns instead of 60. Similarly,
as a robustness check for the price trend, we employ different window sizes of 100 and
120. Moreover, we re-estimate the two-stage sequential ordered probit model with
different transient volatility measures, namely the standard deviation and absolute
value of the mid-quote changes of the previous 60, 100 and 120 orders prior to the
order submission.
Table 3.8 presents the robustness test results for the first stage and second stage
patient trader, whereas Table 3.9 reports the results for the second stage impatient
trader for the sell side of the market. For the sake of brevity, buy side is not re-
ported since the results are qualitatively similar. All of the results are qualitatively
robust, except for the volatility in the second stage–limit order trader. To sum up,
we conclude that all of our main findings are remarkably robust to different proxies.
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Table 3.8: Robustness: First Stage and the Second Stage–Limit Order Trader
This table reports the results for the robustness analysis for the sell side of the market for the first
stage and the second stage–limit order (LO) trader. The first three rows repeat the results for the
benchmark model, whereas the following three rows present the results for the logistic regression
(Logit). The robustness analyses on the definition of volatility (Vola_std60, Vola_abs60) and on
the previous trend (Trend100) are provided. Vola_std60 is the standard deviation of the last 60
mid-quote returns. Vola_abs60 is the absolute change in the last 60 mid-quote prices and Trend100
is the previous price change of the last 100 observations. All of the regressions include 5 lags of the
dependent variable and the time-of-the day dummies. For the sake of brevity, those are not reported.
The median, the percentage of positive coefficients given that they are significant, and finally the
percentage of stocks with a statistically significant slope at a 5% level are reported.
1st stage Vola Trend SPR Vcomp Vcompopp Vsign Vsignopp
Benchmark Median -0.03 1.02 -0.37 1.76 -1.77 -0.14 0.01
Sig. (%) 67 80 83 100 100 77 70
Pos. (%) 5 100 0 100 0 4 57
Logit Median -0.05 1.67 -0.65 3.08 -3.08 -0.24 0.02
Sig. (%) 67 80 83 100 100 77 67
Pos. (%) 5 100 0 100 0 4 60
Vola_std60 Median -0.06 1.02 -0.36 1.80 -1.78 -0.14 0.01
Sig. (%) 77 80 83 100 100 80 70
Pos. (%) 0 100 0 100 0 4 57
Vola_abs60 Median -0.01 1.05 -0.36 1.79 -1.74 -0.13 0.01
Sig. (%) 83 83 83 100 100 77 70
Pos. (%) 0 100 0 100 0 4 57
Trend100 Median -0.03 0.43 -0.36 1.71 -1.67 -0.13 0.01
Sig. (%) 63 67 80 100 100 80 70
Pos. (%) 5 100 0 100 0 8 62
2nd stage LO
Benchmark Median 0.02 -0.42 0.66 0.58 0.02 -0.08 0.02
Sig. (%) 43 60 100 83 27 83 47
Pos. (%) 85 6 100 100 63 8 79
Logit Median 0.03 -0.68 1.02 0.94 0.04 -0.14 0.04
Sig. (%) 43 57 93 83 30 83 47
Pos. (%) 85 6 100 100 44 8 79
Vola_std60 Median 0.02 -0.40 0.67 0.58 0.01 -0.08 0.02
Sig. (%) 33 60 97 83 33 83 47
Pos. (%) 90 6 100 100 50 8 79
Vola_abs60 Median 0.00 -0.41 0.66 0.56 0.00 -0.09 0.02
Sig. (%) 37 60 97 83 30 83 47
Pos. (%) 64 6 100 100 44 8 79
Trend100 Median 0.02 -0.14 0.67 0.63 0.02 -0.08 0.02
Sig. (%) 43 47 100 90 27 80 47





Table 3.9: Robustness: Second Stage–Market Order Trader
This table reports the results for the robustness analysis for the sell side for the second stage–market order (MO) trader. The first three rows repeat the results
for the benchmark model, whereas the following three rows present the results for the logistic regression (Logit). The robustness analyses on the definition of
volatility (Vola_100, Vola_std60, Vola_std100, Vola_abs60, Vola_abs100) and on the previous trend (Trend100) are provided. Vola_100 is the exponential
moving average of the previous 100 squared returns with optimal decay parameter. Vola_std60 (Vola_std100) is the standard deviation of the last 60 (100)
mid-quote returns. Vola_abs60 (Vola_abs100) is the absolute change in the last 60 (100) mid-quote prices and Trend100 is the previous price change of the
last 100 observations. All of the regressions include 5 lags of the dependent variable and the time-of-the day dummies. For the sake of brevity, those are not
reported. The median of the estimated coefficients, the percentage of statistically significant coefficients at 5% level, and the percentage of positive coefficients
given that they are significant are provided.
2nd stage MO Vola Trend SPR Vcomp Vsign Vsignopp Dsame1_2 Dsame2_max Dopp1_2 Dopp2_max
Benchmark Median 0.19 1.20 -0.01 -0.51 -0.08 -0.09 0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.01
Sig. (%) 100 67 7 63 53 50 13 10 37 13
Pos. (%) 100 100 50 0 0 7 0 33 18 25
Logit Median 0.37 2.06 -0.05 -1.00 -0.17 -0.17 0.05 0.01 -0.15 -0.01
Sig. (%) 100 67 7 57 50 50 13 20 43 10
Pos. (%) 100 100 50 0 0 7 0 50 23 33
Vola_100 Median 0.23 1.20 0.00 -0.32 -0.09 -0.10 0.02 0.01 -0.08 -0.01
Sig. (%) 100 67 3 47 50 50 10 20 30 13
Pos. (%) 100 100 0 0 0 7 0 50 22 25
Vola_std60 Median 0.22 1.09 -0.02 -0.41 -0.08 -0.09 0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.01
Sig. (%) 100 67 7 43 50 50 13 23 37 13
Pos. (%) 100 100 50 0 0 7 0 43 18 25
Vola_std100 Median 0.22 1.21 0.00 -0.40 -0.09 -0.09 0.02 0.01 -0.07 -0.01
Sig. (%) 100 67 7 47 47 43 7 20 30 10
Pos. (%) 100 100 50 0 0 0 0 50 22 33
Vola_abs60 Median 0.02 1.18 0.00 -0.55 -0.12 -0.13 0.07 0.01 -0.03 -0.01
Sig. (%) 77 67 7 70 63 50 10 13 30 17
Pos. (%) 100 100 50 0 0 7 0 25 22 20
Vola_abs100 Median 0.01 1.37 0.01 -0.54 -0.12 -0.15 0.10 0.01 -0.04 -0.01
Sig. (%) 70 67 7 70 57 53 7 13 23 30
Pos. (%) 100 100 50 0 0 13 0 25 29 11
Trend100 Median 0.20 0.62 -0.01 -0.36 -0.12 -0.11 0.03 0.01 -0.08 -0.01
Sig. (%) 100 57 7 57 53 50 10 17 30 17
Pos. (%) 100 94 50 0 0 13 0 20 22 2098
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper investigates how the information content of a limit order book affects
the order choice of an investor. By employing a two-stage sequential ordered probit
model, we first answer whether the competition or signaling effects dominate each
other. Second, we examine the order decision of a trader under the non-walking
through the book mechanism. Finally, we study the trading behavior of institutional
and individual investors separately.
By reconstructing the limit order book for the Istanbul Stock Exchange, we show
that the competition effect is present only at the best quotes while determining the
arrival rate of a market or a limit order. On the other hand, a patient trader perceives
an increase in the depth up to the second best quotes as an increased competition and
submits a more aggressive limit order. An increase in the same-side-depth behind the
top of the book is perceived as a signal of a possible mispricing of the current quotes
and encourages agents to submit less aggressive orders. This is consistent with the
predictions of Goettler et al. (2005) and Goettler et al. (2009). We show that, at
every stage, the competition effect is stronger than the signaling effect.
In our market, in her decision to submit a “large” or “small” market order, only
volatility, previous price trend and volume accumulated on the opposite side of the
book matter for an impatient trader. In other words, none of the price information
affects the order choice of an impatient trader. This result might be explained by the
non-walking through the book property of our market. Because under this mechanism,
the spread and the price distance variables do not capture the execution price of an
aggressive market order.
Finally, the results show that institutional investors trading strategies are affected
by fewer pieces of the limit order book information compared to individual investors.
An institutional investor considers other traders’ actions only for competition and
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signaling does not influence her order choice. Moreover, since they have informational
advantages over individual investors, they do not face the picking off risk that makes
the market order trading more costly in high volatility states.
100
Chapter4
Disclosure Practices and Option Implied
Probability of Default
4.1 Introduction
Investors’ limited information of the risks held by financial intermediaries is ar-
gued to amplify both phases of the recent credit cycle. Opacity of banks, coupled with
ever increasing complexity, contributed to the general mispricing of risks as investors
badly misunderstood the risks inherent in structured products. Reliable, timely and
granular information disclosure can go some way towards alleviating these problems.
Hence, efforts to promote transparency through greater disclosure have been an im-
portant theme of the discussions of the current banking reform proposals and reports
of regulatory authorities. The Basel II, Pillar 3 recognizes disclosure as a way to
impose strong incentives on banks to perform less risky activities. December 2009
and 2011 Financial Stability Reports of Bank of England underline the level of the
transparency and enhanced disclosure as a toll to mitigate the informational frictions
especially in stress times. Thus the relationship between disclosure and riskiness of
a financial institution is of key importance to investors, banks, and regulators. De-
spite of its importance, few empirical studies adress this. This paper aims to fill this
gap. We create a measure of voluntary disclosure with public data and then use this
to formally investigate the relationship between the level of disclosure and market
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assessment of the riskiness of a bank.
Given the level of balance sheet risk, if sufficient transparency imposes incentives
on banks to hold less risky positions through the monitoring of the investors, then
banks that disclose more information should choose less risky activities. In other
words, investors or debt holders may exercise a direct market discipline allowing
a reduction in bank’s default probability.1 Even if the bank does not choose to
perform less risky activities, rational investors can interpret the absence of disclosure
as a negative signal about the firm value, since less informed party presumes that
withheld information is a less favorable information (e.g., Grossman and Miller (1980),
Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981), and Verrecchia (2001)). Putting differently, higher
disclosure reduces the information asymmetries between the bank management and
their depositors and regulators. This in turn may affect investor’s assessment of the
riskiness of the firm or reduce the heterogeneity of beliefs about the true value of
the firm (Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia, 2007). Motivated by the aforementioned
theoretical papers, this study analyses the relationship between the firms’ disclosure
decisions and the market expected value of default probabilities.
Our main hypothesis is that banks with higher level of disclosure in the current
year benefit from lower market implied default probabilities in the following year. We
test this hypothesis under the alternative that the level of disclosure does not have
any real impact on investors’ assessment on the default probabilities of banks. This
may be because of the failure of market discipline, a market mechanism in which
investors have sufficient information to assess and incentives to monitor risk taking
behavior of banks (Crockett, 2002). Although increased transparency is a necessary
condition for investors to reach informed judgements, it is not sufficient. Investors
1In a cross-country study, Tadesse (2006) shows highly regulated disclosures lead to lower fi-
nancing costs and lower risk profile. Nier and Baumann (2006) show that banks that disclose more
information on their risk profile are subject to stronger degree of market discipline and choose to
hold higher capital buffers to limit their probability of default.
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only price the risks which they actually bear. If market participants are insured then
their incentives to monitor and punish the risks are reduced.
This paper makes two important contributions. First, it is the first study in the
literature that formally investigates the statistical relationship between the level of
disclosure and market assessment of the credit riskiness of a bank. Second, we propose
a template to measure the level of voluntary disclosure, which is constructed by
using publicly available data. Despite its data limitations, our validating experiments
suggest its adequacy on measuring the level of management’s decision of disclosure.
In order to measure an institution’s default probability, we employ the methodol-
ogy proposed by Capuano (2008) and further developed by Vilsmeier (2011) and use
option prices to estimate the implied probability of default (IPoD). By using tech-
niques of maximum entropy, the IPoD model extracts market-based default probabil-
ities. As options are forward-looking instruments, using option prices brings us the
advantage of extracting information on market participants’ expectations. Moreover,
option prices suffer less from the structural breaks by updating faster to new mar-
ket conditions compared to historical data (Buss and Vilkov, 2011). Then we would
expect our default measure to have an advantage in unstable periods.
Besides the default probability, in order to investigate our main hypothesis, we
need to measure the level of disclosure. Our empirical proxy for disclosure is a self-
constructed voluntary disclosure index, mainly based on the summary measures pro-
posed in December 2009 and 2011 Financial Stability Reports of the Bank of Eng-
land.2 Our index gauges the level of disclosure provided on four main categories:
liquidity risk profiles of the companies, risk positions of key group affiliates and sub-
groups, intra-annual information, and finally exposures between financial institutions
and exposures to hidden risks.
2We sincerely thank Christian Castro from the Bank of Spain, Rhiannon Sowerbutts, and Peter




We hand-collected data to construct the disclosure index. Data collection and
validation requires some effort. Hence, we restrict ourselves to the publicly open
largest 85 U.S. bank holding companies in terms of asset value as of December 2007
for the period 1998–2011. This accounts for the 76% of the total assets of the U.S.
banking system. We select our sample based on 2007 because we want to include
the actually defaulted bank holding companies in the 2008 crises. Our focus on
bank holding companies is motivated by three. First, they file periodic reports to
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), from which we are able to obtain
10–K and proxy statements to construct the disclosure index. Second, U.S. bank
holding companies are regulated by the Federal Reserve and the FDIC. Hence, they
are subject to uniform requirements for compulsory disclosures, which is important to
identify voluntary disclosures. Finally, a typical bank holding company has a complex
structure. It is comprised of several independent subsidiaries and involved in a wide
range of financial activities. This may enhance the importance of granular financial
disclosure for investors to identify correctly the risk taking behavior.
The main hypothesis is tested by employing a panel regression model. First, we
measure our dependent variable as the annual average of the implied default proba-
bility estimates between two 10–K statement disclosure dates. Thus we test whether
the revealed information has an all-year-long effect. Second, we use the three-months
averages of the implied default probability estimates following the announcement of a
10–K statement. It is compulsory for a bank holding company to fill quarterly 10–Q
reports to the SEC. Although those reports are not as comprehensive as the annual
10–K statements, they still provide a continuing view of a company’s financial posi-
tion. Hence, it is likely that the informativeness of an annual report decreases with
the releases of 10–Q statements, i.e., after three months of the release of an annual
report. Results confirm our hypothesis; a higher level of disclosure is associated with
lower levels of market implied default probability both in the following three months
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and in the following year, where the relationship is stronger for the former. The docu-
mented association is economically significant: one standard deviation increase in the
current level of disclosure is associated with a 19% and 27% decrease in the next year’s
and three months’ probability of default, respectively. In all of the specifications, we
include year and bank fixed effects to capture for any time-invariant heterogeneities
across bank holding companies. The results are robust to the inclusion of various
bank characteristics, such as size, beta, capital buffers, or non-performing loans.
The underlying assumption under the baseline panel regression model is that the
level of disclosure is exogenous after controlling for the market risk, bank holding com-
pany characteristics, year, and bank fixed effects. However, a bank holding company’s
past level of market implied default risk can affect both the current level of default
risk and the decision on the level of disclosure. Hence, the model we propose has
a potential endogeneity issue, which may affect the choice of estimation procedure.
Generally one can either employ a panel regression model, which ignores endogeneity
or adopt a procedure that incorporates endogeneity, such as the Arellano and Bond
(1991) dynamic panel GMM estimator. Although we focus our attention on the panel
approach, which is simpler and the one that literature generally opt to do, in order to
see whether endogeneity matters, we also test our main hypothesis by employing the
GMM model. The coefficient on aggregate disclosure score continues to be negative
and significant and the results confirm the joint validity of our instruments.
Next, we examine whether enhanced disclosure is associated with other bank hold-
ing company enterprise risks. In line with the findings of Bushee and Noe (2000),
Baumann and Nier (2004), and Kothari, Li and Short (2009), our results provide
evidence that banks with higher level of disclosure benefit from lower stock volatility.
Economic theory suggests a number of plausible explanations. First, by mitigating
uncertainty, higher disclosure may reduce the magnitude of the impact of news, which
in turn may reduce realised volatility. Second, reduced information asymmetries in
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turn may reduce the adverse price impact of a large trade (Diamond and Verrecchia,
1991). Then we focus on the implied volatility estimated from the option prices as
a measure of downside risk. Similar to the findings of Ederington and Lee (1996)
and Rogers, Skinner and Van Buskirk (2009) we find that implied volatility, the mar-
ket’s participants risk-neutral expectations of volatility, declines following information
releases. Finally, we document that enhanced disclosure in this year significantly de-
creases both the systematic and the idiosyncratic risk of a bank holding company in
the following year, whereas the association is stronger for the latter. Hence, we argue
that disclosure helps to alleviate informational frictions and lead to a more efficient
allocation of risk.
Finally, in a cross-sectional setting, we examine the determinants of disclosure.
We find that banks, which disclose more information last year, continue to provide
higher levels of disclosure compared to its peers this year. In line with the existing
literature, we also find that bigger and less profitable institutions are more likely
to disclose more.3 Moreover, higher levels of observed systematic risk encourage
managers to disclose more information in the subsequent year. This could be argued
as an evidence of market discipline; increased public information helps investors to
assess the risk taking behavior of a bank, and changes in market dynamics influence
the decisions made by bank management.
Our paper is related to the literature that investigates the consequences of cor-
porate disclosure on capital markets. We contribute to the literature by examining
the link between the voluntary disclosures and various firm enterprise risks. There
is an extensive empirical literature that studies the link between the accounting in-
formation and the cost of capital, liquidity, and stock return volatility. Using the
analyst disclosure ratings provided by the AIMR Reports, Healy, Hutton and Palepu
3See for example Lang and Lundholm (1993), Skinner (1994), Botosan and Plumlee (2002), Bujaki
and McConomy (2002), Ho and Taylor (2007), and Francis et al. (2008).
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(1999) show that increased disclosure rating is associated with increased stock liquid-
ity, analyst coverage and higher stock returns. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) document
a positive association between the disclosure and higher stock liquidity and a negative
relationship between the firm’s cost of capital and disclosure. Heflin, Shaw and Wild
(2005) and Balakrishnan, Billings, Kelly and Ljungqvist (2013) show that disclosure
has a sizeable and beneficial effect on liquidity. Botosan (1997), Botosan and Plumlee
(2002), and Barth, Konchitchki and Landsman (2013) document supporting evidence
of the negative relationship between transparency and cost of capital. Bushee and
Noe (2000), Baumann and Nier (2004), and Kothari et al. (2009) document a neg-
ative and significant association of disclosure with stock return volatility. Baumann
and Nier (2003) show that the bank’s book leverage is decreasing with the level of
disclosure, which can be interpreted as lower default probability after controlling for
the risk.
Our paper also contributes to a number of self-constructed disclosure indices in
the current literature. Being one of the earliest studies, using the annual reports
of 122 firms in 1990, Botosan (1997) produces a cross-sectional ranking of disclo-
sure levels based on five categories of voluntary disclosure: background information,
summary of historical results, key non-financial statistics, projected information, and
management discussion and analysis. Francis et al. (2008) further develop Botosan
(1997)’s disclosure index for a sample of 677 firms in 2001 to investigate the rela-
tionship among the voluntary disclosure scores, earnings quality, and cost of capital.
Lang and Lundholm (2000) examine disclosure activity around seasoned equity of-
ferings with a sample of 41 “offering” and matched “non-offering” firms. The level of
disclosure is measured by the score associated to main four groups of announcements
identified in the Dow Jones News Retrieval and then Lexis/Nexis news databases:
performance, management spin, forward-looking, and others, such as management
changes and stock related information. Baumann and Nier (2003)’s disclosure index
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records whether the particular category is disclosed in BankScope database or not.
Finally, in a recent study, Cheung, Jiang and Tan (2010) create a transparency index
based on the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance for 100 major Chinese listed
companies for the period 2004–2007.
We contribute to this literature by considering several dimensions of voluntary
disclosure. Some of these refer to the riskiness of the bank’s assets, for example
the information of the unencumbered collateral, whereas others focus on the funding
vulnerabilities. In contrast to the index of Botosan (1997) and Francis et al. (2008),
for instance, our disclosure index mainly focuses on the disclosure of the riskiness,
rather than the profitability of an institution. For example, we issue a score of 1 if an
institution discloses information on the level or ratio of liquid assets, but we do not
consider whether asset turnover or return on assets is disclosed. Similar to the study
of Baumann and Nier (2003), we look at the maturity and type of funding. On the
other hand, instead of focusing in the risk factors that turn to be compulsory due to
current Basel regulations, for example credit risk, our index focuses on more recent
risk factors that threaten the financial system, like liquidity or spillover risk. Finally,
in addition to the aforementioned disclosure templates, we consider disclosures on the
structure of the banking group, to test whether investors place value on information
about intra-group exposures.
The paper is organized as follows: next section describes the sample and data
sources. Moreover, the construction of the disclosure index, validation of the met-
ric, and details for the estimation of the option implied probability of default are
provided. In Section 4.3, we introduce our empirical methodology along with a pre-




4.2 Data and Empirical Proxies
In Section 4.2.1, we introduce our sample and data sources. Section 4.2.2 describes
in detail the disclosure index, provides evidence supporting its reliability, and descrip-
tive analysis conducted on the index. In Section 4.2.3 we introduce the methodology
and empirical implementation of the option implied default probabilities and provide
preliminary analysis.
4.2.1 Sample selection and data sources
We use several sources to construct our data set. The information related to
the disclosure index is obtained from the bank holding companies’ (BHCs) 10–K
statements, proxy statements as well as the annual reports from the SEC–Edgar
system. We hand-collect data for the largest publicly listed 85 U.S. BHCs, in terms
of the total book value of assets as of December 2007, which accounts for the 76% of
the total assets of the U.S. banking system as of December 2007.4 Our sample spans
the time period of 1998–2011. Table C.1 in Appendix C lists the sample BHCs with
the corresponding identifiers. Moreover, we use the SEC–Edgar system to extract the
dates when the 10–K reports of a given BHC is available to public (released at the
web page).
In order to estimate the option implied default probability (IPoD) for a BHC for
a given date, we use both the CRSP and the OptionMetrics Standardized Options
datasets. We get the daily stock prices from CRSP database, whereas all of the
information regarding the call options; bid and ask prices, trading volumes, open
interests and the corresponding strike prices are from OptionMetrics Standardized
Options Dataset. From our sample, we eliminate a day if the trading volume is 0 for
all of the options traded. Moreover, we consider only the options with time to expiry
4Our sample does not contain of some of the financial institutions that were not a BHC, but
became a BHC after 2008, such as Goldman Sachs, Ally Financial, and American Express.
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are greater than 6 months. After these filtrations, the sample reduces to 80 BHCs.
We obtain data on daily stock returns, market capitalizations, and as well the bid
and ask prices of the equity of each BHC from CRSP. We use this data to estimate the
return volatility of a BHC company. We use CRSP value-weighted portfolio returns
as market return to estimate the beta of each stock. Market returns and the risk
free rates are obtained from Kenneth French’s online data library. Finally, FR Y-9C
reports from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago are used to for the consolidated
financial statement data of the BHCs.
4.2.2 Measuring disclosure
Today’s executives must communicate complex business structures to a broader
range of investors with varying levels of sophistication. Moreover, disclosure de-
manded by investors is outside the bounds of standard reports required by the regu-
latory authorities. December 2009 and 2011 Financial Stability Reports of the Bank
of England provide possible areas for improved disclosure and summary measures to
assess the quantitative information provided by a financial institution. We further
work on this assessment and propose a hand-collected index of voluntary disclosures.
Our index consists of 14 sub-indices of voluntary disclosures, forming four main cat-
egories: liquidity risk profiles of the companies, risk positions of key group affiliates
and sub-groups, period averages, highs and lows, and exposures between financial
institutions and exposures to the hidden risks. For all of the sub-indices, we assign a
score of 1 if a given bank holding company (BHC) includes the corresponding infor-
mation in its 10–K, annual, or proxy reports for a given year. Table 4.1 presents the
sub-indices used in the analysis.
Our first set of variables is aimed to capture whether a given institution discloses
information with regard to its liquidity positions. Institutions reliant on short-term
or foreign currency based funding sources are argued as being particularly vulnerable
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Table 4.1: Disclosure Index–the Template
Table lists the sub–indices of the disclosure index used in the analysis. For all of the 14 sub-indices,
a score of 1 is assigned if disclosure is present in the corresponding 10–K, annual or proxy report of
a given company. Otherwise, a score of 0 is assigned.
I. Liquidity Risk
Decomposition of funding sources:
L1: Liabilities breakdown by term structure: minimum should distinguish between short–term
and long–term borrowing
L2: Liabilities breakdown by currency: minimum should decompose into two currencies
Liquidity resilience:
L3: Liquidity ratios: any kind of quantitative liquidity ratio that helps investors assess ability to
withstand funding stress
L4: Level or ratios of high–quality unencumbered assets
II. Group Structure
G1: Balance sheet information of main group subsidiaries, branches or affiliates
G2: Balance sheet information of sectors, sub–units or segments
G3: Risk ratios of main group subsidiaries, branches or affiliates (e.g. capital, liquidity, loan loss reserves)
G4: Risk ratios of sectors, sub–units or segments (e.g. capital, liquidity, loan loss reserves).
III. Intra-annual Information
I1: Detailed average figures of balance sheet items between reporting dates
I2: Quarterly information for balance sheet items
I3: Risk ratios on quarterly basis
IV. Spillover Risk
S1: Credit exposures to banks/ financial institutions
S2: Detailed breakdown of off-balance sheet items
S3: Exposures to off-balance sheet entities (SPEs)
to stresses in financial markets (Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier and Stulz, 2011). Hence, we
first collect information on the decomposition of funding sources by maturity and
currency. We focus whether a given BHC includes its liabilities breakdown by term
structure and whether it is decomposed into different non-local currencies. Second,
we focused on the liquidity risk profile of firms’ balance sheets and on firms’ holdings
of liquid asset, i.e., liquidity resilience. We specifically search for the liquidity ratios
and level or ratio of high-quality unencumbered assets.
Information on group structure is our second main category. Disclosing infor-
mation on the profitability of key group affiliates is compulsory for the U.S. bank
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holding companies. However particularly in the case of large and complex financial
groups, detailed information on the riskiness and balance sheets of subsidiaries is
non-negligible. Hence, we assign a score of 1 each if the bank holding company dis-
closures balance-sheet and risk ratios of its subsidiaries. In addition, instead of group
subsidiaries, we search the same information regarding the main group segments for
example, the derivatives desk, card services, and insurance services. A failure of one
segment of a large institution not only increases the risk exposures of the individual
bank, but also can trigger a broader systemic failure (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2012).
Another key area we include in our index is the publication of intra-annual in-
formation. End-of-year figures can be unrepresentative of banks’ behavior either due
to intra-period volatility in banks’ business activity or window dressing at the pe-
riod end. Hence, reporting period averages and highs/lows to present a window on
the risks that institutions run during reporting periods is helpful (Bank of England,
2009). We look for the detailed annual average figures of balance sheet items, quar-
terly information on balance sheet items, and risk ratios.
Our final main group is information on the network or spillover risk. First, we look
for information on the exposure of assets and liabilities of a given BHC to different
types of financial institutions. In his annual conference on Bank Structure and Com-
petition in May 2008, Ben Bernanke underlined the banks’ substantial exposures to
subprime risk and off-balance sheet vehicles. Similarly, the Senior Supervisors Group
(2008) mention the importance of enhanced public disclosures to possibly reduce the
uncertainty regarding exposures to off-balance items that the market considers to be
high-risk following the crises.5 Hence, we also check whether the detailed breakdown
of the off-balance sheet items and maximum loss exposure to special purpose vehicles
(or variable interest entities) are present in a given report.
5The Senior Supervisors Group is comprised of bank supervisory executives of France, Germany,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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In order to avoid the subjective judgments regarding the relative importance of
disclosure on sub-indices, following Tetlock (2007) and Ellul and Yerramilli (2012) we
employ the principal component analysis (PCA) to reach the aggregated disclosure
score, DSCORE. DSCORE is obtained as the eigenvector in the decomposition of the
correlation matrix of the four main groups with the highest eigenvalue. For each bank






where LIQb,t is the disclosure score on liquidity risk calculated as the first principal
component of liquidity related sub-indices. The disclosure scores on group structure
(GRP_STR), intra-annual information (INTRA), and finally spillover risk (SPIL)
are calculated analogously.
PCA picks the information in group structure as the key constitute of the disclo-
sure index (having the highest eigenvalue). The first principal component explains
43% of the overall variation. The four main groups are positively correlated with each
other and with the aggregated score, DSCORE. Each of these correlations, except the
correlation between the liquidity risk and intra-annual information, are significant at
1% level.
Assessing the validity of the disclosure index
To quantify a disclosure level is not a straightforward task. Investors can cap-
ture information not only through the annual reports or 10–K statements but as well
through the reports of financial analysts, rating agencies, intra-annual disclosures of
the companies or news channel. Moreover, investors may value not only the quanti-
tative disclosures, but as well quality of a given disclosure. Finally, companies may
manipulate their balance sheets around reporting dates–a practice commonly known
as “window dressing”. Although we acknowledge all above, in order reaching a met-
ric, we focus only on the information provided via publicly available 10–K, annual
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or proxy reports. Moreover, we check whether a given characteristic of the bank is
disclosed, rather than attempt to measure how well it is disclosed. Keeping these
possible limitations in mind, we conduct an analysis that may provide some insights
into the reliability of our self-constructed index.
First, we expect the disclosure score to be positively correlated with number of fi-
nancial analysts following the bank holding company during the sample period, which
is another possible proxy for availability of corporate information.6 The Spearman
correlation coefficient between the two measures is 0.5172, which is significant at 1%
level.
Second, previous literature identifies variables that have a statistically significant
association with the level of disclosure. If our disclosure index measures the disclosure
level, it should be significantly correlated with these variables. The positive link
between the size of the firm and the level of disclosure is documented by many (see
for example Botosan and Plumlee (2002), Bujaki and McConomy (2002), Ho and
Taylor (2007), and Francis et al. (2008)). Various studies examine the consequences
of voluntary disclosure on capital markets. Firms that make extensive voluntary
disclosures benefit from improved liquidity for their stock in the capital market and
they face reduced cost of capital (see Healy and Palepu (2001) for a literature review).
Hence, we examine the relationship between disclosure, the firm size, liquidity, and
finally cost of capital.
We measure the firm size as the natural logarithm of the market value of a given
bank holding company at the end of each year. We employ three different proxies
to measure liquidity: the bid-ask spread (SPR), Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure
(AMD), and stock turnover (TRN). For bank b in a given day d, the weekly liquidity




measures are calculated as follows:
SPRb,w = PAb,w − PBb,w (4.2)
AMDb,w =
|Rw|






where PA is the closing ask price, PB is the closing bid price, TrV ol is the weekly
trading volume, R is the weekly return, PC is the weekly closing price, and Q is the
number of shares outstanding. Finally, SPRb,t, AMDb,t, and TRNb,t are calculated as
the annual averages of the weekly measures for each year.
Following Sironi (2003), we proxy the cost of capital as the average of the primary
market spread to the benchmark security at the time of the subordinated debt issue.
We obtain the subordinated debt issue data from Bloomberg and Dealogic databases.
COSTCAPb,t is the average spread on the subordinated debt issued by bank b fol-
lowing the disclosure in year t. Note that the higher the spread on the subordinated
debt, the higher the cost of capital.
Table 4.2 presents the Spearman correlation coefficients between the level of dis-
closure (DSCORE) and firm size (SIZE), liquidity measures, and finally cost of capital
(COSTCAP). DSCOREb,t is the aggregated disclosure score of the bank b at year t,
calculated as in (4.1). In line with the literature, results show that the aggregated
disclosure score is significantly and negatively correlated with cost of capital, posi-
tively correlated with the size of the firm and liquidity. The ρ is highest in absolute
term with the size of the bank. Within the liquidity measures, the highest correlation
is with the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure. Higher disclosure is associated with
a lower price impact, i.e. higher liquidity, on average. Finally, note that the small
sample size on the analysis on cost of capital is due to missing data points on the
subordinated debt spreads.
To sum up, we provide supporting evidence of the validity of our disclosure index
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Table 4.2: Verification of the Disclosure Index–Correlation Analysis
Table presents the Spearman correlation coefficients between the level of disclosure and firm size,
liquidity measures, and cost of capital. DSCOREb,t is the aggregated disclosure score of the bank
b at year t, calculated as in Equation (4.1). SIZEb,t is the natural logarithm of the market value of
a given BHC at the end of year t. The definitions of the three measures of liquidity, spread (SPR),
amihud (AMD), and turnover (TRN), are given in (4.2), (4.3), and (4.4), respectively. COSTCAPb,t
is the cost of capital, calculated as the average of the primary market spread to the benchmark
security at the time of the subordinated debt issue. The number of observations and the p−values
corresponding the null hypothesis that disclosure and the given variable is independent are presented
as well.
SIZEb,t SPRb,t AMDb,t TRNb,t COSTCAPb,t
DISCb,t Spearman ρ 0.4883 -0.3444 -0.5169 0.2591 -0.2292
p−value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0129
Obs. 1043 1037 1045 1045 117
and the aggregated score DSCORE by two analyses: first the number of financial
analysts following the given bank and second, the correlation between DSCORE and
various variables identified in prior research to be associated with disclosure level.
Descriptive analysis–disclosure index
Table 4.3 presents the descriptive statistics on the sub–indices of the disclosure
index. The first column gives the number of the banks that disclose the particular
information in all of the years, whereas the second column reports the number of the
banks that never discloses the particular risk category throughout the whole period.
The majority of the U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) disclose the average balance
sheet items as well as the risk ratios of the main subsidiaries throughout the whole
sample period with an average score very close to 1, which is the maximum attainable
score for a given category. On the other hand, we see that disclosures on the currency
breakdown of funding sources, risk ratios of sectors or sub-units, and risk ratios
on quarterly basis are assigned with relatively lower scores on average. Within the
liquidity measures, we see that 31 of BHCs disclose a breakdown of funding sources by
term (funding sources categorized by maturity) for the whole sample period. Though,
disclosures on high quality collateral as well as the liquidity ratios are relatively poor.
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics-Disclosure Sub–indices
Table presents the descriptive statistics on the sub–indices of the disclosure index. Panel includes
the largest 85 U.S. BHCs spanning the period 1998–2011. The first column gives the number of the
banks that disclose the particular information in all of the years, whereas the second column reports
the number of the banks that never discloses the particular category throughout the whole period.
The last two columns report the sample average and standard deviation of each disclosure category,
respectively. For all of the categories, the minimum attainable score is 0, whereas the maximum
attainable score is 1.
disclosing in disclosing in
all periods no periods average stdev
L1: term breakdown 31 0 0.656 0.475
L2: currency breakdown 1 2 0.040 0.197
L3: liquidity ratio 15 0 0.339 0.473
L4: unencumbered assets 2 4 0.134 0.340
G1: B/S info of subsidiaries 4 2 0.136 0.343
G2: B/S info of sectors/sub-units 9 1 0.185 0.389
G3: risk ratios of subsidiaries 70 1 0.942 0.234
G4: risk ratios of sectors/sub-units 1 1 0.048 0.215
I1: average B/S figures 81 0 0.983 0.129
I2: quarterly B/S figures 8 1 0.150 0.357
I3: risk ratios on quarterly basis 3 1 0.065 0.247
S1: credit exposure to financial inst. 4 2 0.147 0.354
S2: off-balance sheet items 11 3 0.263 0.441
S3: exposure to SPEs 1 2 0.136 0.343
The average scores attained are far lower than 1 for almost all of the sub-indices.
Table 4.4 reports the within year mean and standard deviation of four main cat-
egories of the disclosure index, which are obtained by averaging the scores on the
corresponding sub-indices. Similarly, Figure 4.1 Panel A and B plots the main cat-
egories and composite disclosure index (DSCORE), respectively averaged across the
BHCs.
We see an increasing trend for the disclosures throughout the period in study, with
a particular improvement in the liquidity risk disclosures as well as the disclosures
related to the spillover and hidden risks (information on off balance sheet items or
exposure to the special purpose entities). The average highest score, 0.399, is on
the disclosures related to intra–annual information, whereas the scores related to the
spillover risk are the lowest among the four main categories. Another area where
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Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics–Disclosure Index
Table reports the standard deviation of four main categories of the disclosure index along with the
aggregated disclosure score throughout the sample period. Panel includes the largest 85 U.S. BHCs
spanning the period 1998–2011. Disclosure score on liquidity (LIQ), for example, is obtained as
average of the scores on the liquidity-related sub-indices: L1, L2, L3, and L4 for each bank in a given
year. GRP_STR stands for the disclosure on group structure, INTRA for intra-annual information,
and finally, SPIL for spillover risk.
LIQ GRP_STR INTRA SPIL
within year mean
1998 0.188 0.264 0.384 0.059
1999 0.188 0.286 0.399 0.057
2000 0.200 0.288 0.400 0.071
2001 0.219 0.300 0.396 0.067
2002 0.250 0.314 0.402 0.142
2003 0.280 0.325 0.402 0.173
2004 0.298 0.321 0.397 0.202
2005 0.306 0.329 0.396 0.208
2006 0.321 0.341 0.400 0.220
2007 0.324 0.350 0.400 0.235
2008 0.341 0.363 0.398 0.252
2009 0.364 0.377 0.403 0.255
2010 0.404 0.366 0.406 0.297
2011 0.415 0.366 0.408 0.315
within year standard deviation
1998 0.185 0.150 0.154 0.151
1999 0.183 0.157 0.172 0.148
2000 0.184 0.144 0.179 0.156
2001 0.192 0.156 0.177 0.154
2002 0.180 0.161 0.187 0.234
2003 0.181 0.169 0.186 0.267
2004 0.192 0.158 0.190 0.269
2005 0.187 0.169 0.189 0.282
2006 0.187 0.172 0.184 0.293
2007 0.188 0.165 0.177 0.299
2008 0.190 0.167 0.177 0.312
2009 0.205 0.170 0.190 0.315
2010 0.234 0.172 0.194 0.317
2011 0.227 0.173 0.197 0.333
uncond. Mean 0.292 0.328 0.399 0.182
uncond. Std 0.206 0.166 0.182 0.273
progress has been slow over the period is the provision of the balance sheet and
the risk positions of the main group affiliates and segments. Results as well show




































































(b) Panel B: Aggregated Disclosure Score
Figure 4.1: Panel A plots the disclosure scores assigned to each of the sub-indices
of disclosure score throughout the sample period, averaged across the bank holding
companies. Disclosure score on liquidity (LIQ), for example, is obtained as average
of the scores on the liquidity-related sub-indices: L1, L2, L3, and L4 for each bank
in a given year. GRP_STR stands for the disclosure on group structure, INTRA for
intra-annual information, and finally, SPIL for spillover risk. For all of the categories,
the minimum attainable score is 0, whereas the maximum attainable score is 1. Panel
B on the other hand presents the cross-sectional average of the aggregate disclosure
score (DSCORE) obtained as the first principal component of the four sub-indices.
standard deviation is around 0.144, whereas it increases up to 0.333 in 2011 for the
score on spillover risk. We see the highest deviation is on the information provided
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on spillover risk category.
4.2.3 Measuring the probability of default
The default probability of an institution depends on the unobservable factors such
as the value of the company or the firm volatility that needs to be translated from
publicly observable data. Several studies use different proxies to estimate the default
probability. Nier and Baumann (2006) proxy the default risk by the book leverage,
Anginer and Yildizhan (2010) use corporate credit spreads. Using the maximum
entropy principle, Jeong (2010) proposes a methodology to estimate the default prob-
ability of a firm using binary option prices.
An appealing methodology to estimate the default probability of an institution
is proposed by Capuano (2008). The idea is to use the Merton (1974) framework
to extract implied probabilities of default from equity option prices. This is quite a
flexible framework, the default barrier, i.e., the threshold level under which the firm
defaults, is endogenously estimated. Moreover, the employed principle of minimum
cross-entropy (Cover and Thomas, 2006) makes it possible to infer the probability
distribution of the firm value. Hence, Capuano (2008)’s Option Implied Probability of
Default (IPoD) methodology does not require any assumption on neither the recovery
rates nor the asset distribution.
One can argue two possible drawbacks of the methodology. First, it estimates the
expected level of default in a risk neutral world rather than the actual probability
measure. Second, since in case of a default, there is neither stock, nor options trading,
we do not have any information regarding the default state. We can only estimate
parameters of entering to the default state. However, within the alternatives, it is
still possibly one of the most flexible methodologies.
The methodology
Merton (1974)’s structural framework suggests that a company goes bankrupt if
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its value of assets, V , is lower than the face value of its debt, D, in which case the
equity holders receive 0. In case of no default, equity holders receive the residual
amount. Hence, the value of a stock, S, which is a claim on equity E is S = E =
max {V −D, 0}. So the payoff of a call option written on a stock can be written as:
CKT = max(ET −K; 0) = max(VT −D −K; 0) (4.5)
where K is the corresponding strike price. If the default value and the distribution






where V is the value of the asset and f(V ) is the corresponding probability density
function.
Hence, to calculate the probability of default, one needs to estimate the default
barrier as well as infer the f(VT ) from the available option contracts. To do so,
Capuano (2008) employs the concept of cross entropy. This is a measure of relative



















is the cross-entropy (or relative entropy) between f(V ) and f0(V ).
The minimization problem (4.7) is subject to the following constraints:
1. Option pricing constraint—The current price of an option is the discounted





(VT −D −Ki)f(VT )dVT (4.8)
7See Capuano (2008) or Vilsmeier (2011) for details of the estimation and for further discussions.
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where Ki is the strike price of option i. Note that the current stock price S0 is
included as an option with K = 0.




























(VT −D −Ki)f(VT )dVT
]
where N is the number of options available, λ0, ..., λN are the corresponding Lagrange
multipliers.
The first step is to determine the optimal values of λs through the first order






1VT>D+Ki(VT −D −Ki)f(VT )dVT − CKi0
= 0, i = 1, .., N.
The above equation should be solved numerically via a multivariate algorithm,
such as the Newton–Paphson algorithm. However, as noted by Vilsmeier (2011),
searching for the roots of the system is unfeasible in many applications mainly due
to near-singularities of the Jacobian matrix resulting from the first Taylor approxi-
mation, unless the initial guess of λs are very “accurate”.8
Vilsmeier (2011) suggests technical modifications to the Capuano (2008)’s frame-
work. Following Alhassid, Agmon and Levine (1978), he uses a robust and compu-
tationally efficient algorithm to calculate the optimal set of λs. This paper follows
Vilsmeier (2011)’s methodology to estimate the optimal λs.9
8The majority of our optimization trails failed due to the non-singularity of the Jacobian matrix.




Once the optimal λs are obtained, we can get f ∗(VT , D). Given f ∗(VT , D), the
default barrier D∗ is calculated trough another numerical optimization of:
lim
∆→0
L (f ∗(VT , D + ∆))− L (f ∗(VT , D))
D + ∆
= 0. (4.11)
Finally the IPoD is estimated through (4.6) once we have f ∗(VT ) and D∗.
Empirical implementation
At least two option contracts written on the same stock with the same expiry
date are needed to solve the problem. The first one is used to shape the density
function f ∗(V,D), whereas the second one is needed to estimate the threshold level
D∗. We apply the framework only to the call options since put options relate by the
put-call parity. Moreover, we consider only the options with time to expiry more than
6 months.
Option prices are estimated as the average of the best bid and ask prices. Finally,
in order to capture the liquidity differences, we weight the option contracts by using
the open interest of each option.10 That is, the weight for option i trading in day τ
expires in day T is:
wi(τ, T ) =
OpenInti(τ, T )∑N
i=1 OpenInti(τ, T )
(4.12)
where N is the total number of options traded at date τ and expires at T . Table C.2
in Appendix C presents the information we use to estimate the IPoD of J.P. Morgan
(JPM) for 12th of December 2010 as an example.
Descriptive analysis–IPoD
Table 4.5 reports the descriptive statistics of the IPoD estimates. For each bank
holding company (BHC), each year, we first calculate the average of the IPoD esti-
10Capuano (2008) uses the trading volume as weight, whereas Vilsmeier (2011) uses the open
interests. We estimate the IPoD using both trading volume and open interests and results are
qualitatively similar. However, the IPoD estimated through open interests are more stable. Hence,
we report only the results, where open interest is used to weight the liquidity of an option.
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Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics–IPoD, annual averages
Table reports the mean, median, and the 25th and the 75th percentile of the annual averages of
the estimated option implied probability of default (IPoD) throughout the sample period, averaged
across BHCs. The annual figure is obtained as the average value for a given calendar year. The
sample includes the largest 80 U.S. bank holding companies for a period of 1998 to 2011. All of the
figures are scaled by 100.
year mean p25 median p75 std. dev.
1998 0.815 0.239 0.472 1.180 0.951
1999 0.790 0.306 0.496 1.040 0.721
2000 1.537 0.564 1.015 1.540 2.510
2001 0.605 0.227 0.458 0.813 0.648
2002 0.626 0.139 0.283 0.620 1.062
2003 0.269 0.062 0.100 0.248 0.516
2004 0.138 0.014 0.031 0.257 0.189
2005 0.148 0.015 0.049 0.164 0.255
2006 0.148 0.015 0.035 0.185 0.227
2007 0.741 0.164 0.389 0.921 1.137
2008 4.653 1.783 3.439 7.110 3.833
2009 10.296 3.078 5.459 11.904 12.575
2010 4.196 0.659 1.818 4.032 7.319
2011 2.812 0.706 1.435 3.233 3.904
mates corresponding to the trading days within that year. The mean, standard de-
viation, 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of the estimated default probabilities (scaled
by 100) averaged across the BHCs are presented. Results reveal relatively low mar-
ket based default probabilities for the 2003–2006 period, where the average expected
default is only 0.17%. On the other hand, we see a significant increase in 2007 with
a peak in 2009. From 2006 to 2009, the average value increased from 0.15% to
over 10%. In order to proxy the overall uncertainty in the stock market, we get the
Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index (VIX) daily data from the
Exchange’s website. As expected, the Spearman correlation coefficient between the
VIX index and IPoD is 0.2566 and significant with a p−value of 0.0000. This sug-
gests that market’s assessment on the riskiness of a stock increases as the market–wide
uncertainty increases.
Similarly, Figure 4.2 plots the estimated values throughout the sample period for





































Figure 4.2: Figure plots the market implied probability of default (IPoD) estimates
throughout the sample period, averaged across the bank holding companies (BHCs).
A BHC is identified as defaulted if it is delisted in a given year.
average IPoD estimates are almost always higher for the defaulted BHCs compared
to non–defaulted ones. The difference is significant particularly for the 2006–2010
period. Indeed, sample mean comparison test fails to reject the null hypothesis that
the mean value of IPoD for the defaulted companies are significantly higher than the
non–defaulted companies with a p−value of 0.1465. Both the augmented Dickey-
Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests reject the unit–root in the IPoD with p−value of
0.0000.
4.3 Empirical Methodology and Preliminary Analy-
sis
This section introduces the empirical methodology we employ to investigate the
impact of total disclosure level on the market implied default probability, followed by




We test our main hypothesis by employing the following panel regression:
IPoDb,t+1 = γ0 + γ1DSCOREb,t + κ ∗Xb,t + Year FE + BHC FE + εb,t. (4.13)
We estimate the above regression on a panel that has one observation for each bank
holding company–year combination, where subscript b denotes the bank holding com-
pany (BHC) and t denotes the year. Year and BHC fixed effects are included in the
regression to capture for any time-invariant unobserved BHC characteristics.
First, we measure our dependent variable, IPoDb,t+1, as the natural logarithm of
the average implied probability of default for bank b between two annual 10–K state-
ments disclosure dates.11 For example, if a bank’s 2008 10–K report became public on
the SEC–Edgar database on the 26th of February 2009, IPoDb,t+1 is calculated as the
natural logarithm of the average IPoD estimates from 27th of February 2009 until 16th
of February 2010, the disclosure date of 10–K statement for the year 2009. Thus we
allow the revealed information has an all-year-long effect. Second, instead of annual
averages, we use the log–transformed three-months averages of the implied default
probability estimates (IPoDb,t+3M) following the announcement of a 10–K statement
as the dependent variable. Since filling quarterly 10–Q reports to SEC is compulsory
for the U.S. bank holding companies, it is likely that investors update their informa-
tion set with the releases of 10–Q statements. In other words, the informativeness of
an annual report decreases with the public 10–Q statements, which is roughly after
three months of the release of 10–K report.
The main independent variable, DSCOREb,t, is the aggregated disclosure score of
the bank b at year t, calculated as in Equation (4.1). In line with our main hypothesis,
the coefficient of interest γ1 is expected to be negative; investors assess high disclosed
11Given the high skewness of the distribution, we use the logarithm of the IPoD estimates instead
of levels in our analysis (see for instance Laeven and Levine (2009)). For brevity, we use the “IPoD”
in referring to the natural logarithm of IPoD in the rest of the paper.
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banks as less likely to default. We include the size of the given bank holding company
(SIZE) as a control variable because extant research presents a positive correlation
between the disclosure score, the size of the institution, and the bank’s risk taking
behavior (e.g., Barrell, Davis, Fic and Karim (2010), Hermalin and Weisbach (2012)).
It is measured as the natural logarithm of the year-end total market capitalization.
We then control for the volatility of the firm value. The volatility of the firm value
is unobservable due to the lack of data on the market value of a firm’s debt. However,
under Merton (1974)’s assumptions, the volatility of the firm value can be estimated
using the volatility of the equity, which is observable. Following Lewis (2011) we











where Wb,t is the number of weeks available in year t for stock b, PHb,w and PLb,w are
the average weekly highest and the lowest prices for equity of bank b in week w,
respectively. It is represented as a percentage of closing price PC to adjust for stocks
trading at different prices. We expect volatility to be positively associated with IPoD.
BETAb,t is the estimated beta of bank b for year t and it is included in the analysis
to account for the systematic risk. It is calculated for each bank and each year from
regressions of bank weekly equity returns on the weekly returns of CRSP value-
weighted index.
Finally, we include other bank holding company financial characteristics. Bau-
mann and Nier (2003) proxy the (inverse) default probability as individual banks’
capital buffers and document a positive relationship between disclosure and the cap-
ital buffer. In a cross-country analysis, Beltratti and Stulz (2011) show that large
banks with more Tier 1 capital perform significantly better during the crises. Fol-
lowing the definition of Baumann and Nier (2003) and Nier and Baumann (2006),
12As a robustness, we measure volatility as the standard deviation of weekly returns for a given
period. The results are presented in Section 4.4.5.
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we define capital buffers, CAPBUF, a bank’s equity capital divided by its total li-
abilities. We expect banks with higher capital buffers to default less. To capture
other accounting risks, we consider non-performing loans, return on equity ratio, and
finally the level of deposits in log terms.13 For all of the variables, the value reported
in the FR Y–9C reports of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago for the end of year
t is used. The non-performing loans ratio, NPL, is calculated as the ratio of the sum
of loans past due 90 days or more and non-accrual loans to total assets. The return
on equity ratio, ROE, is the ratio of the income before extraordinary items to total
book equity. Finally, DEPO is the natural logarithm of the total deposits. We expect
the risk taking behavior of the BHC to be positively associated with the IPoD of the
firm. The definitions of the variables are presented in detail in Appendix C.
4.3.2 Preliminary analysis
This section presents a descriptive analysis of the key variables used throughout
the analysis. Panels A and B of Table 4.6 report the summary statistics and the
pair-wise correlations, respectively. In Panel C, we present a univariate comparison
analysis for bank holding companies with high versus low level of disclosure. The
superscripts * and ** are used to denote the 10% and 5% levels of statistical signifi-
cances, respectively.
Panel A presents the mean, median, minimum, maximum and standard deviation
of the key variables. Disclosure score has an annual mean of 1.54. Its value ranges
from 0.06 to 7.69 with standard deviation of 1.38. The minimum annual IPoD value is
-18.47 (corresponding to a 0 probability of default) and increases up to -0.76 (equiva-
lently 47% of implied default probability). The mean market value of common equity
(SIZE) is $2.65 billion and the median is $1.80 billion. The highest deviation is in
13In unreported results, we control for other accounting risk variables such as loan to asset ratio,




the return on equity. The value ranges from almost -6.2 to 0.3 within the sample.
Similarly, the ratio of the bank’s equity to its liabilities, CAPBUF has a significant





Table 4.6: Descriptive Analysis–Key Variables
Table presents the descriptive analysis for the key variables used throughout the paper. Panel A and B report the summary statistics and the pair-wise
correlations. In Panel C, we present a univariate comparison analysis for banks with high versus low level of disclosure. A bank is identified as high-disclosed
(low-disclosed) if its disclosure score is higher (lower) than the median score in a given year. The superscript * (**) denotes the 10% (5%) level statistical
significance. IPoDb,t+1 is the natural logarithm of the average implied probability of default estimates, calculated between two annual report disclosure dates,
whereas IPoDb,t+3M is the average estimates over three months following the 10–K report disclosure. DSCORE is the aggregated disclosure score defined in
Equation (4.1). All of the variables are introduced in Section 4.3.1 and as well defined in Appendix C. The sample contains the largest 80 U.S. bank holding
companies for a period of 1998 to 2011.
PANEL A: Summary statistics
IPODb,t+1 IPODb,t+3M DSCOREb,t SIZEb,t VOLAb,t BETAb,t CAPBUFb,t NPLb,t ROEb,t DEPOb,t
mean -5.256 -5.825 1.538 14.789 0.036 1.021 0.130 0.011 0.079 16.259
median -5.032 -5.671 1.092 14.404 0.029 0.967 0.102 0.006 0.119 15.884
min -18.470 -31.135 0.058 10.263 0.011 -0.364 0.010 0.000 -6.215 12.612
max -0.758 -0.340 7.686 19.428 0.258 3.593 3.766 0.243 0.266 20.844
std. dev. 2.107 2.563 1.380 1.621 0.025 0.558 0.253 0.016 0.305 1.511
Obs. 671 638 1055 1060 1072 1055 1032 958 1032 1032
PANEL B: Pair-wise correlations among key variables
IPODb,t+1 IPODb,t+3M DSCOREb,t SIZEb,t VOLAb,t BETAb,t CAPBUFb,t NPLb,t ROEb,t DEPOb,t
IPODb,t+3M 0.848∗∗ 1
DSCOREb,t -0.050 -0.076∗ 1
SIZEb,t -0.267∗∗ -0.286∗∗ 0.547∗∗ 1
VOLAb,t 0.587∗∗ 0.693∗∗ 0.021 -0.247∗∗ 1
BETAb,t 0.471∗∗ 0.518∗∗ 0.197∗∗ 0.084∗∗ 0.611∗∗ 1
CAPBUFb,t 0.012 0.038 -0.044 0.121∗∗ -0.009 0.086∗∗ 1
NPLb,t 0.403∗∗ 0.387∗∗ 0.087∗∗ -0.186∗∗ 0.636∗∗ 0.455∗∗ -0.062∗ 1
ROEb,t -0.306∗∗ -0.338∗∗ 0.026 0.265∗∗ -0.526∗∗ -0.337∗∗ 0.042 -0.508∗∗ 1
DEPOb,t -0.086∗∗ -0.111∗∗ 0.630∗∗ 0.868∗∗ 0.019 0.255∗∗ -0.186∗∗ 0.122∗∗ 0.033 1
PANEL C: Comparison of high and low disclosed banks
IPODb,t+1 IPODb,t+3M SIZEb,t VOLAb,t BETAb,t CAPBUFb,t NPLb,t ROEb,t DEPOb,t
High-disclosed -5.205 -6.049 15.471 0.034 1.049 0.106 0.010 0.102 16.985
Low-disclosed -4.791 -5.446 14.052 0.037 0.986 0.136 0.011 0.054 15.562
Difference -0.414 -0.603 1.419 -0.003 0.062 -0.029 -0.001 0.048 1.423
p−value 0.034 0.006 0.000 0.042 0.059 0.031 0.436 0.015 0.000
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The figures of Panel B reveal that the correlation between the annual and three
month IPoD is 0.85 and significant at a 5% level. The correlation between the level of
disclosure and implied default probability is negative as expected, however disclosure
is significantly correlated with the three-months-ahead IPoD only at a 10% level
with a p−value of 0.0576. Size is negatively related to IPoD and positively related to
disclosure, both being highly significant. In other words, investors assess bigger banks
as less likely to default and bigger banks disclosure more. We as well find a strong
statistical relationship between the size of a BHC and BHC characteristics: bigger
banks hold higher capital buffers, have better accounting performance, lower ratio of
non-performing loans, and have higher level of deposits. Both volatility and beta are
significantly and positively correlated with IPoD, suggesting that higher market risk
increases the investors’ risk-neutral expectations of default probability. Within the
accounting variables, we see that the level of deposits and the ratio of non-performing
assets are significantly related to both disclosure and IPoD irrespective of the chosen
period.
Finally, we identify a bank as high-disclosed one if its disclosure score is higher
than the median disclosure score in a given year. Similarly, low-disclosed BHCs are the
ones whose DSCORE values are less than the median score of the corresponding year.
In order to understand the differences in characteristics between high-disclosed and
low-disclosed bank holding companies, we then employ a univariate mean comparison
test between these two samples. Panel C reports the mean values, differences, and
p−values corresponding to a null hypothesis that both samples have the same mean
for a given characteristics. We see that BHCs disclosing more information related to
their risk profiles have significantly lower average implied default probabilities in the
following three months and year, which is consistent with our main hypothesis. Not
surprisingly, BHCs with higher levels of disclosure are larger in size. Larger BHCs
are more likely to be complex in structure, involved in riskier non-banking activities
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and have higher incentives to mitigate the informational frictions by disclosing more
information. We as well see that high-disclosed BHCs have higher levels of deposits
and benefits from higher operating performance compared to their low-disclosed pairs.
Obviously, the causality can go both ways: higher disclosure can lead an increase on
those variables, or higher values of the aforementioned accounting characteristics can
encourage the management to disclose more information.
4.4 Results
In Section 4.4.1 below, we test our main hypothesis that the previous level of
disclosure is associated with lower levels of current market implied default probability
by employing the baseline panel regression (4.13). Then we allow IPoD and DSCORE
being dynamically endogenous and replicate our panel regression by employing the
Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel generalized method of moments (GMM)
estimator. The methodology, discussion, and results are presented in Section 4.4.2.
A natural question arises whether there is an association between disclosure and other
enterprise risks. In Section 4.4.3 we test this question. Section 4.4.4 examines the
determinants of disclosure in a cross–sectional setting. Finally in Section 4.4.5, we
present further robustness tests.
The panel includes the largest 80 U.S. BHCs and spans the time period 1998–2011.
In all of the specifications year and bank fixed effects are included. For the sake of
brevity, we do not report the estimated coefficients of fixed effects. To improve the
ease of interpretation of the estimated coefficients, all of the explanatory variables




4.4.1 Relationship between disclosure and implied default prob-
ability
Estimated coefficients of (4.13) are presented in Table 4.7. Columns I through V
present the results where the dependent variable is IPoDb,t+1; the natural logarithm
of the average IPoD estimates between two 10–K reports dates throughout the year
t+ 1. On the other hand, in columns VI through X, we report the results where the
dependent variable is IPoDb,t+3M ; the natural logarithm of the average IPoD for bank
b between the annual 10–K and quarterly 10–Q reports disclosure dates.
The results confirm our hypothesis. The coefficient on DSCORE is negative and
statistically significant at a 5% level irrespective of the chosen period. This sug-
gests that BHCs with higher disclosure compared to their peers in this year, ceteris
paribus, have lower market implied default probabilities in the following period. The
IPoD–disclosure relationship is stronger for three-months ahead; both the statistical
and economic significance of the estimated coefficient is higher for the specifications
presented in columns VI to X compared to the ones presented in I to V. In terms
of economic significance, one standard deviation increase in the level of disclosure is
associated with a decrease of a 19% and 27% decrease in IPoD in the following year
and three months, respectively.
In columns II and VII we include the size of the bank holding company. Results
reveal that the bigger banks are assessed as less likely to default, which could be a
result of implicit too-big-to-fail guarantees. The third and eighth columns present the
regression of the current level of IPoD on previous year’s disclosure, size, and realized
volatility. As expected, higher levels of stock volatility is significantly and positively
associated with higher levels of market implied default probability. In columns IV and
IX, we control for the systematic risk, proxied by BETA. The estimated coefficient is
positive and significant. In other words, stocks with higher beta are assessed as more





Table 4.7: Relationship Between Disclosure Score and IPoD
Table provides the results of panel regressions that examine the impact of the level of disclosure on a bank holding company’s market implied probability
of default (IPoD). The panel includes the largest 80 U.S. BHCs and spans the time period 1998–2011. In columns I through V, the dependent variable is
IPoDb,t+1, is the natural logarithm of the average IPoD estimates for bank b between two annual 10–K report disclosure dates. On the other hand, columns
VI through X report the results where the dependent variable IPoDb,t+3M , is the natural logarithm of the average IPoD for bank b between the annual 10–K
and quarterly 10–Q report disclosure dates. DSCORE is the aggregated disclosure score and VOLA is the realized volatility calculated from the bid and ask
prices. BETA is estimated from regressions of bank weekly equity returns on the weekly returns of CRSP value weighted index. SIZE is measured as the
natural logarithm of the yearend total market capitalization. CAPBUF is the ratio of bank’s equity capital to total liabilities, NPL is the non-performing
loans ratio, ROE is the return on equity, and finally DEPO is the natural logarithm of the total deposits. In all of the specifications year and bank fixed
effects are included. The explanatory variables are standardized to have a zero mean–unit variance. The t−statistics are reported in parentheses. For each of
the specification, the sample size and the adjusted R2s are also reported.
IPoDb,t+1 = γ0 + γ1DSCOREb,t+controlsb,t+εb,t IPoDb,t+3M = γ0 + γ1DSCOREb,t+controlsb,t+εb,t
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
DSCOREb,t -0.188 -0.232 -0.214 -0.177 -0.183 -0.267 -0.329 -0.303 -0.247 -0.298
(-2.17) (-2.74) (-2.60) (-2.18) (-2.11) (-2.33) (-2.97) (-2.80) (-2.34) (-2.59)
SIZEb,t -0.959 -0.406 -0.367 -0.593 -1.412 -0.705 -0.740 -1.007
(-5.53) (-2.15) (-1.97) (-2.38) (-6.26) (-2.74) (-2.96) (-3.05)
VOLAb,t 0.671 0.429 0.215 0.735 0.316 0.143
(6.38) (3.59) (1.61) (5.32) (2.07) (0.82)
BETAb,t 0.293 0.284 0.524 0.571









cons -4.956 -4.789 -4.874 -5.001 -4.438 -5.463 -5.128 -5.273 -5.496 -4.256
(-30.90) (-30.03) (-31.49) (-32.10) (-26.63) (-25.84) (-24.28) (-25.37) (-26.76) (-19.33)
Obs. 668 667 667 666 613 635 635 635 635 584
adjR2 0.679 0.695 0.714 0.721 0.740 0.604 0.630 0.648 0.668 0.681
Year & Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Finally, we include the bank holding company accounting characteristics in the
analysis. In general, the association between the accounting variables and annual
IPoD is stronger than the three-months IPoD. The estimated sign of CAPBUF is
negative and significant at a 10% level; banks with higher capital buffers are per-
ceived as less likely to default. The ratio of non-performing loans, deposits, and
return on equity are positively associated with next period’s IPoD. The signs are as
expected; higher non-performing loans indicate higher expected losses and associated
with higher default risk. Higher profitability may signal greater efficiency and lower
default risk. However, a higher value might also indicate higher risk-taking activities.
Our results suggest that above–sample–average ROE is assessed as increased risk.
Similarly, higher deposits could be a signal of maturity gap since deposits are more
likely to have short term maturity.
We conclude that, even controlled by the market and the accounting risk, an
increase in the disclosure score reduces the market based implied probability of de-
fault. When the level of disclosure increases, this may be perceived as an increased
transparency by the investors which in turn affect the agents perceptions regarding
the default risk of the given bank holding company. The result is robust to all of
the specifications considered. We would like to underline that our regressions in-
clude bank holding company fixed effects, so the documented association between
disclosure and IPoD cannot be explained by differences in management quality across
BHCs. Besides the level of disclosure, size of the company, stock beta, and ratio of
non-performing loans are significantly associated with the next year’s market default
probabilities and robust to different specifications. The riskiness of the company is




4.4.2 Adjusting for dynamic endogeneity
The underlying assumption under our regression model noted in (4.13) is that
level of disclosure, DSCORE, is exogenous after controlling for the market risk, bank
holding company characteristics, year, and bank fixed effects. However, causality
may run in both directions–from management’s decision on the level of disclosure to
default probability and vice versa. A bank holding company’s past level of market
implied default risk can affect both the current level of default risk and the decision
on the level of disclosure. In other words, IPoD and DSCORE can be dynamically
endogenous. For instance, a bank holding company that is exposed to higher risk may
choose to disclose more information to reduce the uncertainty and change investors’
assessment on its risk. Otherwise, some unobserved time-invariant bank characteris-
tics may jointly affect the implied default probability and the level of disclosure, even
though controlled by year and bank fixed effects. In these cases, the regressors will
be correlated with the error term, which produces biased coefficients.
One solution is to run fixed-effects instrumental variables estimation (two-stage
least squares). However, finding strong instruments is a challenge and with weak
instruments, the fixed-effects IV estimators are likely to be biased as well. Therefore,
to adjust for the dynamic endogeneity, we employ the Arellano and Bond (1991)
dynamic panel GMM estimator, which enables us to use the lags of the endogenous
variables to provide instruments for identifying the relationship between the level of
disclosure and IPoD.14 Recall our main panel regression model:
IPoDb,t+1 = γ0 + γ1DSCOREb,t + κXb,t + εb,t (4.15)
where X stands for the control variables. The error term can be composed of unob-
14Another advantage of the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM is that it is designed for situations
with small T , large N panels, as in the case of our sample.
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served bank-specific effects and observation specific errors:
εb,t = ηb + eb,t
The Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM first uses first-differences to transform (4.15)
into:
∆IPoDb,t+1 = γ1∆DSCOREb,t + κ∆Xb,t + ∆εb,t
Note that the first-differencing eliminates the unobserved ηb:
∆εb,t = (ηb − ηb) + (eb,t − eb,t−1) = ∆eb,t
The final stage in the estimation is to estimate the first-differenced equation via GMM
by using lagged values of the endogenous variables. We include three lags of IPoD as
regressors and estimate the following dynamic panel regression:
IPoDb,t+1 = γ0 + γ1DSCOREb,t + γ2IPoDb,t + γ3IPoDb,t−1 (4.16)
+ γ3IPoDb,t−2 + κXb,t + ηb + eb,t
Table 4.8 report the results where we use both the IPoDb,t+1; the natural logarithm
of the average IPoD for bank b between the two annual report disclosure dates and
IPoDb,t+3M ; is the natural logarithm of the average IPoD for bank b between the
annual 10–K and quarterly 10–Q report disclosure dates as dependent variables. The
full set of control variables introduced in Section 4.4.1 are included in the analysis,
but for the sake of brevity we do not report the estimated coefficients.
We try two different specifications. The first and the third columns present the
estimated coefficients and robust t-statistics for the specification where we treat only
IPOD and DSCORE as endogenous. The first two lags of the endogenous variables
and controls are used as instruments. The coefficient on DSCORE is negative and
significant. However, a crucial assumption for the validity of the GMM estimates is
that the instruments are exogenous. The Hansen test statistic for over-identifying
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Table 4.8: Dynamic Panel GMM Estimaton
Table provides the results of the GMM panel regression in Equation (4.16) that examine the impact
of the level of disclosure on a bank holding company’s (BHC) market implied probability of default
(IPoD). The panel includes the largest 80 U.S. BHCs and spans the time period 1998–2011. In
columns I and II, the dependent variable IPoDb,t+1, is the natural logarithm of the average IPoD
for bank b between the two annual report disclosure dates. In columns III and IV, we report the
results where the dependent variable IPoDb,t+3M , is the natural logarithm of the average IPoD
for bank b between the annual 10–K and quarterly 10–Q report disclosure dates. DSCORE is the
aggregated disclosure score. All of the control variables introduced in Table 4.7; size, beta of the
company, realized variance, capital buffers, non-performing loans, return on equity, and finally level
of deposits, are included in all of the specifications. For the sake of brevity, the estimated coefficients
are not reported. Column I and III present the results in which the IPoD and DSCORE is allowed
to be dynamically endogenous, whereas all of the other variables are assumed to be exogenous. In
columns II and IV on the other hand, in addition to disclosure and IPoD, we allow the accounting
risk variables (CAPBUF, NPL, ROE, and DEPO) to be endogenous as well. The t−statistics are
reported in parentheses. For each of the specification, the sample size, the Hansen test statistics for
over-identifying restrictions with the corresponding p−values are also reported.
Yb,t = IPoDb,t+1 Yb,t = IPoDb,t+3M
I II III IV
Yb,t−1 1.222 0.971 -0.097 -0.109
(12.59) (10.13) (-0.88) (-1.00)
Yb,t−2 -0.162 -0.235 -0.419 -0.281
(-1.29) (-2.62 ) (-3.20) (-2.54)
Yb,t−3 -0.605 -0.555 0.398 0.237
(-5.25) (-4.80) (4.10) (2.68)
DSCOREb,t -1.603 -0.792 -2.296 -1.428
(-2.24) (-2.22) (-3.46) (-2.92)
Obs. 337 337 317 317
Hansen χ2 30.90 45.16 36.24 43.49
Hansen p−value 0.010 0.507 0.001 0.578
BHC controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
restrictions rejects the null of joint validity of our instruments. Hence, in column
II and IV we report the estimated coefficients when IPoD, DSCORE, and all of the
accounting variables; capital buffers, non-performing loans, return on equity, and de-
posits are assumed to be endogenous. In other words, we allow a dynamic relationship
between the market assessment on bank’s risk, the decision on the level of disclosure,
and some of the key accounting identities. The coefficient on DSCORE continues
to be negative and significant and the joint validity of our instruments cannot be
rejected with a p–value of over 0.5 in both of the specifications. We conclude that
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bank holding companies with a higher level of disclosure in the previous year have
lower market implied default probabilities in the current year, even after controlling
for dynamic endogeneity between IPoD and disclosure.
4.4.3 Relationship between disclosure and other enterprise risks
This section examines whether disclosure has any impact on other enterprise risks.
We focus on four different risk measures. First, we use the standard deviation of a
bank’s weekly equity returns as a proxy for aggregate risk (AGG) (Demsetz, Saiden-
berg and Strahan (1997) and Nier and Baumann (2006)). Second, we measure down-
side risk (DOWN) as the mean of implied volatility estimates from the option prices
written on the bank’s stock (Cremers and Weinbaum (2010) and Xing, Zhang and
Zhao (2010)). Third, we measure the systematic risk (BETA) by the beta of the firm,
estimated from the CAPM model, and finally we include the idiosyncratic risk (IDIO)
calculated as the standard deviation of the weekly residuals of the CAPM model.
Table 4.9 present the panel regression estimates of (4.13), where the dependent
variable is one of the above defined risk measures. Again, we report two different
specifications where the dependent variable is calculated as the average value of the





Table 4.9: Relationship Between Disclosure Score and BHC Risk
Table provides the results of panel regressions that examine the impact of the level of disclosure on a bank holding company’s risk. The panel includes the
largest 80 U.S. BHCs and spans the time period 1998–2011. AGG is the aggregate risk, calculated as the standard deviation of weekly stock returns, DOWN
is the downside risk, measured as the natural logarithm of option implied volatility written on bank’s stock. BETA captures the systematic risk and calculated
as the estimated beta of the bank from the CAPM model, and finally IDIO is the idiosyncratic risk calculated as the standard deviation of the weekly residuals
of the CAPM model. In columns I through IV, the dependent variables are calculated as the annual averages of the corresponding risk, whereas in columns V
through VIII we have three-month averages of the risks as dependent variables. The definitions of explanatory variables are presented in Table 4.7. In all of
the specifications year and bank fixed effects are included and the explanatory variables are standardized. The t−statistics, the sample size and the adjusted
R2s are also reported.
AGGb,t+1 DOWNb,t+1 BETAb,t+1 IDIOb,t+1 AGGb,t+3M DOWNb,t+3M BETAb,t+3M IDIOb,t+3M
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
DSCOREb,t -0.435 -0.039 -0.092 -0.284 -0.289 -0.045 -0.133 -0.317
(-3.46) (-2.12) (-2.15) (-2.50) (-1.53) (-2.73) (-2.95) (-1.75)
SIZEb,t -4.099 -0.170 -0.298 -3.913 -5.119 -0.280 -1.004 -4.749
(-7.29) (-3.23) (-2.09) (-7.51) (-4.00) (-3.49) (-3.72) (-4.03)
VOLAb,t 0.063 0.125 0.005 0.0597 0.305 0.035
(1.92) (2.26) (0.03) (1.51) (2.75) (0.10)
BETAb,t 0.294 0.039 0.320 0.438 0.064 0.187
(2.44) (2.52) (3.29) (2.80) (3.55) (1.80)
CAPBUFb,t -0.035 -0.015 -0.024 -0.077 -0.562 -0.037 -0.088 -0.117
(-0.31) (-0.85) (-0.87) (-0.84) (-3.58) (-2.93) (-2.11) (-1.08)
NPLb,t 0.391 0.049 0.017 0.464 0.364 0.035 -0.356 0.619
(2.22) (2.35) (0.40) (2.20) (0.82) (1.60) (-2.64) (1.20)
ROEb,t -0.020 0.040 0.071 -0.129 -0.347 0.013 0.292 -0.372
(-0.12) (2.77) (1.93) (-0.86) (-1.42) (0.49) (2.05) (-1.52)
DEPOb,t 3.749 0.182 0.580 3.412 4.487 0.214 1.247 3.746
(5.64) (2.35) (3.92) (5.84) (3.50) (2.25) (4.83) (3.56)
cons 5.914 -0.846 0.543 5.904 7.117 -0.753 0.338 6.367
(18.83) (-25.04) (8.77) (21.24) (15.96) (-19.48) (3.56) (16.64)
Obs. 851 614 845 844 868 584 871 867
adjR2 0.783 0.873 0.562 0.751 0.765 0.883 0.546 0.688
Year & Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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In columns I and V, the dependent variable is the aggregate risk, AGG. The ex-
pected sign of disclosure on volatility is ambiguous. On one hand, there is a literature
providing evidence that disclosure moves the stock prices and increases volatility (See
for example, Ross (1989) and Leuz and Verrecchia (2000)). On the other hand, a
number of studies argue that the level of disclosure is negatively associated with the
stock return volatility (See for example, Bushee and Noe (2000), Baumann and Nier
(2004), Kothari et al. (2009), and So (2011)). Our findings provide supporting evi-
dence for the latter group; banks with higher level of disclosure benefit from lower
stock volatility. However, the relationship is significant at a 5% level only for longer
horizons. One standard deviation increase in the level of disclosure in the previ-
ous year decreases the stock return volatility by 0.435% in the following year. This
could be explained by two: first, enhanced disclosure may reduce the impact of news
about a firm’s performance since it reduces the uncertainty. Second, as market mi-
crostructure theory suggests, in a market where some investors have access to better
information than others, by reducing the information asymmetries, disclosure dimin-
ishes the advantage to be better-informed. To the extent that this is true, enhanced
disclosure reduces the price impact of a trade initiated by informed agents (Diamond
and Verrecchia, 1991).
Columns II and VI reveal a negative and significant relationship between the
disclosure and the downside risk irrespective of the period chosen. In line with the
findings of Ederington and Lee (1996) and Rogers et al. (2009) implied volatility;
the market’s participants risk-neutral expectations of volatility, declines following
information releases in long-window changes. Finally, results presented in columns
III, IV, VII, and VIII show that enhanced disclosure in the previous year significantly
decreases both the systematic and the idiosyncratic risk of a bank holding company,
whereas the association is stronger for the latter.
Besides, DSCORE, in all of the specifications, size is significantly and negatively
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associated with the enterprise risks we consider. Bigger bank holding companies
benefit from lower enterprise risk, all else being equal.
4.4.4 Determinants of disclosure
In this section, we examine the determinants of disclosure in a cross-sectional
setting. First, we include the one period-lagged value of disclosure in our analysis.
We expect the firms’ past disclosure behavior affecting their prosperity to provide
voluntary disclosures in the future. In their multiperiod analysis, Einhorn and Ziv
(2008) argue that by providing higher levels of voluntary disclosure, the managers
make an implicit commitment to provide similar disclosures in the future.
There is a rich empirical literature providing evidence that the bigger firms dis-
closure more information.15 Due to their more risk taking behavior and complex
activities, the bigger firms are more likely to disclose more if disclosure is a tool to
reduce information asymmetries. Following this, we include the size of the bank hold-
ing company, measured as the natural logarithm of the market capitalization at the
end of each year.
Third, we consider the profitability of the bank holding company, proxied by
return on equity ratio and the average weekly returns in the current year. Both
theoretical and empirical evidence on the relationship between profitability and the
level of disclosure is mixed. Several papers argue that the managers of more profitable
firms have incentives to disclose more to signal the quality (e.g., Verrecchia (1983),
Verrecchia (1990), and Dye (1985)). On the other hand Lang and Lundholm (1993)
and Skinner (1994) argue that the management is more likely to disclose bad news
than good news. In an empirical analysis conducted on the largest 50 U.S. and
Japanese companies, Ho and Taylor (2007) show that firms with lower profitability
disclose more information. Bujaki and McConomy (2002) find that the extent of
15See for example Botosan and Plumlee (2002), Bujaki and McConomy (2002), Ho and Taylor
(2007), and Francis et al. (2008).
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Table 4.10: Determinants of Disclosure
Table presents the results for the cross sectional regressions that examine the determinants of dis-
closure. Sample includes the largest 80 U.S. BHCs and spans the time period 1998–2011. The
dependent variable, DSCORE, is the aggregated disclosure score. All of the control variables are
listed in Appendix C. All of the specifications include the year fixed effects and t-values reported
in the parentheses are based on the robust standard errors that are clustered at the bank holding
company level. For each of the specification, the sample size and the adjusted R2s are also reported.
DSCOREb,t+1 = γ0 + γ1DSCOREb,t + γ2DSCOREb,t−1 +controlsb,t+εb,t
I II III IV
DSCOREb,t 1.335 1.293 1.283 1.287
(11.60) (11.49) (11.29) (11.94)
DSCOREb,t−1 0.045 0.035 0.045 0.037
(0.39) (0.30) (0.38) (0.34)












Obs. 895 889 861 612
adjR2 0.927 0.932 0.933 0.93
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
disclosure is affected by revenue growth, with higher growth firms disclosing less than
their peers. On the other hand, Cheung et al. (2010) show that more profitable
companies tend to disclose more.
Finally, we include the annual IPoD, volatility of the weekly equity returns and
estimated beta of the company in our analysis. One can expect a significant relation-
ship between the disclosure and risk taking behavior of a bank if there is an effective
market discipline; increased public information helps investors to assess the riskiness
of a bank, punish accordingly, and changes in market dynamics influence the decisions
made by bank management in turn. Table 4.10 present the results.
All of the specifications include the year fixed effects and t-values reported in the
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parentheses are based on the robust standard errors that are clustered at the bank
holding company level. In line with the findings of Einhorn and Ziv (2008), we find
that the current year’s level of disclosure is positively and significantly associated
with next year’s disclosure, whereas we find the two-period lagged value of disclosure
does not significantly associated with the current level. Second column reports the
results where the size of the company is included in the analysis. In harmony with
the extant literature, we find that the bigger companies disclose more information on
their risk structure. In column III we include the two proxies of the past performance;
return on equity and average of the weekly equity returns. Results reveal the negative
association of the variables with the next year’s level of disclosure. Finally column
IV reports the results where IPoD, volatility and beta of the company are included
in the analysis. Only the relationship between current year’s BETA and next year’s
DSCORE is statistically significant at a 5% level. Higher levels of observed systematic
risk this year encourage the managers to disclose more information. This is consistent
with the market discipline hypothesis mentioned earlier.
4.4.5 Further robustness checks
We perform four sets of robustness tests to confirm the validity of our results.
First, we examine whether the documented relationship between disclosure and the
annual and three-months-level of implied default probability (IPoD) holds for other
time intervals. To examine this, we re-estimate our baseline panel regression (4.13)
with dependent variable equal to the bimonthly and semi-annually averages of IPoD
estimates following the disclosure date. Second, we assess the sensitivity of our results
to model specification by using the logit-transformed market implied default proba-
bility instead of a log-transformed IPoD. Third, we allow the disclosure measure to
enter the model as a dummy variable. We define a variable DISCDECILE, which
takes the value one if the corresponding bank’s level of disclosure in a given year
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belongs to the top deciles compared to its peers. Finally, we change the definition
of our volatility and instead of calculating volatility from bid and ask prices of the
equity, we use the standard deviation of weekly equity returns (VOLAret).
Table 4.11 presents the results. The first two columns repeat the estimated coeffi-
cients for the baseline regressions, where the main dependent variables are the annual
and three-month averages of IPoD estimates. In columns III and IV, the dependent
variables are the bimonthly and semi-annually averages of IPoD estimates following
the announcement of an annual report. Column V reports the estimated coefficients
when we use logit transformation instead of a log-transformation of IPoD. In column
VI we change the definition of the disclosure index and finally the last column reports
the robustness when volatility is calculated from the weekly returns.
Results confirm the robustness of the documented relationship between market im-
plied default probability and disclosure. The economic significance of the association
is almost monotonically decreasing with the period; it is highest for the three-months
ahead and lowest for the annual. Irrespective of the horizon, disclosure is negatively
and significantly associated with the next period IPoD. Logit-transformed dependent
variable produces almost identical results. When we allow disclosure to enter the






Table 4.11: Robustness Analysis
Table presents the results for the robustness analysis. The panel includes the largest 80 U.S. BHCs and spans the time period 1998–2011. Columns I and II
repeat the estimated coefficients for the baseline regressions, where the main dependent variables are the annual and three-month averages of IPoD estimates,
respectively. In columns III and IV, the dependent variables are the bimonthly and semi-annually averages of IPoD following the announcement of an annual
report. Column V reports the estimated coefficients when we use logit transformation instead of a log-transformation. In column VI we measure disclosure
with a dummy variable (DISCDECILE), which takes 1 of the bank is in the top decile, and finally the last column reports the robustness when volatility is
calculated as the standard deviation of weekly equity returns. The definitions of the other variables are presented in Table 4.7. In all of the specifications year
and bank fixed effects are included and the explanatory variables are standardized. The t−statistics, the sample size and the adjusted R2s are also reported.
IPoDb,t+1 IPoDb,t+3M IPoDb,t+2M IPoDb,t+6M logitIPoDb,t+1 IPoDb,t+1 IPoDb,t+1
I II III IV V VI VII
DSCOREb,t -0.183 -0.298 -0.279 -0.199 -0.188 -0.179
(-2.11) (-2.59) (-2.38) (-2.06) (-2.13) (-2.06)
DISCDECILE -0.631
(-2.70)
SIZEb,t -0.593 -1.007 -1.015 -0.851 -0.673 -0.577 -0.649
(-2.38) (-3.05) (-2.87) (-3.07) (-2.66) (-2.33) (-2.61)
VOLAb,t 0.215 0.143 0.226 0.202 0.206 0.214
(1.61) (0.82) (1.26) (1.39) (1.52) (1.61)
VOLAretb,t 0.015
(0.13)
BETAb,t 0.284 0.571 0.550 0.411 0.289 0.283 0.334
(3.87) (5.76) (5.36) (4.95) (3.88) (3.87) (4.00)
CAPBUFb,t -0.195 -0.229 -0.183 -0.259 -0.193 -0.181 -0.195
(-1.76) (-1.64) (-1.30) (-2.21) (-1.71) (-1.64) (-1.75)
NPLb,t 0.381 0.143 0.0451 0.142 0.397 0.384 0.442
(3.63) (1.52) (0.44) (1.79) (3.72) (3.67) (4.38)
ROEb,t 0.125 0.108 -0.171 0.127 0.142 0.123 0.114
(1.72) (1.05) (-1.04) (1.47) (1.92) (1.70) (1.56)
DEPOb,t 0.62 0.543 0.660 0.410 0.692 0.726 0.607
(1.88) (1.23) (1.43) (1.10) (2.07) (2.18) (1.83)
cons -4.438 -4.256 -4.220 -4.349 -4.407 -4.262 -4.435
(-26.63) (-19.33) (-18.77) (-23.42) (-26.05) (-25.47) (-26.43)
Obs. 613 584 568 593 613 613 613
adjR2 0.740 0.681 0.693 0.703 0.740 0.742 0.739




Increased uncertainty is argued as one of the main reasons of the breakdown of
trading and the associated withdrawal of liquidity in many markets during the crisis.
In periods of stress, there is a flight to quality and safe-heaven. Hence, investors with
imperfect information over the quality of assets reduce their holdings, while holders
of “safe” assets are unwilling to sell at prevailing market prices, leading to a collapse
of market functioning. The evidence presented in this paper suggests that disclosure
may help to mitigate some of these informational frictions. In particular, we show
that an increased disclosure affects the investors’ believes on the riskiness of a bank
and is followed by reduced market implied default probabilities. This result is robust
to the inclusion of a number of other bank characteristics and as well the adjustment
of dynamic endogeneity.
Our sample includes the largest 85 U.S. bank holding companies in terms of asset
size as of December 2007, for the period 1998–2011. We measure the level of disclosure
by a self-constructed disclosure index and we estimate the market implied default
probabilities from traded options of a given company. By construction, option implied
default probabilities reflect investors’ expectations of the bank holding companies’
average default probability over option time to expiration. Hence, one can argue
that the communication processes increase transparency and eliminate disparities
between what investors understand and expect and what management intends to
deliver. Moreover, we provide evidence that voluntary disclosure has a sizeable and
beneficial effect on other enterprise risks; return volatility, downside risk, market risk,
and idiosyncratic risk of a bank holding company. Finally, our results show that bigger
companies, companies with lower performance, and higher market risk are more likely
to provide higher level of disclosures compared to their peers, all else being equal.
Our analysis provides possible policy implications. High disclosure is a necessity
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condition for the market discipline and it seems to provide incentives for investors
to reward the high disclosed banks. This could be beneficial for the bank as well
if reduced risk is translated into a reduced cost of capital as documented in the
literature. Our analysis shows that there is a number of areas in which the banks are
fail to provide sufficient information, where more granular quantitative disclosures
are required on the liquidity risk, especially on the information on unencumbered
funding and liquid asset holdings. Moreover there an evidence of lack of disclosure on
information related to the credit exposure to other financial institutions and exposure




Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis have explored a number of different issues in
pure order driven exchanges. Generally, the results presented in these two chapters
suggest that the state of a limit order book contains non-negligible information about
the short-term aggregate price formation process and order choice strategies of the
agents. Specifically, “Global Depth and Future Volatility” investigates the predictive
power of a limit order book distribution on intraday market and individual stock
volatilities. We summarize the relative accumulation of quoted depth in a given limit
order book and provide empirical evidence that our summary measure, global depth,
has a leading in-sample and out-of-sample predictive power over market volatility.
Our results presented in Chapter 2 points out several directions for further re-
search. First, we left the relationship between aggregate liquidity and subsequent
returns as a further research. One can easily argue that the relative price position of
the quoted depth can signal and can change the expectations of the direction of the
price level as well. However, when we test the predictability of the intraday returns,
we fail to obtain any significant explanatory power of either global depth or other
variables, such as trading activity measures or bid-ask spread. Next, we focus on the
daily predictability regressions. We find that global depth is a significant predictor
of daily returns at a 10% level, which could be results of a small daily sample size.
Hence, as a next step, one could increase the sample size, or adopt the measure on
Chapter 5
another exchange with longer time-series data availability and test the relationship
between global depth and future returns.
Whether traders can design execution strategies that allow them to reduce exe-
cution costs using the informativeness of the state of a limit order book is another
possible interesting question. There is a vast theoretical literature on order choice
concluding that the agents submit limit orders rather than the market orders under
high volatility states to reduce the picking-off risk (see for instance Foucault (1999)).
Moreover, due to option-like features of the limit orders, the execution probability
of an order increases with volatility. Putting differently, as option values depend on
volatility, volatility information can be used by traders to price their orders. For
instance, in an anticipation of increased volatility, a trader can reduce their exposure
to the risk of being picked off by submitting less aggressive orders ((Foucault et al.,
2007)). Similarly, given access to relevant data set, volatility information can be used
to price index options written on the ISE-30 index.
Finally, in this thesis, we mostly focus on the “static” properties of a limit order
book. In other words, we focus on the distribution of non-executed limit orders or we
consider the state of a book both at a given time. Many other “dynamic” properties
can also be analyzed, such as the response of the order flow (i.e. order choice) after
following a high volatility state. These can be commonly obtained by fitting the
volatility and limit order book distribution data to a Vector Auto-Regression model.
Chapter 3, “Competition, Signaling and Non-walking Through the Book: Effects
on Order Choice“ investigates the following questions: (1) Do agents consider the
competition and signaling effects during their order submission?; (2) How does the
feature of non-walking through the book affect order decision of an impatient trader?;
and (3) What is the difference in trading behavior between institutional and individual
investors? We find that the competition effect is stronger than the signaling effect
for both sides of the market. For a limit order trader, the competition effect is the
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strongest for the volume at the second best quotes. On the other hand, we show that
under non-walking through the book rule, only volatility and price trend affect the
order choice decision of a market order trader. Finally, in comparison to individual
traders, we document that institutional traders’ order submission strategies are less
affected by the state of the limit order book.
The novel feature of the chapter is an emphasis on the effect of competition/signaling
in a pure order driven market when walking through the order book is not allowed.
The research questions we addressed have not been thoroughly treated in the current
literature. Chapter 3 focuses the effects a particular market mechanism; non-walking
through the book on order choice. One possible extension could be to analyze the
effects of this market mechanism on liquidity. When walking through the book is
allowed, large market orders walk up the book until they are fully executed. Hence,
“mechanically” the immediate price impact of such an order is higher under walking
through the book. Whether this creates any permanent price impact is important
information for stock exchanges while designing their market mechanism rules.
Chapter 4 of this thesis on the other hand, addresses a question in the area of
corporate governance. It specifically asks whether enhanced disclosure can alleviate
the informational frictions between the management and investors and in turn can
affect the investor’s assessment on the riskiness of a firm. By proposing a template
to measure the level of voluntary disclosure, I conclude that increased disclosure is
associated with lower levels of market implied default probability.
Increased uncertainty is argued as one of the main reasons of the breakdown of
trading and the associated withdrawal of liquidity in many markets during the crisis.
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that disclosure may help to mitigate
some of these informational frictions and is beneficial for various enterprise risks.
This finding is important for policy makers. High disclosure is a necessity condition
for market discipline and it seems to provide incentives for investors to reward the
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high disclosed banks. If reduced risk is translated into a reduced cost of capital
as documented in the current literature (see for instance Botosan (1997), Leuz and
Verrecchia (2000), Botosan and Plumlee (2002), and Barth et al. (2013)), disclosure
can be argued as beneficial for the bank management as well.
The key methodological issue in this chapter is the endogeneity of the disclosure
variable, making it difficult to interpret the findings. A bank holding company’s past
level of market implied default risk can affect both the current level of default risk
and the decision on the past and current levels of disclosure. In other words, the main
explanatory variable and the response variable of the baseline panel regression model
can be dynamically endogenous. In this case, the dynamic endogeneity can be solved
through employing a panel GMM estimation, as discussed in Section 4.4.2. However,
a bank holding company that is exposed to higher risk may choose to disclose more
information to reduce the uncertainty and change investor’s assessment on its risk.
In other words, the bank holding company’s risk culture can jointly determine both
the choice of risk and the level of disclosure. Otherwise, an institution can optimally
choose the level of disclosure given the level of risk it undertakes, i.e. the causality
can be reversed.
One possible solution to assess whether the relation between high levels of dis-
closure and lower market implied default probabilities for these firms is actually a
result of a change in the level of disclosures, rather than the changes that the firm
is experiencing, is adopting a diff-in-diff estimation methodology. The other solution
is to find a relevant instrument for the level of disclosure and employ a fixed-effects
instrumental variables estimation (two-stage least squares).
However, finding strong instruments is a challenge and with weak instruments,
the fixed-effects IV estimators are likely to be biased as well. Moreover, to employ a
diff-in-diff methodology, I need a natural experiment or policy change that “treats”
only a particular subsample of the bank holding companies in my sample. In other
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words, adopting both of the aforementioned solutions are not straightforward and
hence, left as further work.
Another possible route to take as a further analysis of this chapter is to employ a
cross country analysis to examine the differences in the level of disclosure, and whether
there is a link between the transparency and the soundness of the overall banking






Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 present samples of the order data, trade data and limit
order book data for one of the stocks in our sample for July 1, 2008, respectively.
Table A.1 provides the identity number of an order (OrderID), the number of shares
submitted (Volume), the corresponding limit price in Turkish Lira (Price), and time
(Time). In addition, order data includes identifiers showing whether an order is
valid for one session or for the whole day (TIF), whether the order is submitted
by an individual or an institutional client (TraderType), whether the order is an
immediate or cancel order (KTR) order, and finally the identity number of the split
order (SplitID).
Table A.2 reports the transaction time (Time), the traded price in Turkish Lira
(Price), and the number of shares traded (Volume). The identity numbers of buy and
sell orders for a given trade are also presented (BuyerID and SellerID, respectively).
Finally, Table A.3 presents the best bid and ask prices (B1 and A1, respectively),
the inside spread A1−B1 (SPR), and the number of shares waiting at the best bid
and ask prices (VB1 and VA1). Prices and number of shares beyond the best quotes





Table A.1: Order Data
Table reports a sample of the order data for Akbank (AKBNK) for July 1, 2008. OrderID is the identity number of the submitted order assigned by the
Exchange, Volume is the number of shares to be bought or sold, Price is the limit price (in Turkish Lira), TIF is Time-in-force (0 if the order is valid for one
session, 1 if it is valid for the whole day), Time is the order submission time, TraderType takes value IND or INS if the order is submitted by an individual
client or an institutional client, respectively. KTR takes value E if an order is an immediate or cancel order. Finally SplitID is the ID number of the order
which is split into several orders.
OrderID Ticker OrderType Volume Price TIF Time TraderType KTR SplitID
107200800181205 AKBNK Buy 50000 4.02 0 15:30:35 IND
107200800181222 AKBNK Buy 25000 4.02 1 15:30:37 IND
107200800181254 AKBNK Buy 527 4.02 0 15:30:39 IND
107200800181275 AKBNK Sell Modification 24425 4.04 0 15:30:40 INS E
107200800181304 AKBNK Sell 10000 4.04 0 15:30:41 IND
107200800181309 AKBNK Sell 1000 4.04 0 15:30:42 IND
107200800181363 AKBNK Buy 50 4.04 0 15:30:47 IND
107200800165524 AKBNK Buy Modification 5 4.02 0 15:30:50 IND E
107200800181427 AKBNK Buy 1 4.08 0 15:30:53 IND
107200800181431 AKBNK Sell Modification 5000 4.04 0 15:30:53 IND
107200800181452 AKBNK Buy 1000 4.04 0 15:30:55 IND
107200800181479 AKBNK Buy 100 4.02 0 15:30:57 IND
107200800173629 AKBNK Short Sell 5000 4.04 0 15:31:00 IND
107200800181717 AKBNK Sell 100 4.04 0 15:31:27 IND
107200800181844 AKBNK Buy 100 3.94 1 15:31:40 IND
107200800181888 AKBNK Buy 5000 4 0 15:31:44 INS
107200800182186 AKBNK Sell 15000 4.02 0 15:32:23 IND
107200800182191 AKBNK Buy 1 4.08 0 15:32:24 IND
107200800182195 AKBNK Sell 25000 4.02 1 15:32:25 IND
107200800181304 AKBNK Short Sell 10000 4.02 0 15:32:26 IND
107200800173629 AKBNK Short Sell 5000 4.02 0 15:32:28 IND
107200800182223 AKBNK Buy 500 4 0 15:32:28 IND
107200800182230 AKBNK Sell 700 4.02 0 15:32:40 IND
107200800182346 AKBNK Buy 100 4.02 1 15:32:40 IND
107200800178541 AKBNK Buy Modification 2000 4.02 0 15:32:47 IND




Table A.2: Trade Data
The table reports a sample of the trade data for Akbank (AKBNK) for July 1, 2008. Time is the transaction time, Price is the traded price (in Turkish Lira)
and Volume gives the number of orders traded. BuyerID and SellerID are the identity numbers of the matching buy and sell orders for a given trade.
Ticker Time Price Volume BuyerID SellerID
AKBNK 15:30:35 4.02 11501 107200800181205 107200800181191
AKBNK 15:30:47 4.04 50 107200800181363 107200800173428
AKBNK 15:30:53 4.04 1 107200800181427 107200800173428
AKBNK 15:30:55 4.04 1000 107200800181452 107200800173428
AKBNK 15:32:23 4.02 15000 107200800181205 107200800182186
AKBNK 15:32:24 4.04 1 107200800182191 107200800173428
AKBNK 15:32:25 4.02 23499 107200800181205 107200800182195
AKBNK 15:32:25 4.02 1501 107200800181222 107200800182195
AKBNK 15:32:26 4.02 10000 107200800181222 107200800181304
AKBNK 15:32:28 4.02 5000 107200800181222 107200800173629
AKBNK 15:32:29 4.02 700 107200800181222 107200800182230
AKBNK 15:33:01 4.04 1 107200800182498 107200800173428
AKBNK 15:33:25 4.02 7799 107200800181222 107200800182673
AKBNK 15:33:25 4.02 527 107200800181254 107200800182673
AKBNK 15:33:25 4.02 5 107200800165524 107200800182673
AKBNK 15:33:25 4.02 100 107200800181479 107200800182673
AKBNK 15:33:25 4.02 100 107200800182346 107200800182673
AKBNK 15:33:25 4.02 2000 107200800178541 107200800182673
AKBNK 15:33:25 4.02 1000 107200800182428 107200800182673
AKBNK 15:33:25 4.02 5000 107200800181888 107200800182673
AKBNK 15:33:58 4 10 107200800163849 107200800182976
AKBNK 15:34:09 4.02 15469 107200800183084 107200800182678
AKBNK 15:34:09 4.02 965 107200800183084 107200800161924
AKBNK 15:34:09 4.02 50000 107200800183084 107200800182805
AKBNK 15:34:09 4.02 10000 107200800183084 107200800117710




Table A.3: Limit Order Book Data
The table reports a sample of the limit order book data for Akbank (AKBNK) for July 1, 2008. B1 and A1 are the best bid and ask prices respectively,
whereas SPR is the inside spread calculated as A1−B1. VB1 and VA1 give the number of shares waiting at the best bid and ask prices, respectively. Similarly,
B2 (B10) and A2 (A10) are the second (tenth) best prices and VB2 (VB10) and VA2 (VA10) are the corresponding number of shares.
Time B1 A1 SPR VB1 VA1 B2 A2 VB2 VA2 . B10 A10 VB10 VA10
15:30:35 4.00 4.02 0.02 112816 11501 3.98 4.04 215352 51426 . 3.82 4.2 25154 66670
15:30:37 4.02 4.04 0.02 38499 51426 4 4.06 112816 160316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:30:39 4.02 4.04 0.02 63499 51426 4 4.06 112816 160316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:30:40 4.02 4.04 0.02 64026 51426 4 4.06 112816 160316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:30:41 4.02 4.04 0.02 64026 75851 4 4.06 112816 160316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:30:42 4.02 4.04 0.02 64026 85851 4 4.06 112816 160316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:30:47 4.02 4.04 0.02 64026 86851 4 4.06 112816 160316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:30:50 4.02 4.04 0.02 64026 86801 4 4.06 112816 160316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:30:53 4.02 4.04 0.02 64031 86801 4 4.06 112811 160316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:30:53 4.02 4.04 0.02 64031 86801 4 4.06 112811 160316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:30:55 4.02 4.04 0.02 64031 91800 4 4.06 112811 160316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:30:57 4.02 4.04 0.02 64031 90800 4 4.06 112811 160316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:31:00 4.02 4.04 0.02 64131 90800 4 4.06 112811 160316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:31:27 4.02 4.04 0.02 64131 95800 4 4.06 112811 155316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:31:40 4.02 4.04 0.02 64131 95900 4 4.06 112811 155316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:31:44 4.02 4.04 0.02 64131 95900 4 4.06 112811 155316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:32:23 4.02 4.04 0.02 64131 95900 4 4.06 117811 155316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:32:24 4.02 4.04 0.02 49131 95900 4 4.06 117811 155316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:32:25 4.02 4.04 0.02 49131 95899 4 4.06 117811 155316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:32:26 4.02 4.04 0.02 24131 95899 4 4.06 117811 155316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:32:28 4.02 4.04 0.02 14131 85899 4 4.06 117811 155316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:32:28 4.02 4.04 0.02 14131 85899 4 4.06 117811 155316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:32:40 4.02 4.04 0.02 9131 80899 4 4.06 118311 155316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:32:40 4.02 4.04 0.02 8431 80899 4 4.06 118311 155316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:32:47 4.02 4.04 0.02 8531 80899 4 4.06 118311 155316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:32:52 4.02 4.04 0.02 10531 80899 4 4.06 116311 155316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
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A.2 Calculation of Global Depth
Suppose that the limit order book for stock X at 11:00am is as follows:
Order type Volume Limit price Time Best Bid Best Ask
Sell 50000 8.3 09:30:00 - 8.2
Buy 10000 7.9 09:30:01 7.9 8.2




Sell 3334 8.05 10:58:17 8 8.05
Buy 25000 8 10:58:20 8 8.05
Buy 50000 8 10:58:38 8 8.05
Sell 1 8.1 10:58:50 8 8.05
The first step in the calculation of global depth involves the calculation of the
tick-adjusted price distance ∆ of each limit order in the given book relative to the
best extant limit price:
∆buyi,τ = (p
B
τ − pbuyi )/tick,
∆selli,τ = (p
sell
i − pAτ )/tick,
where pBτ (pAτ ) is the best bid (ask) price in interval τ and p
buy
i (pselli ) is the limit price
of the ith order.
Say the tick size is 0.05. Then we have the following price distances for the orders:
Order type Volume Limit Price Time Best Bid Best Ask ∆
Sell 50000 8.3 09:30:00 - 8.2 5
Buy 10000 7.9 09:30:01 7.9 8.2 2




Sell 3334 8.05 10:58:17 8 8.05 0
Buy 25000 8 10:58:20 8 8.05 0
Buy 50000 8 10:58:38 8 8.05 0
Sell 1 8.1 10:58:50 8 8.05 1
Next, we obtain of the percentage of total volume supplied/demanded at a given
∆ for ∆ = 0, 1, 2, .., 30. This way, we reach the limit order book probability density
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function (LOB–PDF). By integrating the LOB–PDF of the each side of the market
over the ranges of ∆, i.e., by calculating the cumulative frequencies, we obtain the
limit order book cumulative distribution function (LOB–CDF). That is:
Buy side Sell side
∆ Total Volume Frequency Cum. Frequency Total Volume Frequency Cum. Frequency
0 78500 0.270 0.270 68400 0.186 0.186
1 52575 0.181 0.450 71602 0.194 0.380
2 58440 0.201 0.651 54588 0.148 0.528




29 0 0.000 1.000 0 0.000 1.000
30 0 0.000 1.000 0 0.000 1.000
Global depth for each stock is the weighted average of the LOB–CDF, where
the weight function is given in Equation (2.2). For the estimated decay parameter
λ̂ = 0.366, we have the following weights and the resulting global depth (GD):
Buy side Sell side
∆ weights (λ = λ̂) Cum. Freq. weight*cum.freq GD Cum. Freq. weight*cum.freq GD
0 0.307 0.270 0.083 0.186 0.057
1 0.213 0.450 0.096 0.380 0.081
2 0.147 0.651 0.096 0.528 0.078




29 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
30 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.576 1.000 0.485
Finally, the aggregated global depth for a given interval τ is calculated as the
cross-sectional average of the individual stock global depth measures.
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A.3 Global Depth vs. “Local” Depth
By definition, global depth is related to the standard “local” depth measures,
i.e., the quoted depth up to a given threshold. To investigate their relationship, we
estimate the following regressions for buy and sell sides of the market separately:
GD(∆, λ)s,τ = b0,s + b1,sDEPTHs,τ + s,τ .
For a given limit order book at time τ and for each stock s, DEPTH denotes the
“local” depth measure calculated at different thresholds. First, we calculate the vol-
ume available at the best quotes, DEPTH0. Second, to capture the volume available
beyond the best quotes, we calculate the cumulative volume of orders up to the three
best quotes, DEPTH03, and five best quotes, DEPTH05.1 We evaluate global depth
given in (2.1) and (2.2) at three exogenously given decaying factors, λ = 0, 0.5 and
1. Hence, we first assign equal weights for each of the quotes, then we allow for
exponential decaying weights with a lower and higher decay factors.
The table below presents the results. To conserve space, only the analysis for the
buy side of the market is reported. Results for the sell side are qualitatively similar.
The main conclusion from this analysis is that, irrespective of the chosen decay factor,
the local depth at the best quotes is strongly and positively related to our summary
measure, global depth. As expected, the explanatory power of DEPTH0 over global
depth is increasing with the decay factor; a higher λ makes global depth more closely
related to the depth at the best quotes. However, as the results suggest, even when
λ = 1, DEPTH0 can explain only 42% (33%) of the variation in global depth for
the buy (sell) side. The explanatory power of the depth variables over global depth
increases up to 59% when we include all of the depth variables.
From this analysis, we conclude that although they are positively and significantly
correlated, there is a non-trivial proportion of the variation of global depth that cannot
1As an additional robustness, we employ different depth variables measured not only at the first
three or five quotes, but also at different thresholds. The results are qualitatively similar.
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be explained by the standard depth measures. This analysis suggests that our variable
provides different information than that of the standard depth measures.
Table A.4: Global Depth and “Local” Depth Variables
PANEL A GD(λ = 0)buyτ






constant 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
[100/100] [100/100] [100/100] [100/100] [100/100]
adj. R2 26.28 28.86 22.99 31.99 29.37
PANEL B GD(λ = 0.5)buyτ






constant 0.34 0.39 0.42 0.38 0.41
[100/100] [100/100] [100/100] [100/100] [100/100]
adj. R2 39.74 14.16 6.23 41.01 45.61
PANEL C GD(λ = 1)buyτ






constant 0.21 0.26 0.30 0.27 0.28
[100/100] [100/100] [100/100] [100/100] [100/100]




This appendix consists of two tables related to Chapter 3, Competition, Signaling
and Non-Walking Through the Book: Effects on Order Choice. Table B.1 presents
the definitions of the key variables used throughout the analysis in the chapter. Table
B.2 on the other hand, summarizes our main findings, expressed qualitatively. For
each finding, we as well include a pointer to the supporting empirical evidence (the
corresponding table), a pointer to similar results in the empirical/theoretical literature





Table B.1: Definitions of Explanatory Variables
The table presents the description of the independent variables used in the two-stage sequential ordered probit model.
Regressors Definition
Covariates for the depth at and beyond the best quotes
Vcomp The total volume of orders at the best quote in the first stage and second stage–MO and
the accumulated volume of orders up to the second best quotes in the second stage–LO for the same side of the book.
Vcompopp The total volume of orders at the best quote in the first stage and
the accumulated volume of orders up to the second best quotes in the second stage–LO for the opposite side of the book.
Vsignal The accumulated volume of orders from the second up to the tenth best quotes in the first stage and second stage–MO and
the accumulated volume of orders from the third up to the tenth best quotes in the second stage–LO for the same side of the book.
Vsignalopp The accumulated volume of orders from the second up to the tenth best quotes in the first stage and second stage–MO and
the accumulated volume of orders from the third up to the tenth best quotes in the second stage–LO for the opposite side of the book.
Covariates for walking through the book
SPR The (tick size adjusted) difference between the best ask and bid quotes.
Dsame1_2 The price distance between the best and the second best quotes for the same side of the book.
Dsame2_max The price distance between the second best ask (bid) and the highest available ask (lowest available bid) quote
for the same side of the book.
Dopp1_2 The price distance between the best and the second best quotes for the opposite side of the book.
Dopp2_max The price distance between the second best ask (bid) and the highest available ask (lowest available bid) quote
for the opposite side of the book.
Additional variables
Vola The exponential moving average of the last 60 mid-quote squared returns.




Table B.2: Summary of the Main Findings
This table presents the summary of our main findings along with the corresponding table. All the variables are defined in Table B.1.
Regressors Main Findings Table Consistent with Inconsistent with
Covariates for the depth at and beyond the best quotes
Vcomp Encourages market orders. 3.4 Parlour (1998), Ranaldo (2004),
Beber and Caglio (2005),
Pascual and Veredas (2009)
It persists beyond the best quotes and 3.3
it is the strongest up to the 2nd best quote.
Vcompopp Discourages market orders. 3.4 Parlour (1998), Ranaldo (2004),
Pascual and Veredas (2009)
Vsign (weakly) discourages market orders. 3.4 Goettler et al. (2005), Pascual and Veredas (2009)
and Goettler et al. (2009)
Discourages the limit order aggressiveness. 3.5 Goettler et al. (2005),
Goettler et al. (2009),
and Pascual and Veredas (2009)
Vcomp/ The competition effect is stronger 3.4, 3.5, 3.6





Table B.2: Summary of the Main Findings (cont.)
Regressors Main Findings Table Consistent with Inconsistent with
Covariates for walking through the book
SPR Discourages MOs. 3.4 Ranaldo (2004),
Beber and Caglio (2005),
Ellul, Holden, Jain,
and Jennings (2007)
Cao et al. (2008),
and Pascual and Veredas (2009)
Encourages aggressive LOs. 3.5 Ellul, Holden, Jain,
and Jennings (2007)
and Pascual and Veredas (2009)
No significant effect on the market order 3.6 Pascual and Veredas (2009)
aggressiveness.
Dopp1_2/ No significant effect on MOs. 3.4 Cao et al. (2008) Pascual and Veredas (2009)
Dopp2_max No significant effect on the market 3.6 Pascual and Veredas (2009)
order aggressiveness.
Additional variables
Vola Discourages MOs. 3.4 Foucault (1999),
Ahn et al. (2001),
Ranaldo (2004),
Beber and Caglio (2005),
Encourages aggressive MOs. 3.6 Hall and Hautsch (2006) Ranaldo (2004)
Trend Discourages (encourages) buy (sell) MOs. 3.4 Beber and Caglio (2005),
Cao et al. (2008)
Encourages (discourages) aggressive buy (sell) LOs. 3.5




In this appendix, we first list and define the key variables used in Chapter 3,
Disclosure Practices and Option Implied Probability of Default. The expressions
within the parentheses denote the corresponding variable names in the FR Y-9C
reports from Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Then in Table C.1 we present the
sample of bank holding companies (BHCs) with the corresponding identifiers. In the
first three columns, the name of the bank holding company, its total asset size as
of December 2007 in billion U.S. dollars, the state where the company is registered,
RSSID, and PERMNO are presented. The last column presents time span of the
BHC in panel data. Finally, Table C.2 presents a sample of option data used to
estimate implied probability of default (IPoD) J.P. Morgan for one of the stocks in
our sample, for a given trading day. The first two columns give the option trading
date (Date) and the expiry date of the option (Exdate). The trading price (Price)
calculated as the average of closing bid and ask prices, K is the strike price (note
that the first line with the strike price 0 corresponds to the stock price), Rf is the
risk free rate corresponding the trading date, T is time to expiry in days, Volume is
the trading volume, and Open Int. is the open interest of the option. Finally, w1 and
w2 correspond to weights calculated using the trading volumes and open interests of
the option, respectively as introduced in (4.12).
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Variable Descriptions
• DSCORE: Total disclosure score. It is calculated as the first principal com-
ponent of the four main groups: liquidity risk, group structure, intra-annual
information and spillover risk.
• IPoD: Option implied probability of default. Implied probability of default
of a given bank is extracted from equity option prices using the methodology
proposed by Capuano (2008) and introduced in Section 4.2.3.
Risk Measures:
• AGG: Aggregate risk, calculated as the standard deviation of a bank’s weekly
equity returns.
• DOWN: Downside risk. It is average implied volatility estimated from options
written on a bank’s stock.
• BETA: The estimated beta of a bank from regressions of bank weekly equity
returns on the weekly returns of CRSP value-weighted index.
• IDIO: Idiosyncratic risk, calculated as the standard deviation of the weekly
residuals of the CAPM model.
Bank holding company characteristics:
• SIZE: Natural logarithm of the BHC’s total market value at the end of the
year.
• VOLA: Volatility calculated from the weekly bid and ask prices of the bank’s
stock as defined in Equation (4.14).
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• CAPBUF: Capital buffer of a BHC at the end of the year. Calculated as the
bank’s equity capital as a proportion of its total liabilities (BHCK3210/BHCK2948).
• NPL: The non-performing loans ratio. It is calculated as the ratio of the
sum of loans past due 90 days or more (BHCK5525) and non-accrual loans
(BHCK5526) to total assets (BHCK2170).
• ROE: Return on equity, calculated as the ratio of the income before extraordi-
nary items (BHCK4300) to total book equity (BHCK3210).




Table C.1: List of Bank Holding Companies
This table lists the sample of bank holding companies (BHCs) we included in the analysis with the
corresponding identifiers.
NAME 2007 TA STATE RSSID PERMNO SAMPLE
($bn)
AMCORE FNCL 5.20 IL 1208661 10304 1998–2009
ASSOCIATED BANC CORP 21.59 WI 1199563 15318 1998–2011
BANCORPSOUTH 13.20 MS 1097614 85789 1998–2011
BANK OF AMER CORP 1720.69 NC 1073757 58827/ 1998–2011
59408
BANK OF HI CORP 10.47 HI 1025309 16548 1998–2011
BANK OF NY MELLON CORP 197.84 NY 3587146 49656 2002–2011
BB&T CORP 132.62 NC 1074156 71563 1998–2011
BOK FC 20.90 OK 1883693 76892 1998–2011
BOSTON PRIVATE FNCL HOLD 6.83 MA 1248078 80223 1998–2011
CAPITAL ONE FC 150.59 VA 2277860 81055 1998–2011
CATHAY GEN BC 10.40 CA 1843080 76504 1998–2011
CENTRAL PACIFIC FC 5.68 HI 1022764 11628 1998–2011
CITIGROUP 2187.63 NY 1951350 70519 1998–2011
CITIZENS REPUBLIC BC 13.52 MI 1205688 86685 1998–2011
CITY NAT CORP 15.89 CA 1027518 23916 1998–2011
COLONIAL BANCGROUP 25.97 AL 1080465 24628 1998–2008
COMERICA 62.76 TX 1199844 25081 1998–2011
COMMERCE BC LLC 49.37 NJ 1117679 86845 1998–2007
COMMERCE BSHRS 16.21 MO 1049341 25129 1998–2011
CORUS BSHRS 8.93 IL 1200393 67046 1998–2008
CULLEN/FROST BKR 13.65 TX 1102367 27888 1998–2011
CVB FC 6.29 CA 1029222 20395 1998–2011
EAST W BC 11.85 CA 2734233 86719 1998–2011
FIFTH THIRD BC 110.96 OH 1070345 34746 1998–2011
FIRST BC 17.19 PR 2744894 11018 1998–2011
FIRST CITIZENS BSHRS 16.23 NC 1075612 10777 1998–2011
FIRST COMMONWEALTH FNCL 5.89 PA 1071306 77643 1998–2011
FIRST HORIZON NAT CORP 37.02 TN 1094640 36397 1998–2011
FIRST MIDWEST BC 8.10 IL 1208184 35917 1998–2011
FIRSTMERIT CORP 10.41 OH 1070804 35167 1998–2011
FNB CORP 6.09 PA 3005332 10629 1998–2011
FRANKLIN RESOURCES 9.63 CA 1246216 37584 1998–2011
FULTON FNCL CORP 15.92 PA 1117129 88197 1998–2011
HANCOCK HC 6.10 MS 1086533 76684 1998–2011
HUNTINGTON BSHRS 54.63 OH 1068191 42906 1998–2011
INTERNATIONAL BSHRS CORP 11.17 TX 1104231 85875 1998–2011
IRWIN FC 6.17 IN 1199732 89237 1998–2008
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO 1562.15 NY 1039502 47896 2000–2011
KEYCORP 99.57 OH 1068025 64995 1998–2011
M&T BK CORP 64.88 NY 1037003 35554 1998–2011
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Table C.1: List of BHCs in the sample (cont.)
NAME 2007 TA STATE RSSID PERMNO SAMPLE
($bn)
MB FNCL 7.83 IL 1090987 81541 1998–2011
NATIONAL CITY CORP 150.38 OH 1069125 56232 1998–2007
NATIONAL PENN BSHRS 5.82 PA 1117026 56611 1998–2011
NBT BC 5.20 NY 1139279 77415 1998–2011
NEW YORK CMNTY BC 30.60 NY 2132932 79859 1998–2011
NEWALLIANCE BANCSHARES 8.23 CT 3214095 90132 2003–2011
NORTHERN TR CORP 67.61 IL 1199611 58246 1998–2011
OLD NAT BC 7.85 IN 1098303 12068 1998–2011
PACIFIC CAP BC 7.39 CA 1029884 83551 1998–2011
PACWEST BC 5.19 CA 2875332 88343 2000–2011
PARK NAT CORP 6.50 OH 1142336 76266 1998–2011
PNC FNCL SVC GROUP 138.98 PA 1069778 60442 1998–2011
POPULAR 44.41 PR 1129382 16505 1998–2011
PROSPERITY BSHRS 6.38 TX 1109599 86432 1998–2011
PROVIDENT BSHRS CORP 6.47 MD 1247633 11823 1998–2008
PROVIDENT FNCL SVC 6.36 NJ 3133637 89653 2002–2011
REGIONS FC 141.04 AL 3242838 35044 2004–2011
SANTANDER BC 9.15 PR 2847115 86398 2000–2009
SOUTH FNCL GROUP 13.87 SC 1141599 10825 1998–2009
STATE STREET CORP 142.94 MA 1111435 72726 1998–2011
STERLING FC 12.15 WA 3152245 11056 1998–2011
SUNTRUST BK 179.57 GA 1131787 68144 1998–2011
SUSQUEHANNA BSHRS 13.08 PA 1117156 73809 1998–2011
SVB FNCL GRP 6.45 CA 1031449 11786 1998–2011
SYNOVUS FC 33.02 GA 1078846 20053 1998–2011
TCF FC 16.07 MN 2389941 10375 1998–2011
TRUSTMARK CORP 8.97 MS 1079562 35263 1998–2011
U S BC 237.62 MN 1119794 66157 1998–2011
UCBH HOLD 11.80 CA 2694814 86437 1998–2008
UMB FC 9.34 MO 1049828 78829 1998–2011
UMPQUA HC 8.35 OR 2747644 86004 1999–2011
UNIONBANCAL CORP 55.73 CA 1378434 20694 1998–2011
UNITED BSHRS 7.99 WV 1076217 11369 1998–2011
UNITED CMNTY BK 8.21 GA 1249347 89323 1998–2011
VALLEY NAT BC 12.75 NJ 1048773 80072 1998–2011
W HOLD CO 17.93 PR 2801546 93105 1999–2008
WACHOVIA CORP 782.90 NC 1073551 36469 1998–2007
WEBSTER FNCL CORP 17.21 CT 1145476 10932 1998–2011
WELLS FARGO & CO 575.44 CA 1120754 38703 1998–2011
WESBANCO 5.38 WV 1070448 11293 1998–2011
WESTERN ALLI BC 5.02 AZ 2349815 90776 2005–2011
WHITNEY HC 11.03 LA 1079740 77053 1998–2011
WILMINGTON TR CORP 11.62 DE 1888193 83030 1998–2011
WINTRUST FC 9.37 IL 2260406 84636 1998–2011
ZIONS BC 52.95 UT 1027004 84129 1998–2011
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Table C.2: Sample of Option Data Used to Estimate IPoD
Table presents a sample of option data used to estimate implied probability of default (IPoD) for
one of the stocks in our sample, J.P. Morgan. Date is the option trading date, Exdate is the expiry
date of the option, Price is the trading price calculated as the average of closing bid and ask prices,
K is the strike price (note that the first line with the strike price 0 corresponds to the stock price),
Rf is the risk free rate corresponding the trading date, T is time to expiry in days, Volume is the
trading volume, and Open Int. is the open interest of the option. Finally, w1 and w2 correspond
to weights calculated using the trading volumes and open interests of the option, respectively as
introduced in Equation (4.12).
Date Exdate Price K Rf T Volume Open Int. w1 w2
20101215 20110618 40.21 0 0.001 185 1.000 1.000
20101215 20110618 21.325 20 0.001 185 0 0 0.000 0.000
20101215 20110618 18.925 22.5 0.001 185 0 1 0.000 0.000
20101215 20110618 15.45 25 0.001 185 50 61 0.049 0.001
20101215 20110618 10.85 30 0.001 185 0 701 0.000 0.008
20101215 20110618 8.725 32.5 0.001 185 20 274 0.020 0.003
20101215 20110618 7.55 34 0.001 185 69 137 0.067 0.002
20101215 20110618 6.75 35 0.001 185 15 279 0.015 0.003
20101215 20110618 6.05 36 0.001 185 4 224 0.004 0.002
20101215 20110618 5.375 37 0.001 185 12 884 0.012 0.010
20101215 20110618 4.7 38 0.001 185 21 5420 0.021 0.060
20101215 20110618 4.1 39 0.001 185 2 1239 0.002 0.014
20101215 20110618 3.55 40 0.001 185 249 12211 0.243 0.135
20101215 20110618 3.05 41 0.001 185 54 1256 0.053 0.014
20101215 20110618 2.595 42 0.001 185 2 6441 0.002 0.071
20101215 20110618 2.185 43 0.001 185 29 894 0.028 0.010
20101215 20110618 1.825 44 0.001 185 61 1137 0.060 0.013
20101215 20110618 1.505 45 0.001 185 160 24056 0.156 0.267
20101215 20110618 1.24 46 0.001 185 183 148 0.179 0.002
20101215 20110618 0.52 50 0.001 185 22 24111 0.022 0.267
20101215 20110618 0.16 55 0.001 185 70 10772 0.068 0.119
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